The present study examined the neural substrate of two classes of quantifiers: numerical quantifiers like ” at least three” which require magnitude processing, and logical quantifiers like ” some” which can be understood using a simple form of perceptual logic. We assessed these distinct classes of quantifiers with converging observations from two sources: functional imaging data from healthy adults, and behavioral and structural data from patients with corticobasal degeneration who have acalculia. Our findings are consistent with the claim that numerical (...) quantifier comprehension depends on a lateral parietal-dorsolateral prefrontal network, but logical quantifier comprehension depends instead on a rostral medial prefrontal-posterior cingulate network. These observations emphasize the important contribution of abstract number knowledge to the meaning of numerical quantifiers in semantic memory and the potential role of a logic-based evaluation in the service of non-numerical quantifiers. (shrink)

We describe how finite colimits can be described using the internal lanuage, also known as the Mitchell-Benabou language, of a topos, provided the topos admits countably infinite colimits. This description is based on the set theoretic definitions of colimits and coequalisers, however the translation is not direct due to the differences between set theory and the internal language, these differences are described as internal versus external. Solutions to the hurdles which thus arise are given.

Szymanik (2007) suggested that the distinction between first-order and higher-order quantifiers does not coincide with the computational resources required to compute the meaning of quantifiers. Cognitive difficulty of quantifier processing might be better assessed on the basis of complexity of the minimal corresponding automata. For example, both logical and numerical quantifiers are first-order. However, computational devices recognizing logical quantifiers have a fixed number of states while the number of states in automata corresponding to numerical quantifiers grows with the rank of (...) the quantifier. This observation partially explains the differences in processing between those two types of quantifiers (Troiani et al. 2009) and links them to the computational model. Taking this perspective, below, we suggest the experimental setting extending the one by McMillan et al. (2005) and Troiani et al. (2009). (shrink)

Let us call the deliberate modification of an individual’s genome to improve it or its progeny intentional genetic enhancement. Governments are almost certain to require that any proposed intentional genetic enhancement of a human (IGEH) be tested first on (what researchers call) animal “models.” Intentional genetic enhancement of animals (IGEA), then, is an ambiguous concept because it could mean one of two very different things: an enhancement made for the sake of the animal’s own welfare, or an enhancement made (...) for the sake of satisfying a human desire. In either case, experimental procedures are likely to entail substantial risks to the experimental animals. What rules should govern IGEA? I criticize the abolitionist conclusions of animal rightists—that no IGEA should be permitted—and I criticize the permissive conclusions of speciesists—that all IGEA should be permitted. Both views are unsatisfying. I suggest instead that current animal welfare law provides a defensible platform on which to begin building ethically justifiable policy in this area. (shrink)

The first sentence of the Annals reads urbem Romam a principio reges habuere. Commentators observe the echo of Sallust, Catiline 6.1 urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, and of Claudius, ILS 212 quondam reges hanc tenuere urbem. In a stimulating recent contribution David Levene also compares the first sentence of Justinus' Epitome of the Histories of Pompeius Trogus: principio rerum gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat. A fourth potential model may now be taken into consideration: (...) Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχρῶντο βασιλɛίαι. (shrink)

Students of the Orestes are fortunate to have two excellent commentaries at their disposal, by C. W. Willink and M. L. West . Neither will help them to understand this line, which is ‘the only allusion to Ganymede's horsemanship’ , because ‘no story of riding by Ganymede is known’ . But we are repeatedly reminded that the scene with the Phrygian has far fewer affinities with tragedy than with comedy, and εριπιδαριστοφαíζεται Comedy provides the clue, specifically at Ar. Vesp. 50If. (...) and Lys. 676ff. The reference is to the variety of equestrianism for which Ganymede is far from unknown . For Innoavvr) here describes a σχμα ρωτικóν and the line means Ganymedes concubinus, Iovis supini inguini insidens et equitans, sc. inter causas fuit malorum propter Iunonis invidiam Troianis immissorum. (shrink)