Philosophy of science as a scholarly discipline exists today side by side with other disciplines within an interdisciplinary framework of the history and philosophy of science or science and technology studies. The rationale for this “joint venture” is commonly seen in the division of labor. The history of science focuses on the rise and development of scientific theories in the past; the sociology of science deals with science as a social institution; the psychology of science investigates the mechanisms of creativity (...) and one’s personal impact upon scientific discoveries; and finally, the philosophy of science is responsible for the logical and methodological analysis of the structure and growth of the scientific knowledge, mostly within the context of justification. This allegedly fruitful division of labor presumes an independent existence of social, personal and cognitive domains, and the desired interdisciplinary communication between the correspondent disciplines aims to account for the complementary understanding of science. But in fact no sufficient exchange of meanings takes place for every discipline insists upon its independence and prior significance. Under these conditions, neither a consistent picture of science appears to be possible nor might science policy be construed and justified basing on this disintegrated conglomerate of knowledge. A way out of the situation is as follows: to acknowledge non-independent character of the philosophy of science; to learn more from social philosophy; to revisit the epistemological status of the natural sciences as the only cognitive ideal; to focus on the social and the human sciences in search of a new methodological experience; to cease considering concrete case studies as a new version of the “neutral language of observation”, which gives a “crucial justification” of a theory, and to view new philosophical interpretations a necessary feature of any case study. (shrink)

The article shows that Russian philosophical community is very sensitive towards the history and the current state of philosophy of science and of science studies, which are a subject matter of special interest by virtue of a dedicated space in the university education system. This status is also supported by its proximity to the international philosophical mainstream of the 20th century and its specific object, its connection with science. Philosophy of science at the same time retains some neutrality in relation (...) to the dominant political ideology and proposes claims for an objective knowledge. History of philosophy of science, therefore, serves largely as a history of philosophical rationalism, and its prospects are determined by the strengthening of the role of science in modern culture. However, the modern existence of philosophy of science is undergoing substantial change and experiences a series of challenges. Among them there are the humiliation of intellectuals and scientists in society political voluntarism, mass consumption and the cult of mysticism. Under these conditions, a philosophical study of science and technology is forced to take on the challenges of social criticism and shape special civil institutions for self-preservation. Thus philosophy of science integrates the political, ethical and even social engineering components that allow for treating it as a hard core of interdisciplinary interaction of all socio-humanitarian disciplines. (shrink)

The article examines the main ideological content of the work of the community of scientists and philosophers, which entered the history of philosophy under the name “The Vienna Circle”. Representatives of this association viewed their main methodological task in the logical analysis of the language of science in order to eliminate metaphysical – pseudoscientific – concepts. They investigated the structure of scientific theories, the functions of the theory – explanation and prediction, the processes of justification, confirmation and refutation of theories. (...) Their results were widely recognized, set down essential influence on scientific problems as well as style of philosophical and academic studies, and are still included in textbooks on the philosophy of science. The members of the Vienna Circle created the first holistic concept of science, which gave impetus to subsequent developments in the philosophy of science and served as example for the construction of similar concepts. The socio-ideological prerequisite of this philosophical movement was the task of creating a new scientific view of the world, opposing philosophical pessimism and anti-scientism. This worldview, however, was not naive-scientististic, but presented a synthetic project at the intersection of natural science, philosophy, art and social pedagogy. (shrink)

The question about epistemic nature of norms is a special case of discussing the non-standard definition of knowledge. Is it possible to expand the understanding of knowledge beyond the proposi­tions expressed by narrative sentence and describing what takes place? Might a moral norm, an aesthetic ideal, a religious symbol be taken as specific types of knowledge? Thesis on the special epistemological status of science, its empirical basis and methods lies in the basis of naturalistic revision of epistemology by Quine. White, (...) on the contrary, considers scientific observations and moral experiences equal means to justify objective and normative content in science as well as in morality and art. With regard to the contemporary expansion of the subject matter of epistemology White is more advantageous, although both sides ultimately do not extend beyond reduction of all cultural phenomena to the facts of individual consciousness. The resolution of the dispute under consideration can be provided by the turn of epistemological reflection to the study of the cognitive content of cultural objectivizations of human activity and communication, to the analysis of specific forms of representation and functions of whatever cognitive phenomena in the social artifacts. On the one hand, this extends the subject-matter of traditional epistemology by involving all the diversity of consciousness and on the other hand, this prepares methodological insights for cultural and reli­gious studies, ethics, aesthetics, and political science. (shrink)

Social epistemology assumes a justification as a realist philosophy in both dealing with cognitive and ontological matters, and providing a profound and refined picture of knowledge and reality. Compared to scientific realism, social epistemology’s advantage consists of grasping the variety of conditions and circumstances influencing the cognitive process. Social epistemology also provides limitations for naturalism in offering a genuine philosophical vision of knowledge and reality. From a social epistemological perspective, extreme forms of defending scientific realism are considered especially relevant as (...) such arguments reveal the ideological ladeness of objectivist argumentation. (shrink)

The philosophical understanding of scientific creativity cannot be limited to the analysis of cognitive abilities or ways of solving problems. It is always anthropologically-laden, based on a historically specific image image of a human being that acquires knowledge. The problem of creativity also articulates a well-known paradox of novelty: the new does not arise from the old, since it is significantly different from it, but it cannot arise from nothing, because then it remains incomprehensible. Paul Feyerabend criticizes such a “mysterianic” (...) concept of scientific creativity, which emphasizes its emergent character, i.e. its suddenness and inexplicability. The distance between subject and object, man and nature, knowledge and reality in this case remains insurmountable. To solve this problem, it is necessary to place creativity in the space between the uniqueness of the creative personality and the mechanisms of social recognition. This, in turn, requires rethinking of the ontological content of creativity, as well as the concept of “labor” with reference to its treatment by Karl Marx’ rethinking of it as the production of not only material goods, but also of the person itself. Moreover, creativity does not just form a person: it is a way of cultivating the entire social space. An unexpected move is provided by an appeal to a new social group – the precariat, which in science gives a lesson in openness to novelty and theoretical freedom. As a result, a deeper understanding of the social base of creativity arises, and a new strategy for the interaction of the scientific community with extra-paradigm groups and marginal individuals is being built. (shrink)

The article explores the contemporary philosophy of science in the context of the idea of eternal return. The problematization of the intellectual field “after postpositivism” runs through the renewed questions “what?”, “how?”, “who?” and “for what?” of scientific research. This questioning is a search for bearings in the historical space and time that determines “after what?” or “back to whom?” the thinking about science unfolds. Such a reflexive appeal to the origins leads to the ideas of the philosophy of science (...) of the first half of the twentieth century. It is then that the main differences within the research of science were formed: between sociological and methodological approaches, between philosophy and disciplines that study science, between the goals of forming a worldview and managing science. The philosophy of science “after postpositivism” expresses itself in the controversial interpretation of the subject matter and method of the study of science, in the division of labor between disciplines and approaches that lose the possibility of constructive interaction and reach the point of “science wars”. In conclusion, it is argued that philosophy as the "hard core” of scientific research, a historical appeal to the origins of scientific activity and the interpretation of the scientific revolution as a renewal of tradition can make such modernity valuable for return. (shrink)

Eine soziale Wissenschaftstheorie schlägt einen Ausweg aus den aktuellen Kontroversen in der Wissenschaftsforschung vor, der erfordert: a) den nicht unabhängigen Charakter der Wissenschaftsphilosophie anzuerkennen; b) den erkenntnistheoretischen Status der Naturwissenschaften als einziges Erkenntnisideal zu überdenken; c) sich auf der Suche nach einer neuen methodischen Erfahrungauf die Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften zu konzentrieren; d) aufzuhören, Fallstudien als Version der ‚neutralen Sprache der Beobachtung‘ oder als ‚entscheidende Rechtfertigung‘ einer Theorie zu betrachten; und e) die Erklärungskraft der lokalen Kontextualisierung mit der Projektion und Konstruktion (...) zukünftiger Wirkungskontexte wissenschaftlicher Ideen zu verbinden. Die Hinwendung zur Sozialität ordnet die Wissenschaftsforschung keiner Doktrin unter; sie ist vielmehr ein ökumenischer Appell zur Maximierung philosophischer Sensibilität und Offenheit. (shrink)

In the article, there proposed an original idea of the collective agent of cognition (CAC) that overcomes the controversy of individualism and collectivism. In the history of philosophy a clear conceptualization of has been offered by I. Kant (the notion of transcendental agent and scheme of imagination). This was interpretedby, among others, G.W.F. Hegel ("Zeitgeist") and K. Marx (the concept of the total and joint labor). A critical analysis of analytic social epistemology (A. Goldman, J. Lackey) helps clarify the tacit (...) presuppositions of the "individual-collective" dualism. In reducing the CAC to the cognizing individual, Lackey fails to interpret adequately the phenomenon of distributed knowledge widely spread in modern science and social practice (F. Hayek, H. Collins). As an alternative to reductionism, the article proposes a typological approach to CAC. It aims to understand its structure as consisting of four main levels (transcendental, imbedded, contract and distributed agent of cognition), each of which being illustrated by a paradigm example. In conclusion, the duality of collective and individual agents of cognition is unmasked as based on the mixture of everyday and philosophical discourses. (shrink)

The article considers the basic arguments of some “critics of epistemology”, according to which the philosophical analysis of the problems associated with the processes of cognition (including science) should be eventually replaced by the study of these problems by means of special cognitive sciences. It is shown that these arguments are in part incorrect and in part can be seen as an indication of the real difficulties in the modern philosophy of cognition. A future philosophical epistemology is associated with the (...) reform of its conceptual apparatus, the methodological arsenal and problem field. An interaction between epistemology and the sciences dealing with cognition is the only and necessary way of development for philosophical epistemology. There are two ways of such interaction. Firstly, there is an analysis of scientific discussions, on the basis of which one identifies new opportunities to overcome the well-known philosophical controversies (between rationalism and empiricism, realism and constructivism, fundamentalism and relativism, etc.). On this way, epistemology moves into a position of horizontal moderation of interdisciplinary discourse and creates a trading (Harry Collins). Secondly, epistemology provides a rational criticism of the foundations of special sciences, and selects semantic levels in the content of its own categories (truth, rationality, agent, object, etc.) referring to different cognitive practices. These practices are evaluated normatively in terms of a value perspective of modern culture. Both ways are complementary to each other. (shrink)

The article offers a socio-historical approach to the problem of creative personality in polemic with the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. Creative activity is considered not as a psychological process or an expression of cognitive abilities, but as a result evaluated by the professional scientific community and even by the entire society. The distinction between the psychological, historical and historical-epistemological interpretation of creativity is discussed. The authors argue that although the proposed approach has an explanatory potential for creativity (...) as a socio-historical phenomenon, it reduces the nature of individual personalities and their role in scientific research to a public response to a new result. The personality of an author is getting vanished in this result, becoming only a label of some social achievement. Using the terminology of J.-P. Sartre, the essence of the author as a unique individual is reduced to his social existence as a scientist. The purpose of this existence is not the fulfillment of a vocation, but the implementation of a professional mission to promote science as a public good, which consists, among other things, in creating a field of intellectual tension. The scientist ensures the objective increase of public awareness of the painful points of history and modernity; critically analyzes global risks from ecology to security; and presents images of a possible and required future. Thus, creative science acts as a source for development through problematization, a factor of cognitive dissonance, a troublemaker, a potential violator of social stability. (shrink)

The author considers some essential problems of philosophical considerations of disciplinary classifications in sciences with the reference to some Russian science classification systems. He de­velops the working definition of science and some criteria which make it possible to understand the principles of these classifi­cations. He also observes some modern Russian approaches to the problem of disciplinary classification (in particular, Bonifatiy M. Kedrov’s approach). The author emphasizes some special as­pects of classifications in cognitive science, computer science, and biology.

ABSTRACTThis article is an introduction to the current thematic issue dedicated to the seminal lecture by Max Weber ‘Science as a vocation’, published in 1919. Its centenary is worth celebrating be...

This article aims at a critical reevaluation of the trading zone concept. It starts from a case study of the Faraday–Whewell collaboration in coming to terms with electrolysis experiments. The case is supposed to be an example of a trade zone of science/philosophy interaction though it demonstrates the unequal nature of the “trade.” This requires the analysis to log in some details concerning Galison’s metaphor of trading zones, which reveals its market-oriented connotations. The following criticism of the market metaphor for (...) science applies a revised version of Boris Hessen’s argument against misinterpretation of technology by some British scientists. A closer look at the ancient trade rituals in Marcel Mauss’ seminal work enables discovering another cultural pattern for describing scientific communication as opposed to trade—gift. This helps picture science as a distribution of social roles and statuses and uncovers the normative and value dimension of gift zones language. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the analysis of new agenda in the philosophy of science and technology that might be dubbed a "political turn". It consists in the problematizing science from the point of its cognitive autonomy; independence from history and culture; ethnic, gender and confession neutrality; disinterest in property and power. There are those concepts emerge like "science economy", "academical capitalism", "techno-science", "pop-science", "science as public good", "fraud science" that reflect the changing social status of science. The main argument (...) confronts modernity and postmodernity, which in Russian tradition takes form of contrasting the classical worldview with the non-classical one. Nowadays science can hardly be studied disregarding its locus within the political system. The means of internal and external science management gain prior significance. All this dramatically transforms the very disciplinary core of science. In the article, the presuppositions and consequences of the political turn are traced and problematized. (shrink)

В книге собраны результаты исследований классической для эпистемологии проблемы истины. Для эпистемологов, методологов науки, а также для философов и ученых.

The article gives a generalized view of the historical epistemology and highlights its main problems: the nature of historical reality, historical knowledge and historical agent. The historical epistemology represents a special philosophical discourse, the purpose of which is constructing historical knowledge for cultural assimilation of the new historical reality at the intersection of science and society. A distinction is proposed between the position of a historian of science and a historical epistemologist in terms of the essence of historical event and (...) historical fact. The historical epistemology reveals its boundaries and a position within modern epistemological approaches. On the one hand, it is the substantialist interpretation of the historical event, which loses its a priori status only by socio-epistemological explanation. On the other hand, a figure of the historical agent (hero and author) keeping the status of a theoretical fiction in historical epistemology, acquires the adequate meaning in the existential philosophy of science. (shrink)

The article tends to clarify the possibilities of philosophical interpretation of migration concept in terms of its meanings in the sciences. The concept of migration appears as an empirical generalization and as a metaphor in different disciplines. In the first case, one dwells upon moving of the real living agents in space, in the second one it deals with the dynamics of quasi-agents (cells, programs, ideas). In order to clarify the conceptual status of migration, the author undertakes its contextualization in (...) the process of anthropogenesis. Hence the archetypical character of migration is displayed as ontological framework of key developments of the emergence of the humans and as catalyst of socio-cultural development in general (E. Cassirer). The paper clarifies the possibility of identifying the structure of migration as a journey and adventure (A.N. Whitehead) in the form of uneven development and recurrence of the original event. The paradox of its legitimation is formulated. Philosopher’s “vnenahodimost” (M.M. Bakhtin), the ambivalence of philosophy (T.I. Oiserman) is the discovery of the philosopher as a stalker between the worlds. (shrink)

This text represents comments to the article by T.D. Sokolova “Conceptualization of scientific progress. A Case of Historical Epistemology”. Her article combines the concepts of differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and the concept of the progress of science interpreted by the historical epistemology of G. Bachelard, on the other, which ultimately is designed to solve the “paradox of interdisciplinarity” and the problem of disciplinary separation of scientific knowledge. The problem posed is highly significant for understanding (...) modern science. At the same time, its formulation can be elaborated and even reformulated, and its premises clarified, since they themselves are the subject of extensive discussions. To do this, it is necessary to revise the widely known definitions of interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity in such a way as to detect the value-worldview content relevant to science as a socio-cultural system that includes the idea of progress. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of the philosophy of interdisciplinarity, set forth in the work of the same name by J.K. Schmidt. The main goal the author sets for himself is to define the inner meaning of the concepts and goals of interdisciplinarity. In accordance with this, the tasks performed by the respective fields of work, divided into intrascientific and extrascientific. The first ones are related to fundamental research, rethinking the forms of scientific knowledge, methodologies, the relationship between man (...) and nature. The latter, embedded in social reality, are related to analysis of the problems of technoscience, knowledge production and science policy. Prof. Schmidt considers two approaches to interdisciplinarity: instrumental or strategic and critical-reflexive or communicative. The first of them is presented as a limited tool for solving actual problems of interdisciplinarity due to its proximity to soluchionism and its predominant focus on organizational and managerial problems of science. The critical-reflexive approach is, on the contrary, associated with a fundamental rethinking of the concept of knowledge. Interdisciplinarity is characteristic of the field of scientific research, while transdisciplinarity and its particular forms – object- and problem-oriented approaches – are associated with solving problems of the real world. The author conducts a comprehensive analysis of the problem of interdisciplinarity, analyzing the historical roots of technoscientific issues, assesses the current state of science, and proposes a paradigmatic ProTA program related to the realization of the predictive potential of the critical-reflexive approach to interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 290-298, September 2022. Disputes in the field of science and technology studies demonstrate its topicality as they elucidate the prospects for a postmodern world, and William Lynch in his book, in search of a constructive solution to current controversies, employs the dialectical approach of Lakatos and Feyerabend. Lynch takes a bold step to present an apparently “degenerated scientific research program” as a competitive alternative to the established and “progressive” mainstream. The (...) book offers not only a theoretical justification for this “minority report,” but also its empirical confirmation, as well as the possibility of practical and socio-political application. We believe that Lynch’s book actualizes the discussion about the nature of sociality as related to scientific cognition, as well as provokes the question of the possibility of specific ontology of scientific knowledge. However, the internal heterogeneity of the sociology of scientific knowledge seems to be slightly underestimated, which sometimes prevents Lynch recognizing his real allies and opponents in modern STS. Lynch’s approach to analyzing scientific alternatives to dominant paradigms and to science communication practices helps problematize current controversies through demonstrating their incommensurability not incomparability. Hopefully this will increase their mutual understanding and collaboration. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe ethics of science becomes a significant part of science and technology studies since it pays attention not exclusively to the moral impact of society on scientists but to that of scienc...

The discussion is devoted to the notion of context and its use in connection to the notion of interdisciplinarity. These two notions are claimed to be crucial for understanding how “naturalization of social epistemology” can be possible and whether it can be exhausted by an interpretation of knowledge in social context and whether it has its own philosophical importance. These questions were initially raised in the works of I.Kasavin.

A certain decline of epistemology in terms of the “naturalized programmes” or the post-modernist discussions makes us think about the form, in which epistemological studies in a broad sense of the word are still possible as a sphere of philosophical analysis. Philosophy of knowledge is nowadays shaken on its throne, which it has occupied for a long time as a theoretical core of philosophy, and perhaps even dismissed from it. The partial loss of orientation by those who are professionally involved (...) in this sphere is the consequence of this state of affairs. This also concerns social epistemology - an influential modern trend, whichnowadays is balancing between neoclassic (A. Goldman1) and non-classic (D. Bloor2), normative and descriptive, veritistic and constructionist approaches. Among all, there are two terminologically different though in fact similar proposals: naturalization and socialization. Within social epistemology, both lead to a kind of interdisciplinary imperialism reducing epistemology to a “positive science” like sociology of knowledge, social history of science, science and technology studies or social psychology of cognitive process. We shall call this attitude “strong version” of naturalism keeping in mind “strong program of Edinburgh School in the sociology of scientific knowledge” (B. Barnes, D. Bloor3). How can we save then philosophical epistemology without indulging into purely transcendentalcontemplations and at the same time securing its connections with empirical sciences? A “weak version” of naturalism is proposed, namely, an idea of social epistemology based on interdisciplinarity. Therefore a special analysis of interdisciplinarity concept is needed. (shrink)

A certain decline of epistemology in terms of the “naturalized programmes” or the post-modernist discussions makes us think about the form, in which epistemological studies in a broad sense of the word are still possible as a sphere of philosophical analysis. Philosophy of knowledge is nowadays shaken on its throne, which it has occupied for a long time as a theoretical core of philosophy, and perhaps even dismissed from it. The partial loss of orientation by those who are professionally involved (...) in this sphere is the consequence of this state of affairs. This also concerns social epistemology - an influential modern trend, whichnowadays is balancing between neoclassic (A. Goldman1) and non-classic (D. Bloor2), normative and descriptive, veritistic and constructionist approaches. Among all, there are two terminologically different though in fact similar proposals: naturalization and socialization. Within social epistemology, both lead to a kind of interdisciplinary imperialism reducing epistemology to a “positive science” like sociology of knowledge, social history of science, science and technology studies or social psychology of cognitive process. We shall call this attitude “strong version” of naturalism keeping in mind “strong program of Edinburgh School in the sociology of scientific knowledge” (B. Barnes, D. Bloor3). How can we save then philosophical epistemology without indulging into purely transcendentalcontemplations and at the same time securing its connections with empirical sciences? A “weak version” of naturalism is proposed, namely, an idea of social epistemology based on interdisciplinarity. Therefore a special analysis of interdisciplinarity concept is needed. (shrink)

On the path from myth to logos Greek culture, which grasped the meaning of this path, formulated the concepts of episteme and theoria, which are connected today with the image of science. They contain many connotations that they partly lost later on . Becoming a term of both ordinary and specialized scientific-philosophical language, theoria preserved also the wider, more general cultural meaning that emphasizes the complexity and contradictoriness of the cognitive process and the problematical character as well as the great (...) value of knowledge in general. Theory, which was first embodied in ancient astronomy, expressed, among other things, the essence of man, which lies in man's mediating position between the heavens and the earth: standing on Earth, he raises his eyes to the heavens. (shrink)

The Victorian era is a unique historical period of turbulent political, economic and social changes. These changes also touched upon science: the emergence of new theories and experimental data, new discoveries and inventions, the growth of the number of scientific societies, the debate about teaching methods in universities and the significance of science and scientists for the state laid the foundations for the institutional structure of the modern sciences. In addition, it is the Victorian era when a fundamentally new theoretical (...) discipline, the philosophy of science, was born. At the heart of the article, there is the personality and social circle of its founder, William Whewell, the author of the fundamental work “The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences founded upon their history”. The author reconstructs the making of the philosophy of science as an independent discipline, considering it, on the one hand, as a product of the Victorian era, and on the other – as a tool for the formation of the modern sciences in all their diversity. (shrink)

The article examines the problem of interpreting normal and revolutionary science in the concept of Thomas Kuhn. It is shown that the “normal science” is the central concept of the Kuhn’s history of science, designed in accordance with the normative definition of science adopted by him. Such a story serves an internal purpose – to justify the special epistemical status of expert knowledge. But there is also an external goal – to establish professional science as an institution with special epistemological (...) status and social function, which is situated in a center of intellectual power and property. Historians are those who are forced to constantly rewrite history – either following the methodology of “rational reconstruction” or responding to the challenges of their time. To be a “conservative” or a “revolutionary” in the history of science is a choice made not only for philosophical reasons, but also under the influence of the general socio-cultural situation of the epoch. (shrink)

The approach proposed by Jennifer Lackey is an analytical version of social epistemology, in which the subject of the research is the nature of collective (group) beliefs. She analyzes the possibility of explaining cognitive collectivity and reducing collective knowledge to the individual one at the example of deviant knowledge types - lie and bullshit. In the given paper, the author argues that Lackey's point of view deserves criticism for neither “group" nor “belief" receive a clear definition; no criteria are proposed (...) to distinguish cognitively relevant and irrelevant social factors; the opposition of the individual and the group is retained. The author argues that the concept of collective knowledge could be much more consistent if one uses the group-grid approach elaborated by M. Douglas; one shows the social nature of the individual; one applies the entire toolkit of philosophy of language and discourse analysis for reduction of beliefs to linguistic expressions. Still the concept under criticism moves then closer to the criticalsocial epistemology, which is hardly acceptable for Lackey. What follows is. (shrink)

The concept of “social technology,” as used in science and journalism, has yet to reach theoretical maturity. This is related to the general state of the social and human sciences, which have not given rise to sociotechnical sciences, and is also related to a number of sociopolitical circumstances. On the one hand, social technology involves solutions that require an empirical, interdisciplinary synthesis; on the other hand, it represents a series of new theoretical conceptualizations. The article offers a working definition of (...) a number of theoretical positions and typologies, and provides examples of the development and application of social technologies that represent steps toward the construction of a synthetic theory. (shrink)

The epitome of modern scientific infrastructure and distributed knowledge systems is scientific social networks (NSS). Their number, as well as the number of their users, is constantly growing and reaches millions. They are in demand, and, therefore, perform significant social functions. It is still unclear what their own nature is, what their functions are and how they perform and, finally, what are the consequences of their integration with the social institute of science. Along with the obvious advantages, the NSS creates (...) clear cultural dissonances and challenges that change the usual ways of communication. There is already enough evidence that the NSS not only bring about positive change, but also face rejection. Science policy, the scientist's moral code, the scientific citation and evaluation systems are all affected by the activities of the NSS and become an important subject matter of science and technology studies (STS). This text is a response to the article “Social Networks for Researchers on the Internet: A New Sociality?” by S.V. Shibarshina. (shrink)

This paper presents some perspectives in contemporary epistemology, relating in particular to the links between contextualism and interdisciplinary approaches. The author considers the role played by different theories of context in the frame of a social epistemology.

The article discusses the intellectual biography of Teodor I. Oizerman. The main stages of the formation and development of Oizerman’s philosophy are considered within the context of the historical changes of twentieth-century Russia. The author identifies five main stages of Oizerman’s philosophical evolution and offers an overview of the main ideas that define each of these stages.