This paper addresses the problem of the origin and principle of Aristotle’s distinctions among the categories. It explores the possibilities of reformulating and reviving the “grammatical” theory, generally ascribed first to Trendelenburg. The paper brings two new perspectives to the grammatical theory: that of Aristotle’s own theory of syntax and that of contemporary linguistic syntax and semantics. I put forth a provisional theory of Aristotle’s categories in which (1) I propose that the Categories sets forth a theory of lexical structure, (...) with the ten categories emerging as lexical or semantic categories, and (2) I suggest conceptual links, both in Aristotle’s writings and in actuality, between these semantic categories and certain grammatical inflections. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of the origin and principle of Aristotle’s distinctions among the categories. It explores the possibilities of reformulating and reviving the “grammatical” theory, generally ascribed first to Trendelenburg. The paper brings two new perspectives to the grammatical theory: that of Aristotle’s own theory of syntax and that of contemporary linguistic syntax and semantics. I put forth a provisional theory of Aristotle’s categories in which (1) I propose that the Categories sets forth a theory of lexical structure, (...) with the ten categories emerging as lexical or semantic categories, and (2) I suggest conceptual links, both in Aristotle’s writings and in actuality, between these semantic categories and certain grammatical inflections. (shrink)

In his logical exegesis of Descartes’ cogito, Hintikka has claimed that, formulated as an inference, it would be question--begging and that it is best understood as a performance, But (1), Hintikka’s discussion of an inferential interpretation omits reference to the possible relevance ofmodalities, and (2), Hintikka assumes that to beg the question is to assume what one is trying to prove. Question-begging is better understood in terms of how evident the premisses are in relation to the conclusion. In this paper (...) I construct a modal inferential interpretation, defend itagainst any charge of question-begging, and outline a system of quantified modal logic which would validate it. (shrink)

In his logical exegesis of Descartes’ cogito, Hintikka has claimed that, formulated as an inference, it would be question--begging and that it is best understood as a performance, But (1), Hintikka’s discussion of an inferential interpretation omits reference to the possible relevance ofmodalities, and (2), Hintikka assumes that to beg the question is to assume what one is trying to prove. Question-begging is better understood in terms of how evident the premisses are in relation to the conclusion. In this paper (...) I construct a modal inferential interpretation, defend itagainst any charge of question-begging, and outline a system of quantified modal logic which would validate it. (shrink)

In this paper I have investigated the claim that egoism is incapable of being a moral action-guide. Egoism is that normative view in ethics which claims that a person has an obligation to perform or refrain from performing some act, if and only if so doing is in that person's (the agent's) own best interest. William Baumer and W.D. Glasgow have both presented arguments which purportedly show that egoism leads to contradictions and inconsistencies which prevent it from being a (...) moral action-guide. In my refutation of these charges I argue that Baumer's agrument begs the question against egoism by employing a non-egoistic definition of 'right', and that Glasgow's arguments involve various ambiguities and equivocations. I conclude, then, that at least from a logical point of view, egoism is as acceptable a moral action-guide as any non-egoistic view. (shrink)

L’Empire romain atteint à la fin de la République une étendue géographique qui englobe des aires culturelles très diverses, ce qui a une influence sur la typologie et les fonctions des maisons dans les différentes régions de la Méditerranée. Dans l’impossibilité de pouvoir donner une vue d’ensemble et laissant de côté pour cette même raison les provinces occidentales de l’Afrique du Nord et du Levant, nous allons évoquer, après un regard sur la description de la maison urbaine chez Vitruve, quelques (...) exemples de Pompéi pour nous concentrer par la suite sur quelques maisons dans les provinces orientales, en particulier en Grèce et en Asie Mineure, pour mesurer l’influence ou non des Romains dans l’architecture privée. Il s’avère que cette dernière est bien restreinte, et que l’intégration de l’atrium est plutôt une référence qu’un élément structurel des maisons dont le péristyle reste l’élément central. L’étude est complétée par un excursus sur plusieurs maisons de l’Antiquité tardive à Athènes. (shrink)

As algorithms pervade numerous facets of daily life, they are incorporated into systems for increasingly diverse purposes. These systems’ results are often interpreted differently by the designers who created them than by the lay persons who interact with them. This paper offers a proposal for human-centered algorithm design, which incorporates human and social interpretations into the design process for algorithmically based systems. It articulates three specific strategies for doing so: theoretical, participatory, and speculative. Drawing on the author’s work designing and (...) deploying multiple related systems, the paper provides a detailed example of using a theoretical approach. It also discusses findings pertinent to participatory and speculative design approaches. The paper addresses both strengths and challenges for each strategy in helping to center the process of designing algorithmically based systems around humans. (shrink)

It seems that every so often in philosophy some argument widely accepted as conclusive is challenged, and those who have accepted it as well as he who originated it are alleged to have committed serious errors. Of late this sort of challenge has been levelled against Kant’s criticism of cosmological arguments, and has taken two forms. In its first form it is the claim that Kant’s criticism is irrelevant to those cosmological arguments of which Aquinas’s “third way” is paradigmatic. In (...) its second form this challenge is the claim that Kant’s criticism of such arguments is vitiated by a logical error. The first two things to be shown in this essay are that these two claims are mistaken. The re-examination of Kant’s argument involved here is important not merely because it returns Kant’s criticism to its accustomed status. It is also important because it shows two further things. One of these is not too surprising; this is that Kant’s criticism extends to attempts to prove the existence of God which do not involve the use of a scholastic or rationalist philosophical terminology. The other, however, may be fairly surprising to many; this is that Kant’s criticism equally extends to attempts to prove the existence of any ultimate source of things, no matter how un-Platonic or non-Aristotelian or “scientific” that source may be. Thus this essay shows that what Kant has given us is not merely a successful criticism of cosmological arguments to prove the existence of God, but a successful criticism of cosmological arguments. Every such argument includes an ontological one and thereby either fails or begs the question. This in turn sheds some light on why metaphysical systems and religious positions must be presented for consideration rather than proved beyond objection. (shrink)

Increasingly, medical records are being stored in computer databases that allow for efficiencies in providing treatment and in the processing of clinical and financial services. Computerization of medical records has also diminished patient privacy and, in particular, has increased the potential for misuse, especially in the form of nonconsensual secondary use of personally identifiable records. Organizations that store and use medical records have had to establish security measures, prompted partially by an inconsistent patchwork of legal standards that vary from state (...) to state. There is widespread appreciation among policy makers regarding the need for legal reform. The Health Information and Portability Accountability Act of 1996 mandated that the Administration develop regulations regarding the control of medical records. The Administration has offered regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services. Survey data reveal what healthcare professionals who have access to sensitive medical records believe are the greatest threats to patients' privacy. The overlap between Administration proposals and the responses of healthcare professionals is striking. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at seminar.

How do ethics show up in the everyday behaviors and conversations of researchers in a scientific laboratory? How does the microcosmic culture of the laboratory shape researchers’ understandings of scientific ethics? We, an interdisciplinary team representing anthropology, computer science, and rhetorical studies, investigated these questions in two university STEM labs. Similar to previous work mapping out the epistemic cultures, we sought to understand the ethical cultures of these research groups. We observed their lab meetings for several months and conducted interviews (...) with members of the research laboratories. Ultimately, we recognized two distinct ethical cultures within the two laboratories: one focused on the relationship between science and social justice, and the other focused on clean data and accuracy as an ethical issue. These two distinct ethical cultures were discernable through ethnography, close reading of laboratory members’ language, as well as broad-scale topic modeling. Our project complements previous studies of ethics in science that have focused on codes of ethics or student curricula as ways in which scientists develop an understanding of scientific ethics. Our project demonstrates that everyday interactions between the members of scientific research labs additionally shape, at a decidedly local level, how scientists understand and ultimately approach ethical decision-making in the scientific research process. (shrink)

One of the more famous criticisms of ontological arguments is that provided by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, and two of the more frequent comments on it are essentially these: Kant points out that existence is no predicate; his criticism contains several puzzling elements which can just as well be neglected, since the first point is enough. It is the intent of this paper to substantiate a protest against such analyses of Kant’s anti–ontological–arguments argument and to develop certain (...) consequences from this for current attempts to rehabilitate ontological arguments. The protest is not that such analyses are simply wrong, but that they are dangerously misleading and represent Kant’s argument as weaker than it in fact is. The substantiation is provided by the examination of the three main elements of Kant’s criticism of ontological arguments: the distinction of real and logical predicates, the analysis of uses of ‘to be’, and the discussion of concepts of possible and of actual things. The consequences for current attempted rehabilitations of ontological arguments center upon the alleged distinction of ‘existence’ and ‘necessary existence’. On the basis of the foregoing substantiation it is shown that this distinction, despite its proponents’ claims, does not make Kant’s criticism inapplicable, that the sense of ‘necessity’ remains a problem, that Kant knew quite well what he was doing in criticizing ontological arguments, and that the necessary existence allegedly proved by ontological arguments is not that which is also alleged to be religiously required. (shrink)

This paper considers the relationship between G. H. von Wright's solution to the paradoxes of confirmation and his "Principal Theorem of Confirmation". The former utilizes the order of our knowledge of the qualities of confirming instances of an hypothesis; the latter states the way in which an instance contributes to the probability of an hypothesis. It is shown that these two, as stated by von Wright, are logically incompatible. Then the most thorough possible emendation of the paradoxes solution is considered, (...) and it is shown that this still prohibits use of the "Principal Theorem" to confirm hypotheses stating necessary causal conditions, and to confirm by deliberate experiment hypotheses stating sufficient causal conditions. It is concluded that any solution of the paradoxes must rest solely upon the relation of the data to the hypothesis involved. (shrink)