The healthcare systems of the United States and United Kingdom are vastly different. The former relies primarily on private sector incentives and market forces to allocate medical care services, while the latter is a centrally planned system funded almost entirely by the public sector. Therefore, each nation represents divergent views on the relative efficacy of the market or government in achieving social objectives in the area of medical care policy. Since its inception in 1948, the National Health Services of the (...) United Kingdom has consistently emphasized equity in the allocation of medical services. It has done so by creating a system whereby services are universally free of charge at the point of entry. Conversely, the United States has relied upon the evolution of a perplexing array of public and private sector insurance schemes centered more around consumer choice than equity in allocation. (shrink)

Ernst Mach’s philosophical ideas were warmly received in America, which already had a pragmatist tradition close to Machian empiricism and budding schools of philosophy, psychology, and physics more or free of the neo-Kantian influences which were a strong academic competitor to the spread of empiricism in Europe. The founding pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce and William James engaged directly with Mach and Paul Carus, the editor of the Monist and publisher of the Open Court press actively translated and published Mach’s (...) works for the American public. A generation later when members of the Vienna Circle sought Academic posts in elite American universities, the ground was well prepared for their arrival as Holton and Stadler have described. Beneath the surface however, the American reaction to Mach was not one of naïve admiration but fairly staunch criticism, which Mach himself appreciated and welcomed. Peirce was highly critical of Mach’s mechanics in a review and Peirce famously described Mach’s empiricism as akin to riding a horse to death. In some ways, Peirce himself had anticipated aspects of Mach’s views on mind and body, a surprising discovery I made recently. Even Carus, who declared himself an admirer, was highly critical of Mach’s theory of economy of thought. James, too, who admired Mach greatly, had major disagreements with Mach on so-called sensations of innervation in psychology, and although’s James’ own radical empiricist essays owed much to Mach’s neutral monist ideas in the Analysis, James broke away from what he saw as Mach’s excessive physical reductionism, rejecting the monism about nature that was Mach’s trademark. In short Mach’s ideas acted as a stimulus to American thinkers, but they had their own tradition and they were able to resist his authority and contribute in reverse to Mach’s own refinement of his positions. (shrink)

In this paper we extend an argument originally developed in Hülsmann to analyze changes to the structure of production that occur when the demand for money changes. In particular, we show that Hülsmann’s argument, which contrasted such changes under commodity and fiat systems, applies as well to the case of 100% reserve systems contrasted with fractional reserve free banking systems . Specifically, we argue that under a 100% reserve system, the structure of production will change in response to (...) a change in demand for money, and that it will not under FR/FB. In fact, such changes are beneficial. Since one of the central arguments in defense of FR/FB is precisely the fact that it avoids such changes to the structure of production , we conclude that this argument amounts to comparing different mechanisms for attaining different equilibrium states, and hence is invalid as a defense of that mechanism as such. (shrink)

In this article we consider an argument put forth by Selgin in support of the claim that there exists a mechanism for limiting coordinated expansions of fiduciary media under a system of fractional reserve free banking. Selgin argues that such banks hold risk-adjusted reserves against expected losses, and even if the expectation of reserve losses remains zero, the variance of such losses increases under an in-concert expansion . It is this increased variability that is claimed to act as (...) a brake on the expansion. We take issue with this argument on the basis of the fact that such a characterization of observed clearings would require that characteristics of the underlying data-generating process be obtainable from pathwise realizations of that process. In other words, there is an implicit assumption of stationarity in Selgin’s argument, and this assumption is at odds with well-known empirical facts of non-stationarity associated with most economic time series. We also point out ways in which techniques of risk management commonly found in the modern financial industry are unlikely to be effective in addressing this problem. (shrink)

The numerous historical episodes of free banking have invariably ended in the establishment of central banking. Was the failure of free banking due to ?theory,? ?seignorage??the attempt by governments to use central banks for revenue purposes?or to ?crises?? Would a free banking system be stable, free of crises? This is the crux of the theoretical and historical debate.

Le propos est de comparer la dynamique concurrentielle à la gestion centralisée de l’industrie bancaire à partir de la mise en perspective de deux systèmes différents : l’expérience des banques libres du Massachusetts et celle de la monopolisation de l’émission de billets par la Banque de France.Nous montrons l’influence de la réglementation sur la structure du système bancaire, l’ accumulation du capital bancaire et la stabilité du crédit. Les banques peuvent financer leur politique de crédit à partir de fonds permanents (...) ou de fonds à vue. La mise en place de privilèges réglementaires sur les fonds à vue permettant aux banques de les utiliser sans les payer au prix de marché est à l’origine de l’instabilité cyclique.Our purpose is to compare the competitive dynamics and the centralized management of banking industry from the prospects of two different systems: the Free Banking experience in Massachusetts and the monopolization of issue by the Banque de France.We show the influence of regulation on the banking system structure, the hoarding of banking capital and credit stability. Banks may finance their loans either from investment funds or from demand deposit. The establishment of regulatory privileges on demand deposit allowing the banks to use them without paying the market price involves cyclical instability. (shrink)

Revision of thesis (Ph. D.)--U.C.L.A., 1982?Includes index. Bibliography: p. 151-156.

Cette réaction est suscitée par l’article de Laurent Le Maux, récemment publié dans ce Journal. Le Maux affirme que Ludwig von Mises était le défenseur d’un système de réserves fractionnaires et un précurseur des économistes contemporains partisans des réserves fractionnaires. Nous critiquons la manière dont Le Maux utilise la littérature ancienne dans ce domaine, et nous montrons qu’il n’est pas suffisamment au fait des travaux de Mises et des problèmes qui divisent les défenseurs et les opposants du système de réserves (...) fractionnaires. Les écrits de Ludwig von Mises fournissent la preuve accablante qu’il était, et il le disait lui-même, un économiste qui développait l’approche de la Currency School dans le domaine des problèmes bancaires.This paper takes issue with an article by Laurent Le Maux that recently appeared in this journal. Le Maux claims that Ludwig von Mises was an advocate of fractional-reserve banking and a precursor of presentday economists defending fractional reserves. We criticise Le Maux’s treatment of previous literature in the field, and show that he is insufficiently acquainted with Mises’ work and with the problems that divide advocates and opponents of fractional reserves. Ludwig von Mises’ writings provide overwhelming evidence that he was, and saw himself as, an economist who developed the approach of the Currency School toward problems of banking. (shrink)

Cette réaction est suscitée par l’article de Laurent Le Maux, récemment publié dans ce Journal. Le Maux affirme que Ludwig von Mises était le défenseur d’un système de réserves fractionnaires et un précurseur des économistes contemporains partisans des réserves fractionnaires. Nous critiquons la manière dont Le Maux utilise la littérature ancienne dans ce domaine, et nous montrons qu’il n’est pas suffisamment au fait des travaux de Mises et des problèmes qui divisent les défenseurs et les opposants du système de réserves (...) fractionnaires. Les écrits de Ludwig von Mises fournissent la preuve accablante qu’il était, et il le disait lui-même, un économiste qui développait l’approche de la Currency School dans le domaine des problèmes bancaires.This paper takes issue with an article by Laurent Le Maux that recently appeared in this journal. Le Maux claims that Ludwig von Mises was an advocate of fractional-reserve banking and a precursor of presentday economists defending fractional reserves. We criticise Le Maux’s treatment of previous literature in the field, and show that he is insufficiently acquainted with Mises’ work and with the problems that divide advocates and opponents of fractional reserves. Ludwig von Mises’ writings provide overwhelming evidence that he was, and saw himself as, an economist who developed the approach of the Currency School toward problems of banking. (shrink)

Ce texte répond aux critiques formulées par J.G. Hülsmann à propos de mon article “Ludwig von Mises, Théoricien de la Banque Libre”. J.G. Hülsmann me reproche une méthode scientifique douteuse sans voir que ses reproches ne s’adressent qu’à luimême. Pour lui répondre, il me suffit de le paraphraser. Le commentaire de Hülsmann a néanmoins un léger mérite, celui de mettre en exergue deux courts passages de l’oeuvre de Mises que j’omets involontairement dans mon article. Aussi il me revient de combler (...) cette lacune, d’interpréter ces deux passages, d’affiner et finalement d’appuyer le propos et la conclusion de mon article.This article is a reply to J.G. Hülsmann’s critics concerning my article “Ludwig von Mises, Théoricien de la Banque Libre”. J.G. Hülsmann blames me for an uncertain scientific method when these reproaches are aimed at himself. To respond, we just have to paraphrase. Nevertheless, for the credit of Hülsmann’s commentary, we have to say that it makes appear two short citations of Mises’ work that we unintentionally ignore in our article. So, to fill the gap, I have to interpret these citations, improve and finally rest the purpose and the conclusion of my article. (shrink)

The necessity for a government “lender of last resort” has been advanced as a justification for central banking. In this paper, I compare lending practices under central banking with those that would be likely to exist under a system of fractional-reserve free banking (FRFB). To do this I examine the underlying nature of banks as warehousing and credit-granting institutions and consider how redemption runs can arise as a consequence of fractional reserves in this system. Following the (...) work of Thornton and Bagehot, I describe principles of prudent lending that can be used to stem a redemption run when it arises. I examine the market incentives that apply under FRFB and how these incentives are perverted under a system of central banking. I find that a government central bank is not well-placed to lend according to prudent standards, and in fact is likely to use its power to pursue political goals that are at odds with prudent lending. I examine the US financial crisis and the actions of the Federal Reserve System to illustrate this view. (shrink)

A recurring citation in systemic risk literature reviews offers a model where what they describe as a free banking system is vulnerable to contagious bank runs through clearinghouse loans. The paper ignores key contributions to both free banking and financial history literature, such that the paper is of little relevance to the understanding of the stability of both free banking systems and clearinghouse arrangements. Our criticism concentrates on the institutions of banking absent or (...) misrepresented. It is argued that their conclusions are inapplicable to free banking. (shrink)

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article “Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles”. Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not [...].

The conventional view of banking crises sees them as an inherent problem of fractional?reserve banking systems. According to this view, government regulation in the form of an alert central bank (acting as a ?lender of last resort"), or deposit insurance, or both is needed to keep isolated bank failures from generating systemwide panic. But this view does not mesh with historical experience, which points to government regulation itself as the most likely cause of banking crises.

Public interest theory has argued that lack of trust in companies may reduce support for free markets. The literature did not address, however, the underlying causes of lack of trust and support of free markets in customer’s perceptions of virtuousness in economic actors. Combining public interest theory with virtue theory and stakeholder trust theory of organizations, we surmise that if customers perceive that employees of companies have insufficient due care for customers’ interests, the perceived trustworthiness of those companies (...) will be low. Customers will then be more inclined to support government regulation in that particular sector or industry. In this paper, we test the relevance of these relationships for the banking sector using a representative sample of 5844 respondents in the Netherlands. We find that if bankers are perceived as persistent in their due care for customers, this encourages a perception that banks are trustworthy, which in turn induces support for free markets in banking and reduces the call for government regulation. An important management implication of our research is that banks should foster due care by means of employee-virtue training programs to enhance trust, thus generating more support for free market operations in the banking sector. (shrink)

Two recent studies use history and theory to examine the likely consequences of eliminating government intervention in the provision of money. Such proposals would end the central bank monopoly over note issue and replace it with note issues by competing banks. Supervisory functions of central banks would be dispensed with. Accordingly, the proposals would free banks from all regulations on entry, disclosure, geographical limitations, and the products they may offer to customers. Monetary and banking arrangements would be left (...) to the market. Unfortunately, the historical evidence does not speak as loudly in favor of free banking as its proponents claim. (shrink)

Charles Goodhart's The Evolution of Central Banks represents a rare and welcome attempt to spell out those shortcomings of “free banking” that supply a rationale for the establishment of central banks. However, one of Goodhart's principal arguments—that central banks are practically inevitable outgrowths of the “natural” tendency for bank reserves to become concentrated in a dominant “bankers’ bank” — understates the role legal restrictions have played in sponsoring the emergence of bankers’ banks, including the Bank of England. Some (...) of Goodhart's other arguments against free banking rest on an exaggerated view of the likelihood of business cycles and financial crises under free banking as compared with central banking. (shrink)

This set examines the development of banking in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. When Congress first tried to introduce a unified currency to finance a national army it failed because of the large number of counterfeit notes in circulation. Similarly two attempts to set up a central bank resulted in bankruptcy. Even after the Mint was set up, the Federal government's theoretical monopoly over coinage did not stop states from using their charter to (...) set up note issuing banks. The resulting corruption and fraud let to experiments in regulation and a system of 'free banking'. The material included examines such issues as the role of a central bank, banking regulation, banks and the money supply. (shrink)

A series of meetings, in search of industrial equity, started in Worcester, Massachusetts, August, 1867, disclosed a belief that the solution of the labor problem will not be found in trades monopolies, special legislation to reduce the hours or increase the wages of service, co-operation on present methods of ownership, exchange, and finance, or other expedients, by restricting competition, to remove evils which natural forces would expel if allowed a chance; but rather in opportunity and reciprocity, in the unrestricted liberty (...) to create and equitable exchange of values which only asks government to step out of the way. In the progress of thought, service appeared to be the source of wealth, and the true basis of exchange; while interest, rent and profit or dividends seemed inadmissible, except for work done or risk incurred. The use of one's credit was found to be a natural right, antecedently independent of human law, and free money the destined mediator between labor and capital. After this faith was reaffirmed in the Boston Convention of January, 1869, we were agreeably surprised to learn that substantially the same conclusions had been reached, by a different line of argument, twenty years before, in a series of articles published in a Worcester County newspaper over the signature of "Omega." Reprinted in 1850 and 1857, these essays generously placed at our disposal by their author, we now have the pleasure of reissuing for general circulation. The truths stated in them are as fresh and practicable today as they were twenty years ago, and the public is better prepared to receive them. (shrink)

In a number of recent articles, the debate on the ethics of fractional reserve “free” banking has been extended to loan maturity mismatching, specifically the banking practice of borrowing short and lending long. Barnett and Block :711–716, 2009; 2010) claim the practice is illicit, because like fractional reserve banking it creates duplicate property titles. They argue there is a continuum in the time dimension between the two kinds of activities. Bagus and Howden :399–406, 2009; 106:295–300, 2012a; (...) Eur J Law Econ, 2012b; Bus Ethics 22:235–245, 2013) maintain that loan maturity mismatching does not create duplicate titles and is not illicit, and that from an economic and legal perspective there is no continuum with fractional reserve banking. Cachanosky and Evans enter the debate from the free-banking standpoint and view both practices as legitimate. In this paper, I agree with the conclusions of Bagus and Howden, but adopt a different approach to support this position. Using the title-transfer theory of contract, I demonstrate from first principles why loan maturity mismatching does not create duplicate property titles and is a legitimate practice. Employing this same theory, I then present a novel argument to show why the contractual arrangements found in fractional reserve banking are logically contradictory and illegitimate. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the origins and evolution of IslamicBanking and Finance from the early days of Islam up to the formal establishmentof Islamic banks in the sixties of the last century. It also sheds light on thebanking practices in the later parts of Islamic history which is an almost unresearchedarea. It records the existence of interest free lending societies at theend of the 19th century and the situation preceding the development of modernIslamic banks in the second half (...) of the twentieth century. The paper concludesthat Islamic banking was an attempt to practice an aspect of economic life inan Islamic way and it first emerged in rural and agricultural economies andnothing to do with the petrodollar or oil boom of the Middle East as usuallyput forward. (shrink)

This Article discusses why a “corporate governance movement” that commenced in the United States in the 1970s became an entrenched feature of American capitalism and describes how the chronology differed in a potentially crucial way for banks. The Article explains corporate governance’s emergence and staying power by reference to changing market conditions and a deregulation trend that provided executives with unprecedented managerial discretion as the twentieth century drew to a close. With banking the historical pattern paralleled general trends in (...) large measure. Still, while the “imperial” CEO who achieved prominence in the 1980s became outmoded for the most part after corporate scandals at the start of the 2000s, this was not the case with large financial companies. The continued boldness of “star” CEOs in the financial services industry plausibly contributed to the market turmoil of 2008, but the financial crisis emphatically ended the corporate governance “free pass” banks had enjoyed. (shrink)

The current economic crisis arose in large part from financial activities in which capital was practically and logically alienated from real economy. This essay examines the exploitative logic of modern finance while considering two alternative models—microfinance and Islamic banking. These models will be considered against the backdrop of medieval arguments over usury, notably the debates between Franciscans and Dominicans surrounding the lending institutions known as monti di pietà. While noting that either model is decidedly preferable to current normative (...) class='Hi'>banking practices, this essay argues for the interest-free logic of Islamic finance against the logic of usury insofar as usury lends itself to a double alienation—of lender from borrower and of profit from value. (shrink)

Kit Fine’s arguments in Essence and Modality are widely accepted as being a decisive blow against modal essentialism. A selection of replies exist that have done little to counter the general view that modally construed essence is out of touch with what we really mean when we make essentialist claims. I argue that Fine’s arguments fail to strike a decisive blow, and I suggest a new interpretation of the debate that shows why Fine’s arguments fall short of achieving their goal.

Continuing the debate over whether consciousness causes behaviour or plays no functional role in it, leading scholars discuss the question in terms of neuroscience, philosophy, law, and public policy.

Traditional conventionalism about modality claims that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true by convention. In the wake of the widespread repudiation of truth-byconvention, traditional conventionalism has fallen out of favour. However, a family of theories of modality have arisen that, whilst abandoning truth-by-convention, retain the spirit of traditional conventionalism. These ‘neo-conventionalist’ theories surpass their forebears and don’t fall victim to the criticisms inherited through truth-by-convention. However, not all criticisms levelled at traditional conventionalism target truth-by-convention. Any conventional theory (...) of modality must face the contingency problem. This claims that the contingency of our linguistic conventions jeopardises the necessity of the necessities they determine. I present the contingency problem as relevant to both the traditional conventionalist and the neo-conventionalist. I examine a response from Einheuser that builds upon a response from Wright. I show that the Einheuser response does more to accommodate the conventionalist’s modal beliefs, but that it does not fully satisfy some further conditions that ought to be laid upon such a response. I then suggest how the response can be revised so as to satisfy these conditions. The resulting model of conventionalism is compatible with the validity of S4, and suitably in the spirit of conventionalism. (shrink)

I. Scientific method as a mental operation [by] T. Case.--II. On some aspects of the scientific method [by] F. Gotch.--III. Physiology; its scope and method [by] C. S. Sherrington.--IV. Inheritance in animals and plants [by] W. F. R. Weldon.--V. Psycho-physical method [by] W. McDougall.--VI. The evolution of double stars [by] A. H. Fison.--VII. Anthropology: the evolution of currency and coinage [by] Sir R. C. Temple.--VIII. Archaeological evidence [by] W. M. F. Petrie.--IX. Scientific method as applied to history [by] T. B. (...) Strong. (shrink)

The third edition of this popular book has been updated to take account of the latest developments in policy and social work practice. It includes new sections on radical/emancipatory and postmodern approaches to ethics, analysis of the latest codes of ethics from over 30 different countries, additional case studies of ethical problems and dilemmas, practical exercises, and annotated further reading lists at the end of each chapter.

The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.

A consideration of Mach's elements, his philosophy of neutral monism, and philosophy of physics, especially space and time, much of it based on unpublished writings from the Nachlass and other original sources. The historical connection between Mach and logical positivism is shown to be superficial at best, and Mach's elements are shown to be mind independent natural qualities (world-elements) with dynamic force, not limited to human sensations.

The domain of professional ethics -- Virtue, ethics, and professional life -- Virtues, vices, and situations -- Professional wisdom -- Care -- Respectfulness -- Trustworthiness -- Justice -- Courage -- Integrity.

Professionals in all fields, struggling to be both successful and ethical, will find the book challenging, provocative, yet reassuring.

McDowell offers an unusually frank discussion of the ethical principles that should govern decisions and analyzes the pressures that drive some professionals to sell unnecessary or excessive services.

Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then (...) considers recent neo-Russellian versions in the second half. The chances for a revival of neutral monism are probably slight; its key ideas and starting points lie far from those in contemporary philosophy of mind. A better route might be through the philosophy of science and a deeper understanding of causation. (shrink)

This project is an investigation into the prospects for an antirealist theory of essence. Essentialism is the claim that at least some things have some of their properties essentially. Essentialist discourse includes claims such as “Socrates is essentially human”, and “Socrates is accidentally bearded”. Historically, there are two ways of interpreting essentialist discourse. I call these positions ‘modal essentialism’ and ‘neo-Aristotelian essentialism’. According to modal essentialism, for Socrates to be essentially human is for it to be necessary that he be (...) a human if he exists, and for Socrates to accidentally have a beard is for it to be contingent that Socrates has a beard if he exists. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialism, objects have definitions in something like the way words do. For Socrates to be essentially human but accidentally bearded is for it to be part of the definition of Socrates that he is human, but not part of that definition that he is bearded. I argue that both are susceptible to antirealist interpretation. This thesis sets about showing that this is the case. In Chapters One and Two I investigate neo-conventionalist theories of modality, in the hope of using such a position to develop an antirealist modal essentialism. In Chapter Three I discuss the debate between modal and neo-Aristotelian essentialism and conclude that it is by no means settled. In Chapter Four I develop an antirealist neo-Aristotelian essentialism based on the mechanism of one of the neo-conventionalist accounts of modality. In Chapter Five I argue that this account is in a better position to give an essentialist theory of necessity than its realist counterparts. I conclude that, regardless of whether one is a modal or neo-Aristotelian essentialist, antirealist essentialism is a viable theory of essence that is worthy of consideration in contemporary debate. (shrink)

This book explores the far-reaching ethical implications of recent changes in the organization and practice of the social professions, including social work, community and youth work. Drawing on moral philosophy, professional ethics and new empirical research, the author explores such questions as: * Can any occupation justifiably claim a special set of ethics? * What is the impact of the new 'ethics of distrust' on the autonomy discretion and creativity of practitioners? * How does inter-professional working challenge conceptions of professional (...) identities and roles? * Do 'professional ethics' act as an obstruction to constructive developments? Combing interviews with practitioners with developments in ethical theory, Ethics, Accountability and the Social Professions shows the complexity and range of issues at stake. (shrink)

The human conceptual system comprises simulated information of sensorimotor experience and linguistic distributional information of how words are used in language. Moreover, the linguistic shortcut hypothesis predicts that people will use computationally cheaper linguistic distributional information where it is sufficient to inform a task response. In a pre‐registered category production study, we asked participants to verbally name members of concrete and abstract categories and tested whether performance could be predicted by a novel measure of sensorimotor similarity (based on an 11‐dimensional (...) representation of sensorimotor strength) and linguistic proximity (based on word co‐occurrence derived from a large corpus). As predicted, both measures predicted the order and frequency of category production but, critically, linguistic proximity had an effect above and beyond sensorimotor similarity. A follow‐up study using typicality ratings as an additional predictor found that typicality was often the strongest predictor of category production variables, but it did not subsume sensorimotor and linguistic effects. Finally, we created a novel, fully grounded computational model of conceptual activation during category production, which best approximated typical human performance when conceptual activation was allowed to spread indirectly between concepts, and when candidate category members came from both sensorimotor and linguistic distributional representations. Critically, model performance was indistinguishable from typical human performance. Results support the linguistic shortcut hypothesis in semantic processing and provide strong evidence that both linguistic and grounded representations are inherent to the functioning of the conceptual system. All materials, data, and code are available at https://osf.io/vaq56/. (shrink)