The logos question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato's Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides' logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos’ complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological conditions that (...) make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist’ one; finally, the identity between the power to produce “spoken images” and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces. (shrink)
In the Sophist Plato introduces a very peculiar character, the eleatic stranger who plays both for Theaetetus and for us the role of a perfect sophist. His terrific power simply comes of his refusal to understand the examples. He just requires his interlocutors that absolutely all what is to be understood by them must be explicitly said. And “all” means really all: even the most evident for everybody, all what is not necessary to say and perhaps is not possible either. (...) The eleatic visitor, in order to hunt the sophist whose role himself is playing, trays to say all indeed, even the most difficult: the meaning of words as being, not-being, same, other or similarity. In this way, the language shows oneself as a play of likeness and unlikeness. (shrink)
The radical evil. Notes on the revolt of masses. In his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant speaks about a radical evil present in the human being, a tendency to place before the desire with regard to the rational duty, which is impossible to tear up by the roots from the human nature. In The revolt of the masses, Ortega also speaks about an evil that is anyway present in the so called mass-man, in each one of us, (...) and that is not to eradicate. The aim of this paper is to read the book of Ortega y Gasset in dialogue with Kant. (shrink)
The temporality of human action is very peculiar: different from the cosmic time and even paradoxical, inasmuch as it is really a circular time. The aim of this essay is to study this circularity in the sphere of human activity through the relations between the notions of potency and habit in the Aristotelian Ethics, among others structural conditions of the action. These structural conditions are explored by Aristotle as those which make possible to judge the actions.
This article is a commentary of the section 5.552 of the Tractatus, about the “experience” that is necessary to understand logic, from the point of view of the so called continental philosophy. In this commentary are tackled some questions: what is exactly this “experience”?; what does mean that logic is a speculative image of the world?; how are the relations between logic and metaphysics (the two components of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein)? All these questions lead us to the conception of (...) philosophy present in the Tractatus and to the role, so important, the two following problems play in this book: the reflection on the philosophical method and the transcendental character of being. Just for this it is necessary to take it seriously the opposition between speaking of something and speaking about something, employed in the final section and so clear in German as habitually mistranslated. (shrink)
The necessity of a continuous creation by God, the need of a creation that is prolonged in the time, is an important issue in the Metaphysics of Descartes; for the being of the human conscience is not so persistent and so strong as the being of a really substance. The Cartesian cogito raises the problem of the weakness of this needy being: the distance between what is in each case thought, which is not temporal, and the thinking itself, which is (...) in the time. Descartes has very interesting observations about this theme. (shrink)
The logos’ question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato’s Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides’ logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos’ complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological conditions that (...) make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist’s one; finally, the identity between the power to produce “spoken images” and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces. (shrink)
The intention of this article is to show that the Tractatus deals with the problem of the relation between reality, possibility, and necessity as traditionally considered in the ontological argument, that is, in relation to the idea of limit, and that in Section 5.5521, we find an especially clarifying formulation of this question; the formulation itself, however, is not at all clear, so that a lengthy commentary of it is justified.
El presente artículo defiende que, en el _Político_, Platón investiga sistemáticamente la índole metafórica del _logos_: quienes hablamos y nos entendemos hablando no podemos dejar de hacer comparaciones, poner ejemplos o servirnos de modelos o paradigmas, cada vez que estamos entendiendo algo, tanto si nos damos cuenta de ello como si no. En particular, el llamado “método de las divisiones” necesita de los ejemplos para que le sirvan de guía en el descubrimiento de las diferencias y las semejanzas. De hecho, (...) este carácter metafórico del _logos _se descubre en el intento de dar caza al político, que estructura el diálogo de comienzo a fin. La principal dificultad a la que es preciso hacer frente en dicha búsqueda se debe a que, ya desde el inicio, la caza del político se está dejando guiar subrepticiamente por un ejemplo que desorienta a sus perseguidores: el paradigma del pastor. Por ello hace falta dar tantas vueltas y recomenzar de nuevo varias veces la persecución, pues el ejemplo que oriente la búsqueda ha de hacerse explícito y ha de ser además un buen ejemplo, un ejemplo que permita entender. Pero, así reconducida, como la búsqueda de un buen paradigma para entender qué es la política, la caza del político plantea algunos problemas, relacionados con el vínculo entre _logos _y semejanza. Este artículo se centra en uno de ellos: la dificultad de explicar qué es un ejemplo y la consiguiente necesidad de proponer algo tan paradójico como un ejemplo de ejemplo. (shrink)
el presente artículo se propone abordar el papel del olvido en la obra de Platón. Para ello toma como textos principales de trabajo los diálogos en que se expone la doctrina de la anamnesis y a partir de ellos, pero atendiendo también a algunos otros diálogos, se exploran las conexiones entre el olvido y otros temas platónicos como el lenguaje, la memoria, la experiencia o el amor, con el fin de aclarar las relaciones de dependencia que puedan encontrarse entre ellos. (...) de este modo se intenta descubrir en el olvido un sentido filosófico que no resulte desdeñable en comparación con el sentido y la relevancia concedidos desde antiguo a la anamnesis, dado que uno y otra no se pueden separar. (shrink)
This paper tries to undertake one more time the well-know image of the divided line to take out its political meaning by situating it in its context: a dialogue in which the justice is inquired. But it has at once the intention to intepret the question: what is justice? Not only as a moral or political question, but also as ontological, the question for that that makes posible every delimitation and every discernment. The place where both topics converge is the (...) pólis, the place where the absence of principle, of arkhé, rest alive. (shrink)