Technology has become one of the main channels through which people engage in most of their everyday activities. When working, learning, or socializing, the affordances created by technological tools determine the way in which users interact with one another and their environment, thus favoring certain actions and behaviors, while discouraging others. The ethical dimension behind the use of technology has been already studied in recent works, but the question is often formulated in a protective way that focuses on shielding (...) the users from potential detrimental effects. Nevertheless, when considering collateral ethical benefits that the use of technology could bring about, virtue ethics and the notions of “practice” and “practical wisdom” present new opportunities to harness this potential. By understanding the combination of technology, its users and their interactions as a system, technology can be seen as the space where most of its users’ daily practice happens. Through this practice, users can get the chance to collaterally develop and enhance their ethical awareness, sensitivity and reasoning capabilities. This work is shaped as a manifesto that provides the background, motivations and directions needed to ask a complementary question about the ethics of technology that aims towards the potentiality behind the use of technology. Instead of focusing on shielding the users, the proposed _ethical idealist_ approach to the ethics of technology aims to empower them by understanding their use of technology as the space where the development of their practical wisdom, understood in the virtue ethics’ sense, takes place. (shrink)

Is it rational to strive for the unattainable? In this short and provocative study, Nicholas Rescher vigorously defends both the rationality and practicality of seriously pursuing impossible dreams.

Is it rational to strive for the unattainable? In this short and provocative study, Nicholas Rescher vigorously defends both the rationality and practicality of seriously pursuing impossible dreams.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1987.

This is an eminently sensible book with a clear and strightforwardly argued thesis, that to pursue ideals impossible to achieve in practice is not always irrational, but is often useful and productive of good results. Professor Rescher maintains that, while “must” in practical matters certainly implies “can,” “ought” does not; so that “cannot,” while it excuses failure, does not abrogate obligation to try. This, he claims disposes of many theoretical problems about moral dilemmas, which certainly may arise with respect to (...) what one should do, but which cannot exist with respect to what, in the given circumstances, one must do. To decide what the latter obligation is, is indeed difficult and complicated. It involves priorities unattainable in the prevailing conditions, for others considered more important. But once the priorities have been settled, what must be done is unequivocal and further conflict of duties is precluded. A moral code, says Rescher, is intended as a guide to conduct, which it could not be if it were specific in every detail. Rules must therefore be general, and particular situations require their modification in order to ensure the best results. This leaves room for, and requires, casuistry the balancing and harmonizing of potentially conflicting demands to achieve the best possible in the circumstances. (shrink)

In this very slim monograph, Nicholas Rescher argues that various schools of ethical theory might profitably reconsider the role of moral ideals. By "ideals" Rescher means Kantian-like regulative principles which orient a moral agent in areas of conduct which categorical rules leave indeterminate. Thus, he highlights a facet of Kantian idealism which deontologists tend to downplay, or ignore altogether. Rescher also makes use of the Jamesian, pragmatic tradition, in which moral ideals--even those which are unrealizable-are understood to be (...) instrumentalities optimizing moral energy and vision. He discusses ways in which the pragmatic notion of moral idealism corrects the utilitarian focus upon morality as a mere distributive maximization of goods. He also points out that recent interest in an ethics of virtue requires an appreciation of moral ideals. Moral ideals, Rescher argues, are crucial for making sense of acts of supererogation which go beyond the call of duty, but which are important for any ethic that stresses those excellences which are the hallmark of an ethics of virtue. (shrink)

Although regulators have identified ethical lapses as a key factor contributing to auditors’ failure to detect their clients’ fraudulent financial reporting, research using ethical theory to examine auditors’ fraud detection remains limited. We provide evidence on the joint effect of ethical idealism and trait skepticism on auditors’ fraud judgments. Ethical idealism reflects an individual’s concern for the welfare of others while trait skepticism reflects an individual’s disposition to validating a proposition. Forsyth theorizes that there (...) is an association between ethical idealism and tolerance for deception. Drawing on that insight, we posit that ethical idealism and trait skepticism have a complementary effect on auditors’ fraud planning performance. This is because the former determines an auditor’s tolerance for allowing a client to get away with an ethically questionable act while the latter is important in determining how evidence is generally sought and evaluated. We used the Forsyth ethical position questionnaire to measure ethical idealism and the Hurtt :149–171, 2010) scale to measure trait skepticism. Our results indicate that there is a significant positive association between trait skepticism and the number of effective audit procedures but only for auditors who have high ethical idealism. The results highlight the importance of measuring and controlling for the effects of these traits when evaluating fraud detection performance. The paper also contributes by showing that an ethics theory can generate additional understanding of and insights into an important accounting phenomenon. (shrink)

This is an eminently sensible book with a clear and strightforwardly argued thesis, that to pursue ideals impossible to achieve in practice is not always irrational, but is often useful and productive of good results. Professor Rescher maintains that, while “must” in practical matters certainly implies “can,” “ought” does not; so that “cannot,” while it excuses failure, does not abrogate obligation to try. This, he claims disposes of many theoretical problems about moral dilemmas, which certainly may arise with respect to (...) what one should do, but which cannot exist with respect to what, in the given circumstances, one must do. To decide what the latter obligation is, is indeed difficult and complicated. It involves priorities unattainable in the prevailing conditions, for others considered more important. But once the priorities have been settled, what must be done is unequivocal and further conflict of duties is precluded. A moral code, says Rescher, is intended as a guide to conduct, which it could not be if it were specific in every detail. Rules must therefore be general, and particular situations require their modification in order to ensure the best results. This leaves room for, and requires, casuistry the balancing and harmonizing of potentially conflicting demands to achieve the best possible in the circumstances. (shrink)

In the midst of the religious upheaval of Victorian England, from 1860 to 1880, Matthew Arnold proposed a broad middle way between the shocking new secularism and the easily shocked clerical conservatism, which were warring over the philosophy of Evolution, Christian dogma and Biblical criticism. Full of moral seriousness in conduct, which for him composed ‘three–quarters’ of human life, and anxious to preserve religion as the natural fulfilment of deep human need, he simply proposed that its supreme written source, the (...) Christian Bible be regarded, neither as the expression of literal fact nor of unscientific theory, but as moving literature to be interpreted by the mature insight of wide humanist culture. The late works in which he proposed this religious novelty in contrast with his purely literary efforts have been depreciated commonly and their message misinterpreted, as the epigram of F. Meyers shrewdly observes: “He has been treated as a flippant and illusory Christian, instead of as a specially devout and conservative agnostic”. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus in recent literature that Nietzsche adheres to some form of “naturalism,” that his closest philosophical kin are Hume and Darwin rather than Derrida.1 Despite this consensus, however, scholars disagree as to the relationship between Nietzsche’s naturalism and his ethics.2 The most prominent interpretation is that Nietzsche is an ethical naturalist in the Aristotelian tradition. According to this interpretation, the good life for an individual is derived from natural “type-facts” about him.3 Each individual possesses certain (...) natural interests and capacities in virtue of being a member of a type, such that the satisfaction or fulfillment of these needs or capacities amounts to her.. (shrink)

This paper challenges the hitherto common distinction between Hermann Cohen’s early phase of Völkerpsychologie and his later phase as a critical idealist. Recently, it has been claimed that Cohen’s turn was not a rapid conversion but a development that was already inherent to his early view. This paper argues that even in Cohen’s mature critical idealism, a thin basis of Völkerpsychologie continues to exist. Cohen’s critical programme is presented as having a twofold aim: On the one hand, it strives (...) to give an account of pure, formal, and logical laws that regulate critical thinking; on the other hand, it offers a reading of Kant’s dualism between matter and form that allows critical thinking to be seen as inevitably embedded in causal laws of psychology, history, and physiology. Concerning the latter, the paper argues that Cohen remained in the tradition of Völkerpsychologie in his mature ethical thought. (shrink)

This paper challenges the hitherto common distinction between Hermann Cohen’s early phase of Völkerpsychologie and his later phase as a critical idealist. Recently, it has been claimed that Cohen’s turn was not a rapid conversion but a development that was already inherent to his early view. This paper argues that even in Cohen’s mature critical idealism, a thin basis of Völkerpsychologie continues to exist. Cohen’s critical programme is presented as having a twofold aim: On the one hand, it strives (...) to give an account of pure, formal, and logical laws that regulate critical thinking; on the other hand, it offers a reading of Kant’s dualism between matter and form that allows critical thinking to be seen as inevitably embedded in causal laws of psychology, history, and physiology. Concerning the latter, the paper argues that Cohen remained in the tradition of Völkerpsychologie in his mature ethical thought. (shrink)

In this paper I defend certain features of F. H. Bradley's moral, and to a lesser extent political, philosophy in the wake of recent feminist critiques of ethics. I attempt to establish congeniality with Bradley's ethical and political theory to current discussions in feminist ethics. Not only is Bradley's idealism consistent with feminist ethics, but it is able to meet several standard feminist objections to traditional moral theory. In spite of making sexist comments characteristic of the nineteenth century, (...) Bradley's ethical-political doctrine does not necessarily imply sexism, and is indeed coextensive with much current feminist theory. Before proceeding to this duscussion it is necessary to undertake a brief review of the intellectual origins of, and current state of debate in, feminist ethics. (shrink)

W. J. Mander examines the nature of idealist ethics, that is to say, the form and content of ethical belief most typically adopted by philosophical idealists. His inquiry has two aims. The first is historical: from the record of past philosophy, Mander demonstrates that there exists a discernible idealist approach to moral philosophy; a tradition of 'idealist ethics', and examines its characteristic marks and varieties. The second aim is apologetic. He argues that such idealist ethics offers an attractive way (...) of looking at moral questions and that it has much to contribute to contemporary discussion. In particular he argues that Idealist ethics have the power to cut through the sterile opposition between moral realism and moral anti-realism. To be an idealist is precisely to hold that the universe is so constituted that things are real if and only if they are ideal; to hold that uncovering in something the work of mind makes it more not less significant. (shrink)

Recent communication and discussion concerning corporate governance, CSR, codes of conduct and other ethical policies have restored the tarnished reputation of the business world which followed a spate of financial scandals. However, one also notices an increased dissonance between the attractive messages emanating from business leaders and the reality. This disconnection between the ‘CSR rhetoric and corporate governance ethics’ and the practical reality experienced within companies leads to hypocrisy. The reality seems too often in contradiction with the idealistic character (...) of corporate communication.In our paper, we analyse the impact of communication and perception on the image and reputation of the company. We survey the characteristics of the media, which include lack of nuance and the tendency to generalization, amplification and reduction. We confront the hypocrisy in the contradiction between words and deeds, and briefly analyse the reasons for this disconnection between message and reality. The continuum from idealism to hypocrisy to position a company in function of the degree of congruence or dissonance between communication and reality forms the basis for a sincerity index. (shrink)

This book offers a unique account of the development of thinking about nature from Early German Romanticism into the philosophies of nature of Schelling, Hegel, and beyond. Alison Stone explores the ethical and political implications of German Romantic and Idealist ideas about nature, including for gender, race, and environmentalism.

Not content with merely telling us how to find a way back to objective idealism, Hosle exhibits his philosophy in a wide-ranging series of essays on topics ranging from the greatness and limits of Kant's practical philosophy to the moral ends and means of world population policy, from moral reflection and the decay of institutions in the enlightenment and counter- enlightenment to a reflection on philosophical foundations of a future humanism in our world of overinformation.

This paper is aimed at investigating the differences in ethical perception between Mainland China and Hong Kong through qualitative analysis. The level of idealism and relativism of the informants are measured quantitatively. The qualitative analysis of the viewpoints of participants from Hong Kong and other Chinese cities offers a profound understanding of ethical perception. Contradicting previous studies, our research offers a fresh perspective, indicating that those with high idealism are not always the ones who condemn misconduct (...) or advocate for whistle-blowing. Interestingly, we noted that individuals with high relativism frequently consider and emphasize alternative perspectives, rather than merely condemning or advocating misconduct and whistle-blowing. Conversely, those with low relativism frequently exhibit more anger, regardless of their stance. This discovery suggests that high relativism could be beneficial for facilitating communication between conflicting parties. (shrink)

A new moral philosophy emerged on the British philosophical scene in the late 1870s, one referred to as the idealist ethic of social self-realization, which rapidly became the dominant mode of moral thought for over twenty years. This chapter discusses the views of the pioneers of idealist ethics, F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green.

The purpose of this present research is to expand upon the foundation that codes of ethics are more useful guides to managers in their behavior and decision-making when managers are more familiar with code content and intentions. We explore whether the impact of code familiarity on code usefulness differs: (a) under varying conditions of turbulence and (b) between persons with relativist versus idealist personal values. Data have been collected from a sample of 1700 executives in member companies of the U.S. (...) Direct Selling Association, and responses were received from 286 (16.8% returned). Perceptions of ethics code familiarity and usefulness decline as business turbulence increases. The decline in familiarity/usefulness was more pronounced for managers with a relativistic ethical orientation. (shrink)