This book presents the state of the art in the fields of formal logic pioneered by Graham Priest. It includes advanced technical work on the model and proof theories of paraconsistent logic, in contributions from top scholars in the field. Graham Priest’s research has had a considerable influence on the field of philosophical logic, especially with respect to the themes of dialetheism—the thesis that there exist true but inconsistent sentences—and paraconsistency—an account of deduction in which contradictory premises do not entail (...) the truth of arbitrary sentences. Priest’s work has regularly challenged researchers to reappraise many assumptions about rationality, ontology, and truth. This book collects original research by some of the most esteemed scholars working in philosophical logic, whose contributions explore and appraise Priest’s work on logical approaches to problems in philosophy, linguistics, computation, and mathematics. They provide fresh analyses, critiques, and applications of Priest’s work and attest to its continued relevance and topicality. The book also includes Priest’s responses to the contributors, providing a further layer to the development of these themes. (shrink)

In this work, we investigate the relationship between paraconsistent semantics and some well-known topological spaces such as connected and continuous spaces. We also discuss homotopies as truth preserving operations in paraconsistent topological models.

Paraconsistent logics are the formal systems in which absurdities do not trivialise the logic. In this paper, we give Hintikka-style game theoretical semantics for a variety of paraconsistent and non-classical logics. For this purpose, we consider Priest’s Logic of Paradox, Dunn’s First-Degree Entailment, Routleys’ Relevant Logics, McCall’s Connexive Logic and Belnap’s four-valued logic. We also present a game theoretical characterisation of a translation between Logic of Paradox/Kleene’s K3 and S5. We underline how non-classical logics require different verification games and prove (...) the correctness theorems of their respective game theoretical semantics. This allows us to observe that paraconsistent logics break the classical bidirectional connection between winning strategies and truth values. (shrink)

Dans son influent Proofs and Refutations (Preuves et Réfutations), Lakatos introduit les méthodes de preuves et de réfutations en discutant l’histoire et le développement de la formule V — E+F = 2 d’Euler pour les polyèdres en 3 dimensions. Lakatos croyait, en effet, que l’histoire du polyèdre présentait un bon exemple pour sa philosophie et sa méthodologie des mathématiques, incluant la géométrie. Le présent travail met l’accent sur les propriétés mathématiques et topologiques qui sont incorporées dans l’approche méthodologique de Lakatos. (...) Pour chaque exemple et contre-exemple utilisé par Lakatos, nous présenterons brièvement sa contrepartie topologique, ce qui nous permettra de présenter les fondations et les motivations mathématiques derrière sa philosophie de la méthodologie des mathématiques et finalement, par ce fait même, nous développerons certaines intuitions sur le fonctionnement de ses notions d’heuristique négative et d’heuristique positive. (shrink)

Dans son influent Proofs and Refutations (Preuves et Réfutations), Lakatos introduit les méthodes de preuves et de réfutations en discutant l’histoire et le développement de la formule V — E+F = 2 d’Euler pour les polyèdres en 3 dimensions. Lakatos croyait, en effet, que l’histoire du polyèdre présentait un bon exemple pour sa philosophie et sa méthodologie des mathématiques, incluant la géométrie. Le présent travail met l’accent sur les propriétés mathématiques et topologiques qui sont incorporées dans l’approche méthodologique de Lakatos. (...) Pour chaque exemple et contre-exemple utilisé par Lakatos, nous présenterons brièvement sa contrepartie topologique, ce qui nous permettra de présenter les fondations et les motivations mathématiques derrière sa philosophie de la méthodologie des mathématiques et finalement, par ce fait même, nous développerons certaines intuitions sur le fonctionnement de ses notions d’heuristique négative et d’heuristique positive. (shrink)

This article provides a brief overview of several formal frameworks concerning the relation between knowledge on the one hand, and obligation on the other. We discuss the paradox of the knower, knowledge based obligation, knowingly doing, deontic dynamic epistemology, descriptive obligations, and responsibilities as dynamic epistemology.

This paper introduces a game theoretical semantics for a particular logic of formal inconsistency called mbC.

History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.

The Brandenburger–Keisler paradox is a self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which can be viewed as a two-person version of Russell’s Paradox. Yablo’s Paradox, according to its author, is a non-self referential paradox, which created a significant impact. This paper gives a Yabloesque, non-self-referential paradox for infinitary players within the context of epistemic game theory. The new paradox advances both the Brandenburger–Keisler and Yablo results. Additionally, the paper constructs a paraconsistent model satisfying the paradoxical statement.

In this paper, we discuss Hintikka’s theory of interrogative approach to inquiry with a focus on bracketing. First, we dispute the use of bracketing in the interrogative model of inquiry arguing that bracketing provides an indispensable component of an inquiry. Then, we suggest a formal system based on strategy logic and logic of paradox to describe the epistemic aspects of an inquiry, and obtain a naturally paraconsistent system. We then apply our framework to some cases to illustrate its use.

This book discusses major milestones in Rohit Jivanlal Parikh’s scholarly work. Highlighting the transition in Parikh’s interest from formal languages to natural languages, and how he approached Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, it traces the academic trajectory of a brilliant scholar whose work opened up various new avenues in research. This volume is part of Springer’s book series Outstanding Contributions to Logic, and honours Rohit Parikh and his works in many ways. Parikh is a leader in the realm of ideas, offering (...) concepts and definitions that enrich the field and lead to new research directions. Parikh has contributed to a variety of areas in logic, computer science and game theory. In mathematical logic his contributions have been in recursive function theory, proof theory and non-standard analysis; in computer science, in the areas of modal, temporal and dynamic logics of programs and semantics of programs, as well as logics of knowledge; in artificial intelligence in the area of belief revision; and in game theory in the formal analysis of social procedures, with a strong undercurrent of philosophy running through all his work.This is not a collection of articles limited to one theme, or even directly connected to specific works by Parikh, but instead all papers are inspired and influenced by Parikh in some way, adding structures to and enriching “Parikh-land”. The book presents a brochure-like overview of Parikh-land before providing an “introductory video” on the sights and sounds that you experience when reading the book. (shrink)