_ Source: _Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 147 - 165 Though Hobbes consistently differentiates between the ‘subject’ and ‘servant’ across Elements of Law, On the Citizen, and Leviathan, we currently lack an exhaustive account of the Hobbesian servant. In this paper, I argue that the distinction would have profound consequences for one’s disposition toward both the commonwealth and the community at large. Because the servant joins under the immediate threat of violence and covenants directly with the sovereign, we would expect (...) her initial experience to contribute to a fundamentally more pessimistic attitude toward the commonwealth and atomistic understanding of her place in the body politic. On one level, this distinction could be used to distinguish privileged populations from otherwise marginalized groups. On another level, however, in revealing both the brute reality of sovereign power and the ways in which she is alienated from it, the servant gives us a more accurate understanding of the commonwealth than the subject’s own. (shrink)

I propose a theory of moral obligation that is inspired by the way obligation has been understood in the Anabaptist tradition. I use the resources of the theory to explain and defend the appropriateness of the Anabaptist claim that Christian ethics is unique. I also use the theory to show that some of the standard objections to Christian pacifism, the most visibly distinctive feature of Anabaptist ethics, are misplaced when pacifism is understood as an application of the theory I defend. (...) Finally, I suggest some theological and theoretical advantages this theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the claim that Christian theology gives us good reason to think that virtue is relative to individuals and communities, i.e., that what character traits are virtues for individuals is relative to individuals and to the communities of which they are members. I begin by reviewing the theological claims that I take to be relevant. I then argue that these claims make it plausible to conclude that virtue is morally redemptive and therefore relative to individuals and (...) communities. I then seek to use these conclusions to illuminate the discussion of the correctiveness of virtue. Finally I respond to some objections and suggest some further ways that my views could be developed. (shrink)