The aim of the article is to analyze the situation of contemporary logic with reference to the issue concerning connections between the pluralism of logical systems and relativism in logic. Accordingly, I seek answers to the following questions: Can the plurality of logic, more specifically, a large number and variety of systems constructed by logicians, be justified in a rational way? Does pluralism in logic imply the thesis of relativism? Is logical relativism in the contemporary philosophy of logic just a (...) superstition or is it a duly substantiated view? (shrink)

Jednym z głównych pytań w filozofii logiki jest to, czy jest jedna, czy wiele logik. Pytanie to doczekało się różnych odpowiedzi, które formułują opozycyjne stanowiska: monizm logiczny contra pluralizm logiczny. Za reprezentatywnego przedstawiciela monizmu uznawany jest Willard Van Orman Quine, a pluralizmu — Susan Haack. Oba te stanowiska są kontynuowane współcześnie: monizm (m.in. Michael Dummett, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson) oraz pluralizm (m.in. Jc Beall i Greg Restall, Johan van Benthem, Ottavio Bueno i Scott Shalkovski, Stewart Shapiro i Roy Cook). Monizm (...) jest znacznie mniej preferowany niż pluralizm. W artykule wskazano na źródła pluralizmu w logice (m.in. wieloznaczność spójników języka naturalnego, prawdy i wynikania) oraz przywołano argumentacje wybranych przedstawicieli tego stanowiska. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest analiza Józefa M. Bocheńskiego zabobonów występujących w logice w odniesieniu do żywo współcześnie dyskutowanej w filozofii logiki problematyki pluralizmu logicznego. Koncentruję się na jednym zabobonie, nazwanym hasłowo „relatywizm w logice”, który pojawił się w związku z powstaniem nieklasycznych rachunków logicznych. Rozważam problem, czy pluralizm w logice, rozumiany jako współistnienie wielu (nieskończenie wielu) systemów logicznych, przekreślajedność logiki i sprzeciwia się jej normatywnemu charakterowi oraz czy z tego faktu można wyprowadzić wniosek o relatywizmie w logice.

O czterech typach argumentacji na rzecz logiki klasycznej Moim celem w tym artykule jest analiza argumentacji pod kątem poprawności standardowej logiki. Formułuję też kilka uwag krytycznych i porównawczych. Skupiam się na czterech najbardziej spójnych i kompletnych argumentach, które próbują uzasadnić wyróżnione stanowisko logiki klasycznej. Istnieją następujące argumenty: argumentacja pragmatyczno-metodologiczna Willarda van O. Quine’a, argumentacja filozoficzno-metalogiczna Jana Woleńskiego, argumentacja ontologiczno-semantyczna Stanisława Kiczuka, argumentacja metalogiczna. Moim zdaniem teza o poprawności logiki klasycznej jest racjonalnie uzasadniona tymi argumentacjami. Pozostaje problem, czy analizowana logika standardowa (...) jest jedyną właściwą logiką. (shrink)

Ludwik Borkowski’s vast knowledge of philosophy allowed him to put his logical studies in a philosophical context. As a logician, he continued the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw school. He dealt with the basic issues of the widely understood logic as well as with those having strong philosophical implications (e.g. non-classical logics, the theory of truth, natural deduction, the theory of consequence). He also worked on the theory of definition and the intuitive interpretation of logical results. For Borkowski, logic was an (...) autonomous science whose function is supposed to be ancillary towards the other sciences. Although he did not write any typical philosophical-logical works, investigating philosophical sources, inspirations and the implications of logical results was something he did throughout the whole period of his creative activity. (shrink)

A review of Marcin Tkaczyk, Futura contingentia, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2015, pp. 450, ISBN 978-83-8061-111-5.

WHAT IS LOGICAL PLURALISM? (J.C. BEALL’S AND GREG RESTALL’S STANDPOINT) S u m m a r y C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical (...) consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics. The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics. The paper—apart from presenting LP—also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the applicability of systems of many-valued logics. Those systems are claimed to be applicable in many local fields, e.g.: future contingents, semantic paradoxes, vagueness, meaninglessness, sense without denotation, undecidable sentences, quantum mechanics, cybernetics, mathematical machine theory. It is claimed that the many-valued logic does not need accepting any additional truth-values apart from classical 'true' and 'false'. In other words, it does not need rejecting the rule of bivalence. Intermediate values are most often understood (...) as epistemic variants of classical truth-values, the assignment of classical truth-value to non-classical bearers, or as the lack of classical truth-value. Thus, the many-valued logic only apparently constitutes a threat for the classical logic. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: 10.1007/s11225-021-09980-z.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest systematyczny namysł i próba oceny badań Dariusza Kuboka nad krytycyzmem, związanych z monografią Krytycyzm, sceptycyzm i zetetycyzm we wczesnej filozofii greckiej, która problematyzuje krytycyzm z perspektywy filozoficznej i prezentuje nowy paradygmat interpretacyjny wczesnej filozofii greckiej. Artykuł składa się z trzech części. Pierwsza przybliża część dorobku publikacyjnego Polskiego Badacza, będącego drogą do jego głównego dzieła. Druga omawia problem, metodę i strukturę opus magnum. Trzecia poddaje ocenie badania, a także ich znaczenie z perspektywy filozoficznej oraz ogólnohumanistycznej.

"I. Roman Suszko (9.11.1919, Podobora – 3.06.1979, Warsaw) was one of the most fascinating personalities in Polish academic community after the Second World War and one of the most outstanding logicians of the time. He was above all a scientist but he also participated in academic life. He was Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at Warsaw University for two terms of office. He studied abstract problems of logic, but also played a part in the satirical film Rejs [The Cruise] (...) directed by M. Piwowski. Suszko was involved in various scientific problems, for example: logical syntax of natural language, liar antynomy, logical probability; but two of his achievements have the greatest value for philosophy of science, i.e., diachronic logic and non-Fregean logic. Like Ferdinand de Saussure, who, in his monograph Cours de Linguistique Générale.. (shrink)

The main thrust of my argument was that ad hoc su gge s ti ons of ch a ri ty cannot replace a systematic and theoreti c a lly inform ed approach to poverty rel i ef . Ch a ri t a ble don a ti on som eti m e s h elps—and som etimes harm s — but is no general solution to global poverty, and can be po s i tively dangerous wh en pre s en (...) ted as such. We need to consider, and often choose, other routes to helping the poor—including ethical to u rism and fair trade in lu x u ry goods. We will not be able to invest in such feasible routes if we give away all our extra income, as Singer recommends. Sticking to donation above all, when a combination of other strategies is necessary, is highly likely to harm the poor. Si n ger doe s n’t re a lly en ga ge my argumen t . In s te ad , he cari c a tu res our “f u n d a m ental disa greem en t” :a pp a ren t ly, Si n ger rej ects va ri o u s policies because he takes into account the “f act s” ; wh ereas Ku per is the one seeking a “f a i t h ,” a “po l i tical ph i l o s ophy. . . i m mune to ref ut a ti on on the basis of evi den ce .” Anyon e who has re ad my arti cle (pp. 1 07 - 2 0) must fin d this puzzling. The arti cle explains at len g t h wh i ch kinds of b ack ground theories help us to d i s cern and re s pon s i bly con s i der the rel eva n t f act s . I show that Si n ger sel ects and uses fact s u n c ri ti c a lly prec i s ely because he has no po l i tical econ omy, no po l i tical soc i o l ogy, and no t h eory of ju s ti ce . We are seri o u s ly misled if we do not draw adequ a tely on the wi s dom and.. (shrink)

In 1905 was publshed a biographical nowel written by Adolf Nowaczyński entitled Portrait of Mikołaj Rej from Nagłowice. While the novel was being written, there were not enough comprehensive and reliable materials about Rej’s life. The purpose of this work is to show pieces of work which were used by Nowaczyński in his novel. Only thanks to searching analysis of those hypothetical available materials the author could manage to establish sources of the hero’s creation. We are sure to say that (...) while writing a novel about Rej, Nowaczyński took some pieces information from Andrzej Trzecieski’s biograhy from the XVI century and Zbigniew n‘aziohtcki’s biography from the XIX century. We can suppose that the author of the Crcation knew the results of Beicikowski’s research. (shrink)