What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism (...) or the principles that distinguish Bare Particularism from rival views that entails a constituent ontology. I outline a version of Bare Particularism that in rejecting a constituent ontology avoids the New Objection. I argue against Theodore Sider that this really is a distinct theory to the version of Bare Particularism that endorses a constituent ontology, and not a mere terminological variant. I show that this, the best version of the Bare Particular Theory, is also defensible against the old objections. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject (...) them. (shrink)

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. (...) If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence. (shrink)

The claim that there are bare particulars — individuals possessing no properties — is a highly controversial thesis in metaphysics. It has been heavily criticized and is often thought to be subject to a number of decisive counterarguments, some of which aim to show that there is something incoherent about the very idea of a bare particular. I believe that the theory of bare particulars can, given certain modifications, be defended from such accusations. But the fact (...) that a theory is not incoherent does not suffice for it to be a good theory, and I believe that the theory of bare particulars — although capable of coherence — is a deeply unsatisfactory theory in metaphysics, for reasons rarely appreciated in the discussion. In sections 2 and 3 of this paper, I introduce the notion of a bare particular by presenting two of the central theoretical tasks for which the postulation of such entities has been thought necessary. In section 4, I present three of the classical arguments intended to show that the theory of bare particulars is fundamentally flawed or even incoherent. In section 5, I argue that if we adopt what I call the minimal view of bare particulars, the theory can handle all of these objections. Finally, in section 6, I argue that despite not being undermined by the classical arguments, the minimal view of bare particulars makes it highly implausible to suppose that there are any entities of that kind. The theory of bare particulars can be made coherent only at the cost of being made highly theoretically unattractive. (shrink)

One often hears a complaint about “bare particulars”. This complaint has bugged me for years. I know it bugs others too, but no one seems to have vented in print, so that is what I propose to do. (I hope also to say a few constructive things along the way.) The complaint is aimed at the substratum theory, which says that particulars are, in a certain sense, separate from their universals. If universals and particulars are separate, connected to (...) each other only by a relation of instantiation, then, it is said, the nature of these particulars becomes mysterious. In themselves, they do not have any properties at all. They are nothing but a pincushion into which universals may be poked. They are Locke’s “I know not what” (1689, II, xxiii, §2); they are Plato’s receptacles (Timaeus 48c–53c); they are “bare particulars”.1 Against substratum theory there is the bundle theory, according to which particulars are just bundles of universals. The substratum and bundle theories agree on much. They agree that both universals and particulars exist. And they agree that a particular in some sense has universals. (I use phrases like ‘particular P has universal U ’ and ‘particular P ’s universals’ neutrally as between the substratum and bundle theories.) But the bundle theory says that a particular is exhaustively composed of (i.e., is a mereological fusion of) its universals. The substratum theory, on the other hand, denies this. Take a particular, and mereologically subtract away its universals. Is anything left? According to the bundle theory, no. But according to the substratum theory, something is indeed left. Call this remaining something a thin particular. The thin particular does not contain the universals as parts; it instantiates them. (shrink)

See Abstract under this title of the journal article below.

1 A particular may have other particulars as parts, but according to the bundle theory its ultimate constituents are confined to universals. Parts are different from constituents or components. A part is a type of constituent, but there are constituents that are not parts. Parts belong to the same general category as the whole: if a concrete particular has parts, those parts will themselves be concrete particulars. This is not always the case with constituents: the constituents of a (...) fact do not have to be facts and the constituents (or members) of a set do not have to be sets. The relation of “being a part of” is also transitive, whereas the relation of “being a constituent of” is not always transitive. If a particular has parts, such as atoms, then its constituents include its intrinsic properties, its atoms, and the arrangement relation. If an atom has parts, such as subatomic particles, then the constituents of the atom include its properties, the subatomic particles, and the arrangement universal. If it is like this all the way down without any termination (no bedrock), then the bundle theory says that at each stage there are only universals and ordinary particulars with parts, in other words there are no bare particulars. This approach should also work if there were arbitrary undetached parts that are real entities. The alternative to no bedrock is metaphysical atomism. There are two ways that metaphysical atomism could be true in classical mechanics: (1) if the ultimate constituents of matter are point particles — perhaps electrons are point particles, (2) if matter is continuously divisible and arbitrary undetached parts are not real entities or real parts. But it would be rash to say that these were the only two options for all theories. Point particles are a convenient kind of particular to think about when discussing the bundle theory. There could be just three properties bundled together, a certain mass, a certain charge, and the property of being point like.. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell's Bundle Theory of Particulars presents and evaluates Russell's arguments for two competing theories on the nature of particulars at different stages in his career: the substratum theory of particulars (1903-1913) and the bundle theory of particulars (1940-1948). Through its original focus on Russell's little known metaphysics in the later part of his career, this study explains why Russell's theory of particulars is relevant today. It argues that a Russellian realist bundle (...) class='Hi'>theory is indeed the best explanation of similarities and differences that we observe around us thanks to the ontological economy such a theory provides and its strength and completeness as a theory of the nature of reality. Tackling the major criticisms levelled against the realist bundle theory - the problem of individuation, the problem of necessity, and the problem of analyticity - this study presents and defends a tenable Russellian bundle theory which can answer the objections. Bertrand Russell's Bundle Theory of Particulars is a novel and significant contribution to Russell scholarship. (shrink)

Must we choose between reducing material substances to collections of properties, a’ la Berkeley and Hume or positing bare particulars, in the manner of Locke? Having repudiated the notion that a substance could simply be a collection of properties existing on their own, is there a viable alternative to the Lockean notion of a substratum, a being essentially devoid of character? E.J. Lowe and Michael Loux would answer here in the affirmative. Both recommend hylomorphism as an upgrade on the (...) metaphysics of the British empiricists: treating a material substance as its essential 'form,' this embodied 'substance' universal being, in turn, the substratum in which its 'accidents' inhere. Here, I evaluate this Aristotelian metaphysics, identifying the advantages it enjoys over the empiricist's alternatives pertaining to dependence, unity, identity, change, and the distinction between essential and accidental properties. I also develop solutions to the two problems that Loux sees it posing. (shrink)

Within some ontological theories, bare or thin particulars are the “kernel” of ordinary substances and they are supposed to clarify some key features of the latter, including their nature. In this article, I wish to offer a new theory of bare particulars, based on an interpretation of properties as modes and on a new reading of the dependence relations holding among entities in terms of respects of dependence. In Section 1, I shall introduce bare particulars, modes (...) and respects of dependence. In Section 2, I shall consider the relationships between bare particulars, clothed particulars (i.e., ordinary substances) and their properties. I shall present two models and I shall examine some of their problems. In Section 3 and in Section 4, I shall present a new model by invoking modes and respects of dependence. This will ground my theory of the relationships between bare particulars, clothed particulars and their properties. Finally, in Section 5, I shall compare my model with the second model presented in Section 2 and, in Section 6, I shall deal with some objections against bare particulars and against my own theory. (shrink)

Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the (...) three arguments Mertz raises against bare particulars. To substantiate this assertion, we clarify the nature of bare particulars as individuators, state Mertz's objections, and respond to them. We conclude that Mertz has failed to show that bare particular theory is untenable. (shrink)

Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the (...) three arguments Mertz raises against bare particulars. To substantiate this assertion, we clarify the nature of bare particulars as individuators, state Mertz's objections, and respond to them. We conclude that Mertz has failed to show that bare particular theory is untenable. (shrink)

In his paper Bare Particulars, T. Sider claims that one of the most plausible candidates for bare particulars are spacetime points. The aim of this paper is to shed light on Sider’s reasoning and its consequences. There are three concepts of spacetime points that allow their identification with bare particulars. One of them, Moderate structural realism, is considered to be the most adequate due its appropriate approach to spacetime metric and moderate view of mereological simples. However, it (...) pushes the Substratum theory to dismiss primitive thisness as the only identity condition for bare particulars, but the paper argues that such elimination is a legitimate step. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of the nature of concrete particulars come in two basic kinds, those according to which a concrete particular consists of properties and a bearer of those properties (a substratum), and those according to which a concrete particular consists only of its properties, in a relation of compresence or concurrence. Substrata are theoretical entities defined by their explanatory functions. As such, there is not much disagreement about their nature: they are propertyless, unobservable constituents of concrete particulars that are the (...) bearers of properties 1 and the individuators of distinct particulars. The situation is different with respect to properties. Among realists, some think properties are universals, either transcendent (Platonists) or immanent (Aristotelians), and some 2 think they are particulars (“tropes” ). Of the resultant possible positions on the nature of concrete particulars, six have been the focus of recent philosophical attention. These theories variously identify concrete particulars with (i) material substrata bearing transcendent universals, (ii) material substrata bearing immanent universals, (iii) material substrata bearing abstract particulars, (iv) bundles of transcendent universals, (v) bundles of immanent universals, and (vi) bundles of abstract particulars. (shrink)

The traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by a "substratum" was rejected by conscientious empiricists like Berkeley, Hume and Russell on the grounds that only qualities, not the substratum, could be experienced. To these philosophers the proper alternative seemed obvious. One simply eliminates the "unknowable" element in which qualities are alleged to inhere. In Russell's words, "What would commonly be called a 'thing' is nothing but a bundle of coexisting qualities such as redness, hardness, (...) etc."' But this empiricist formula has difficulties of its own, and some philosophers have attempted to develop other views of particulars which avoid the errors of the Substratum Doctrine on the one hand and the Bundle-of¬Qualities Theory on the other.2 Discussions of what this third alternative might be have generally approached the question through an examination of the epistemologically suspect concepts of a substratum and its close relative, the concept of a "bare particular". The concept of a quality of something, because it seemingly presents no epistemological difficulties, has attracted much less critical attention. This imbalance in critical interest is unfortunate, however, for a close scrutiny of this latter concept, especially in its role as the key element in the "bundle" analysis of particulars, throws a great deal of light on the relation between particulars and their attributes. -/- . (shrink)

A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist’s Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject (...) spatiotemporally located zero-dimensional property instances. Finally, it is argued that since she must accept such instances if she accepts zero-dimensional material object bundles, she ought to avoid the latter. This leaves bare particular theory as the default view of zero-dimensional material objects. The argument for the second premise invokes the thesis that the exemplification of at least one sparse property is a prerequisite for the existence of any particular. It is argued from Humean considerations that bare particulars fail this prerequisite. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of 'equivalent' to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps : first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with (...) tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not be equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it's precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing. (shrink)

Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to (...) class='Hi'>bare particularism, but, by looking at a series of questions, to instead specify what, if one is a bare particularist, one is committed to. Along the way, I address three major objections: a classic objection about whether bare particulars have properties, a new objection raised by Bailey, and an understanding objection that questions some of the position’s resources. (shrink)

Field theories have been central to physics over the last 150 years, and there are several theories in contemporary physics in which physical fields play key causal and explanatory roles. This paper proposes a novel field trope-bundle (FTB) ontology on which fields are composed of bundles of particularized property instances, called tropes and goes on to describe some virtues of this ontology. It begins with a critical examination of the dominant view about the ontology of fields, that fields are (...) properties of a substantial substratum. (shrink)

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with (...) the claim that it is necessary that particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by an "unknowable substratum." To them the proper alternative seemed obvious. Eliminate the substratum in which qualities are alleged to inhere, leaving a bundle of coexisting qualities--a view that we may call the Bundle Theory or BT. But by rejecting only part of the traditional substratum theory instead of replacing it entirely, Bundle Theories perpetuate certain confusions which are (...) found in the Substratum Doctrine. I examine two major types of BT developed by Russell and by G. F. Stout with the intention of showing that (1) the seemingly innocuous concept of "a quality" employed by these versions cannot be used to state their theories coherently, and (2) the fatal problems that the BT encounters point to a more satisfactory and interesting alternative to both the Substratum Doctrine and the BT. This is a view that I call the Qualified Particulars Theory. In a final section I draw morals from this discussion that apply to the analogous Humean view that a mind is a "bundle of perceptions and sensations.". (shrink)

In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I (...) then distinguish various ways in which a bare particular might be thought to have a nature and show that on none of these is it possible for a bare particular to be a constituent of a complex particular. Thus, Moreland’s attempt to resurrect bare particulars as ontologically indispensable entities is not wholly without difficulties. (shrink)

1 See for example, E. J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics, pp. 51-3, 210-220, and David Lewis, The Plurality of Worlds on the notion of concrete object. 2 The properties that are constituents of a particular should be intrinsic properties, though it need not be assumed that all its intrinsic properties are constituents. The notion of intrinsic property is easier if a sparse view (as opposed to an abundant view) of properties is assumed. A sparse view requires a criterion for (...) being a property, such as a causal principle (Shoemaker) or the related Eleatic principle (Armstrong). Intrinsic properties should be real properties. Such a criterion should rule out conjunctive properties, disjunctive properties, and negated properties. On the hand, it could be stipulated that these are not intrinsic properties. Those that believe in abundant properties should use the criterion to divide properties into two classes (natural and non-natural); intrinsic properties would then be located in the first class. Extrinsic properties are properties that an object possesses in virtue of other objects, their properties, and relations that involve them. If these other objects were to disappear all intrinsic properties would be unaffected. Intrinsic properties are non-relational in the sense that an object does not possesses them in virtue of other objects, their properties, and relations between them. However, intrinsic properties can be relational when an object possesses a (monadic) property in virtue of relations between its parts. Paradigmatic intrinsic properties are the mass, charge, magnetic moment, and spin of the electron as normally understood. (shrink)

Bundle Theory is the view that every concrete particular object is solely constituted by its universals. This theory is often criticized for not accommodating the possibility of symmetrical universes, such as one that contains two indiscernible spheres two meters from each other in otherwise empty space. One bundle theoretic solution to this criticism holds that the fact that the spheres stand in a weakly discerning—i.e., irreflexive and symmetric—relation, such as being two meters from, is sufficient for (...) the numerical diversity of the spheres. For this solution to be effective, however, it should be established that weak discernibility not only necessitates but also explains numerical diversity. In this paper, I argue that the fact that two objects have a certain distance between them does explain why they are non-identical. I also argue that the worry that the weak discernibility approach has some circularity problems is not well-founded. (shrink)

The general aim of this paper is to defend a theory of properties grounded on universals and the notion of substratum. We offer first a brief survey of some problems concerning the attribution of properties to objects and the similarity of objects. We next characterize the notion of universal by contrasting universals against other entities that have often been postulated in order to account for the mentioned problems. Besides, we distinguish two different theories of properties, both based on the (...) notion of universal: the bundle theory of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to some of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to some of the serious objections that have been posed against the substratum theory. Firstly, we argue that the theory of temporal stages can solve some problems deriving from the substantial change and the accidental change; moreover, we give a reply to some objections advanced against this substratum as a bare particular. Thirdly, we discuss some objections to the use that the substratum theory makes of these bare particulars as individuators. Our reply is based on a distinction between three different roles that can be ascribed to an entity: a particularizer role and two kinds of individuatory roles . We argue that a substratum can perfectly play a rol as a particularizer and also as an intraworld individuator. Finally, we offer a solution to the well known Bradley´s regressum. (shrink)

My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to (...) class='Hi'>bare particulars. However, within the framework of a realist constituent ontology, bare particulars provide for a coherent theory of individuation—one with a potentially significant theoretical price tag, but one that also has advantages over rival theories. (shrink)

Bare particulars tend to get a bad rap. But often, the arguments lodged against bare particulars seem to miss important aspects of the theoretical context of bare particulars. In particular, these arguments fail to situate bare particulars within a constituent ontology with substrates, and thus fail to appreciate an important consequence of that context: the need for two types of exemplification. In this paper, I do three things. First, I motivate and describe the need, given (...) class='Hi'>bare particulars, for two types of exemplification, and explore more generally how constituent ontologies with substrates ought to think about exemplification. Second, I show how Andrew Bailey’s (2012) new argument against bare particulars fails when that need is charitably considered. Third, I highlight where bare particular theory ought to be pressed, which turns out to be precisely its account of exemplification. (shrink)

This paper looks at Gregory of Nyssa's so-called "bundle theory" sensible individuals and matter (as recently argued by Gerd Van Riel and Thomas Wauters in a 2020 article) amidst the broader context of Gregory's view of created beings and his reception of Neoplatonist, Stoic, and Aristotelian conceptions of particulars and matter. I argue that Gregory's position is closer to an Aristotelian position, despite the parallels to Plotinus and other contemporaneous bundle theory positions: in arguing against prime (...) matter, and insofar as he emphasizes the identity of each kind of created being with its material substrate—understood as a "bundle" of properties—Gregory inadvertently upholds a reading of Aristotle that refutes an ontological notion of prime matter. (shrink)

This dissertation consists of a philosophico-historical study of Duns Scotus' theory of individuation. In order to do justice to the history of philosophy, it grants a fair hearing to the problem of individuation as he conceived it, his criticisms of various theories available at his time, and his own intriguing theory of haecceitas. His doctrines of the formal distinction, the real unity of the common nature, and ultimate differences are studied in some detail because his explanation of haecceitas (...) by a triple analogy between the individual difference and the specific difference presupposed them. From a philosophical point of view, however, it is useful to study a contemporary counterpart of haecceitas in order to understand Scotus' conception better. Thus, this study attempts to show that the widespread interpretation of haecceitas as an individual essence or a coordinate quality is not supported by Scotus' major writings. Haecceitas, in fact, is somewhat similar to Bergmann's bare particular. So, a comparison of haecceitas and the bare particular is drawn in order to understand the similarities and differences between them and understand Scotus' theory better. (shrink)

This paper provides a rational reconstruction of a Platonic trope bundle theory that is a live alternative to contemporary bundle theories. According to the theory, Platonic particulars are composed of what Plato calls images of Forms; contemporary metaphysicians call these tropes. Tropes are dependent on Forms and the Receptacle, while trope bundles are structured by natural kinds using the Phaedo's principles of inclusion and exclusion and the Timaeus’ geometrised elements, as well as by co-location in the (...) Receptacle. Key elements of discussion include persistence and abundance of Plato's tropes. The resulting theory is compared with contemporary trope bundle theories. (shrink)

An argument to the effect that, under a few reasonable assumptions, the bare particular ontology is best understood in terms of supersubstativalism: objects are identical to regions of space(-time) and properties directly inhere in space(-time) points or region as their bearers.

If ordinary particulars are bundles of properties, and if properties are said to be universals, then three well-known objections arise : no particular can change, all particulars have all of their properties essentially (even the most insignificant ones), and there cannot be two numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible particulars. In this paper, I try to make a little headway on these issues and see how the objections can be met, if one accepts a certain view about persistence through time and (...) across possible worlds – namely, four-dimensionalism and its modal analogue. The paper is especially devoted to the second and third of the three objections. (shrink)

Bundle Theory is the view that every concrete particular object is solely constituted by its universals. This theory is often criticized for not accommodating the possibility of symmetrical universes, such as one that contains two indiscernible spheres two meters from each other in otherwise empty space. One bundle theoretic solution to this criticism holds that the fact that the spheres stand in a weakly discerning—i.e., irreflexive and symmetric—relation, such as being two meters from, is sufficient for (...) the numerical diversity of the spheres. For this solution to be effective, however, it should be established that weak discernibility not only necessitates but also explains numerical diversity. In this paper, I argue that the fact that two objects have a certain distance between them does explain why they are non-identical. I also argue that the worry that the weak discernibility approach has some circularity problems is not well-founded. (shrink)

Bundle theory reduces particulars to bundles of properties. Bundle theorists have been working to explain individuation within an ontology of repeatable properties, but the outcomes are not satisfactory. Even the trope approach toward properties is not capable of establishing individuation. This article argues that bundle theorists are wrong in searching for individuators within the bundles of properties. Rather, indi­viduation should be established within ontologically more fundamental level of events. Events, with their spatial and temporal character, enable (...) us to individuate the bundles of properties involved and this is one of the reasons for the superiority of bundle theory to other competitive theories of substance. (shrink)

I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. (...) Regarding experiences as events rather than peculiar sorts of particulars facilitates each of these points. (shrink)

I want to defend the “bundle theory” of mind from two criticisms which are sometimes levelled against it. The criticisms rest on the claim that particular experiences are “individuated” by the experiencer who has those experiences. One of these criticisms is that while it is logically impossible that there be an experience which is not had by some sentient or cognizant being, acceptance of the bundle theory would entail admission of the possibility of experiences without experiencers. (...) The other criticism is one which has been raised at least with respect to the most plausible form of the bundle theory. It is directed at that view which analyzes the conditions for an experience's membership in a given person's mind in terms of some external relationship between an experience and that particular person's body. The objection is, once again, that the view in question is committed to regarding as logically possible something which is in fact logically impossible. (shrink)

The metaphysical problem of individuation requires an answer to two different but intimately related questions: 1) How are we to characterize individuality ontologically? To what ontological category or logical type does individuality belong? 2) What sort of distinction is there between the individuality and nature of an individual, e.g., a real distinction, a modal distinction, a distinction of reason, or some other distinction My purpose in this article is to clarify a bare particular account of individuation and respond to (...) objections that have been raised against bare particulars as individuators. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI present a new objection to Bundle Theory. The objection rests on the repeatability of universals, and targets every version of Bundle Theory that assumes that concrete particulars constituted by the same universals are numerically identical. The only way that bundle theorists can elude this objection is to admit the possibility of distinct bundles constituted by the same universals. If even this view is untenable, then Bundle Theory as such is hopeless. Finally, I (...) show how the present inquiry reshapes the dialectical relationship between Bundle Theory and the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Our Ontological Commitment to Material Substances The Bundle Theory and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles Problems with the Bundle Theory The Bare Substratum Theory and the Principle of Acquaintance Objections to the Bare Substratum Theory An Alternative.

ACCORDING TO DUNS SCOTUS, what makes a material substance an individual is a positive entity which falls within the category of substance and contracts the specific nature to this or that. That entity, called haecceitas, together with the formal distinction, constitutes the core of Scotus' theory of individuation. But what is haecceitas? Haecceitas is not definable. Nor can we be acquainted with it. Then how could we understand it? Both negatively and positively, Scotus himself tried to give an answer (...) to this question. Before presenting his haecceitas theory, Scotus criticized six different types of rival theories available in his day: the position of the nominalists, the double negation theory, the theory of individuation by actual existence, the theory of individuation by quantity or other accidents, the theory of individuation by matter, and the theory attributed to Godfrey of Fontaines. In other words, he was explaining "what haecceitas is not" when he criticized these theories. More importantly, he tried to give us a positive characterization of haecceitas. Since he used "individual difference" as a synonym for "haecceitas," he resorted to an analogy between the specific difference and the individual difference in order to explain the notion of haecceitas. The problem is that twentieth-century ontologists may not be patient enough to study the triple analogy, which again presupposes Scotus' doctrines of the formal distinction and the ultimate difference. In order to draw their attention to Scotus' theory of individuation, one would need to discuss the following questions: How can we translate the term "haecceitas" into modern terminology? Is there any counterpart of haecceitas in contemporary ontology? For what reasons should we reintroduce haecceitas into the current discussion of individuation, if it has a good counterpart? Is there still anything significant left to add to our understanding of haecceitas? (shrink)

This book supports a version of the trope-bundle view of individual substances matching also with a coherent account of change, individuation and individual essences. In particular, it is argued that qualitative individuation and qualitative individual essences can be tackled within the frames of a trope account. The adoption of a trope BT together with the individuation of tropes via the bearer substance might create the feeling of circularity since tropes and substances seem mutually to individuate each other. The novel (...) solution to the problem developed here consists in showing that the individuation of concrete individual substances is independent, in crucial respects, from the fact that they are construed as bundles of tropes. Apart from metaphysician colleagues, the book is recommended for advanced students in analytic metaphysics. (shrink)

The theory of frames has recently been proposed as a universal format for knowledge representation in language, cognition and science. Frames represent categories as well as individual objects and events in terms of recursive attribute-value structures. In this paper, we would like to explore the potential ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations, with particular emphasis on the ontological status of the possessors of quality attributes in individual object frames. While not strictly incompatible with nominalistic, bundle- or substratum-theoretic approaches (...) to the metaphysics of particular objects, it will be argued that representing objects in terms of attribute-value structures is more in accordance with a tradition that can be traced back to Aristotle’s doctrine of physical substances. Attributes appear to describe primary potentialities of objects, which, in the Aristotelian view, are the unchangeable nature or essence, hence substance, of any separate object. (shrink)

Whether the mind is thought to be physical or non-physical, philosophers generally agree that there is an intimate connection between the mind and the self. Dualists have always maintained that the person is his mind and that he just happens to have a particular body. There has also been support for this in classical and contemporary literature on personal identity in the discussions of numerous hypothetical cases involving the transfer of “mental contents” from one body to another, often in the (...) form of “brain transplants”. In connection with each case the following question was raised: Does mental continuity guarantee that one will be the same person or is spatio-temporal continuity necessary? Most philosophers have thought that spatio-temporal continuity is not necessary, but that mental continuity is. Finally, very recently there has been much interest in two types of abnormal phenomena—the “split-brain” and multiple personalities—which give indications of there being more than one mental stream associated with a single body and, as a result, philosophers discussing these phenomena have thought that there is good reason to think of there being more than one self involved in such cases. (shrink)

Mirativity is a grammatical category or a linguistic strategy that makes explicit the surprising aspect of a piece of information. Different mirativity strategies appear in different languages. Evidentiality is a grammatical category that explicitly expresses the source of information, i.e. if something has been seen, heard or inferred. Whether mirativity forms part of evidentiality is an open question. An agent makes use of a mirativity marker when she or he expresses something about a surprising fact with respect to her or (...) his background knowledge. But there are different kinds of mirativity markers. Some of them are simple and direct and others, more complex, involve inferential processes. Here, we focus on complex mirativity and we compare it with inferred evidentials and deferred realizations. Our proposal goes beyond the purely linguistic analysis, since we try to interpret mirativity, and its role in interaction, as forming part of or involving a particular kind of inference, namely abduction. Mirativity can be used to express the surprising state that triggers an abductive reasoning but it can also encapsulate its result in such a way that it can be understood in relation to evidentiality. Thus, at least in some cases of complex mirativity, mirativity may convey indication about the source of information. Interesting for studies on dialogue is that they also indicate the degree of commitment of the speakers with the content of their own utterances. (shrink)

I offer a mereological bundle of universals theory of material objects. The theory says that objects are identical to fusions of immanent universals at regions of space. Immanent universals are in the objects that instantiate them, and they can be wholly located at many regions of space. The version of the bundle theory I offer explains these characteristics of immanent universals, and it captures the instantiation relation in terms of the part-whole relation. The version of (...) the theory I offer is simpler and more unified than other mereological bundle theories. Yet, it is not as encompassing as other versions. For I suppose throughout that space is a particular substance, but not a bundle of properties. (shrink)

The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be thatmanyproperties are ever instantiated byoneobject. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is argued here to be the best version of the relata-specific bundle theory—the (...) thesis that each instance of compresence has a special intrinsic nature in virtue of which it necessarily bundles its specific bundle-ees—is also a species of Russellian monism, labeled by David Chalmers as ‘constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism’. The upshot of this connection is significant for the metaphysics of the mind-body problem: a credible theory of property instantiation turns out to have a built-in account of how consciousness is grounded in certain (broadly) physical systems. (shrink)

The thematization of writing has often been seen as Derrida's personal contribution to modern philosophy, but it is significant that in his earliest extended discussions of it, he presented it as a sign of the times. This chapter focuses on Derrida's discussion of writing in the first part of Of Grammatology and provides an analysis of its stakes by bringing it into conversation with Althusser's new theory of reading. Althusser was the most powerful figure in the philosophy department. Derrida's (...) first publication, the “Introduction” was a contribution to the history and philosophy of science, a fact recognized by the Société des Amis de Jean Cavaillès, which awarded it their book prize in 1964. Writing, especially mathematical writing, for instance in algebra, seemed to represent best the formal systems of mathematics. (shrink)

This essay reads Derrida's early work within the context of the history of philosophy as an academic field in France. Derrida was charged with instruction in the history of philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure, and much of his own training focused on this aspect of philosophical study. The influence of French history of philosophy can be seen in Derrida's work before Of Grammatology, especially in his unpublished lectures for a 1964 course entitled “History and Truth,” in which he analyzed (...) the semantic richness of the word “history.” According to Derrida, “history” comprised both the ideas of change and of transmission, which allowed the writing of history at a later time. In the Western tradition, Derrida suggested, philosophers had consistently tried to reduce the idea of history as transmission, casting it simply as empirical development in order to preserve the idea that truth could be timeless. Derrida's account of the evolving opposition between history and truth within the history of philosophy led him to suggest a “history of truth” that transcended and structured the opposition. I argue that Derrida's strategies in these early lectures are critical for understanding his later and more famous deconstruction of speech and writing. Moreover, the impact of this early confrontation with the problem of history and truth helps explain the ambivalent response by historians to Derrida's analyses. (shrink)