This article argues that Machiavelli’s chapters on the Decemvirate ( D 1.35, 1.40-45) advance an internal critique of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. I first contextualize these chapters in relation to several of Machiavelli’s potential sources, including Livy’s Ab urbe condita, Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s Roman Antiquities, and the antiquarian writings of Andrea Fiocchi and Giulio Pomponio Leto. I then analyze Machiavelli’s claim that the decemvirs held “absolute authority” ( autorità assoluta)—an authority that was unconstrained by either laws or countervailing magistrates. (...) I proceed to argue that Machiavelli’s account of the decemvirs’ election contains a web of allusions to the lex regia, the “royal law” by which the Roman people were thought to have conveyed their sovereign power to an emperor. By modeling the decemvirs’ election on the lex regia, Machiavelli reveals the political limitations of the doctrine of popular sovereignty; moreover, he illustrates that even free and fair elections can easily give rise to tyranny. (shrink)

By convention epinician poetry claims to be both obligatory and truthful, yet in the intersection of obligation and truth lies a seeming paradox: the poet presents his poetry as commissioned by a patron but also claims to be unbiased enough to convey the truth. In Slater's interpretation Pindar reconciles this paradox by casting his relationship to the patron as one of guest-friendship: when he declares himself a guest-friend of the victor, he agrees to the obligation ‘a) not to be envious (...) of hisxenosand b) to speak well of him. The argumentation is:Xeniaexcludes envy, I am axenos, therefore I am not envious and consequently praise honestly’. Slater observes that envy may foster bias against the patron, but the problem of pro-patron bias remains: does the poet's friendship with and obligation to his patron produce praise at the expense of truth? (shrink)

The author argues that despite appears to the contrary the transcendentalism naturalism dichotomy is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is possible for someone to give a transcendental argument demonstrating that the world must have certain characteristics. If the argument is correct, i.e., if water is necessarily H2O, then science and the naturalist will find water to be H2O in fact. One can therefore be a transcendentalist and naturalist at the same time. The dichotomy is not exhaustive either, since it is (...) possible to develop a philosophy which is descriptive of reality and yet is neither transcendental nor naturalistic. The author illustrates this alternative with a view he calls “Piecemeal Realism.”. (shrink)

This article unveils the Qur'an's perspectives on the erosion of phobia of other religions because of the negative stereotypes attached to Islam and Christianity to create greater peace in religious life globally. Furthermore, the Qur'an's perspective on adult religious morality development is revealed by the at-tafsir al-maudhu'i method (a thematic interpretation). The study shows that adult religious morality development should integrate (1) religious morality (appreciation for faith differences), (2) national morality (love for the state and motherland) and (3) social morality (...) (social integration) to build individual religious maturity to overcome Islamophobia and Christianophobia. Religious maturity renders humbleness, moral consistency, comprehensiveness and heuristic in every individual character. The results of this research are in accordance with Wallport's opinion on religious maturity. CONTRIBUTION: The main contribution of this study is to reveal the insights of the al-Qur'an regarding the solution to the problems of Islamophobia and Christonophobia caused by the stereotypes of Islam and Christianity. In addition to interpreting verses, this study is equipped with psychological studies in building everyone's religious maturity so that they can think and act wisely in respecting differences in beliefs. This study is expected to minimise the problems of Islamophobia and Christianophobia from inside and outside the adherents of these religions. (shrink)

Selection within the educational domain breeds a special kind of suspicion. Whether it is the absence of transparency in the selection procedure, the observable outcomes of the selection, or the criteria of selection itself, there is much to corroborate the suspicion many have that selection in practice is unfair. And certainly as it concerns primary and secondary education, the principle of educational equity requires that children not have their educational experiences or opportunities determined by their postcode, their ethnic status, first (...) language, or family wealth. Indeed educational opportunities determined by unearned advantage or disadvantage offend against basic notions of fairness. But are public schools even permitted to select their students, and if so, how can selection procedures used by schools be best structured to achieve equitable ends? In this article we delineate, describe, and defend what we believe are the essential features of selection and also why we need to pay equal attention to both the outcomes and the processes leading to those outcomes. Provided the selection is motivated and guided by the right reasons, as well as appropriately monitored, we argue that selection can be equity promoting. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough nurses are crucial to ensure patients’ peaceful death in hospitals, many nurses experience various ethical conflicts during end-of-life care. Therefore, research on nurses’ entire ethical decision-making process is required to improve nurses’ ethical decision-making in end-of-life care. This study aimed to identify Korean nurses’ ethical decision-making process based on their moral sensitivity to end-of-life patients.MethodsIn total, 171 nurses caring for terminal patients responded to the survey questionnaire. To measure the participants’ moral sensitivity and ethical decision-making process, we used the (...) Korean version of the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and Nurses’ Ethical Decision-Making around End of Life Care Scale. Finally, multiple linear regression analysis was used to investigate the effect of moral sensitivity on nurses’ ethical decision-making.ResultsThe mean of moral sensitivity was 4.8 ± 0.5 (out of 7), and that of ethical decision-making was 4.6 ± 0.5 (out of 6). Among the sub-dimensions of ethical decision-making, the highest score was in perceived professional accountability (5.2 ± 0.5), and the lowest in moral reasoning and moral agency (3.9 ± 0.6); the score of moral practice was 4.4 ± 0.7. In the multiple linear regression model, moral sensitivity (β = 0.852, p <.001), clinical department (β = − 7.018, p =.035), ethics education (β = 20.450, p <.001), job satisfaction (β = 5.273, p <.001), and ethical conflict (β = − 2.260, p = 0.031) were influential ethical decision-making factors.ConclusionsThis study revealed a gap between nurses’ thoughts and practices through the ethical decision-making process. They failed to lead their thought to moral practice. It also implies that moral sensitivity could positively affect nurses’ ethical decision-making. To make nurses morally sensitive, exposing them to various clinical cases would be helpful. Additionally, ethics education and clinical ethics supporting services are valuable for improving nurses’ ethical decision-making. If nurses improved their ethical decision-making regarding end-of-life care, their patients could experience a better quality of death. (shrink)

Background: Compassion fatigue and professional quality of life are important in health and professional ethics. Aim: This study aimed to determine the relationship between compassion satisfaction, compassion fatigue, secondary traumatic stress, and moral injury in nurses. Research design: This research is a cross-sectional descriptive-analytical study. The research community of this research was all the nurses of the teaching hospitals of Ardabil city. Three questionnaires on demographic characteristics, the Professional Quality of Life Scale (ProQOL), and the Moral Injury Events Scale were (...) used to collect data. SPSS (version 22) software was used for data analysis. Participants and research context: The study recruited 297 nurses randomly selected from five teaching hospitals in Ardabil city. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was obtained from the Ardabil University of Medical Sciences ethics committee (with the code of ethics IR.ARUMS.REC.1401.198). Informed consent was obtained from the participants. Results: The results showed that the mean compassion satisfaction score of this study’s participants was 37.61 ± 8.86, the mean compassion fatigue score of this study’s participants was 28.73 ± 7.04, and the mean secondary traumatic stress score of this study’s participants was 29.95 ± 7.84. The mean score of moral injury among nurses was 31.19 ± 8.54. The results showed a negative significant relationship between compassion satisfaction and moral injury ( p < 0.001). Also, there is a positive significant relationship between compassion fatigue and secondary traumatic stress with moral injury ( p < 0.001). Conclusion: The results of this study show a negative relationship between compassion satisfaction and moral injury. According to the results of the present study, nurse managers should implement educational interventions, create ethical processes, and clear ethical guidelines to reduce moral injury and increase compassion satisfaction. (shrink)

Whereas the Upanishads contain much which is, strictly speaking, of little interest to the historian of Indian thought, the Pre-Upanishadic texts are not completely devoid of passages which are of special importance for anyone who endeavours to trace the origin and oldest form of the main texts of classical Indian philosophy. Too often the difference between Upanishads and Pre-Upanishadic literature has been exaggerated ; too often the philosophical importance of the ritualistic speculations contained in the Brahmanas has been undervalued ; (...) too often these texts have been neglected by the compilers of handbooks. One of those points which have not always received due attention concerns the theoretic foundation of the belief in the possibility of gaining the victory over death and of the efforts to realize this ambition. One of the most important problems in which the Indians have always been interested is the relation between the One and the Many, between this phenomenal world and its source and ground. Already in the Rgveda opinions differ : it has been a divine architect who made the phenomenal world ; it has been an anonymous primeval deity who became a golden germ from which a demiurge was born ; the world has arisen from the impersonal One who desired to create the world, etc. In the course of time these creators and ideas of the original One fused into the great figure of Prajapati, „the Lord of Creatures”. This God, who occupies a central position in the Brdhmawa-texts originally was what he was to remain in popular belief : the deity presiding over biological creation. In the ritualistic speculations of the authors of the Brahmanas he is the Creator, the Father of gods and anti-gods, the origin of creation. In the beginning Prajapati was alone, he was ,all this’, he was the universe in ,concentrated’ and unmanifested form. By way of emanation and self-differentiation he became the manifested universe, including the creatures. After this creative activity he is empty and exhausted, because he has ,entered the universe' or rather transformed himself into the universe. His strength, force and health can however be recovered and restored by means of rites. The world and the creatures which emanated from Prajapati were not perfect ; they were a discontinuum, disintegrated, in the power of death. In order to make life possible and to make the world habitable Prajdpati instituted rites. Prajapati is in the Brahmanas identified with the highest and most general categories ; he is the year, i.e. the complete cycle of time comprising the past and the future, totality and completeness. The year, viewed as an integral structure is the fundamental basis of all that happens. Being also the rite, the sacral act, Prajapati is on the other hand the earthly counterpart of the great cosmic drama. On these two identifications the ritualistic system of these authors is constructed. Among these authorities Sandilya. occupies a prominent place. The mundane events oscillating between the poles of birth and death, of genesis and decay, rites are needed to reintegrate what has become decomposed. They are however also to restore the original unity and totality, to co-ordinate the non-co-ordinated phenomena, to reconstruct Prajapati, to restore his original oneness. The rites reduce, temporarily it is true and with regard to the individual who has them performed, the phenomenal multiplicity to a reintegrated totality, in which the diversity of Prajapati's emanation has been destroyed, and the original unity and oneness has been restored. This theory underlies the structure of the great Fire-altar , by which the sacrificer identifies himself with Prajapati whose original unity is restored. By performing this elaborate ritual the personality of the sacrificer was transformed into a new and divine existence, which was no longer subject to the imperfections proper to this world. That is to say : the sacrificer acquires ,immortality' , he transcends the limits of phenomenal time, he becomes sarva, i.e. safe-andsound, whole. Prajapati-the year will not destroy the man who identifies himself with the totality, with Prajapati-the year, and who has acquired an insight into the meaning of this identification ; that man overcomes disintegration and discontinuity, he gains the victory over death, that is to say : he attains to a sound and complete condition. In the course of time the personal Prajapati and the impersonal Brahman are identified. In the early Upanishads the latter becomes the great fundamental principle. These works resume on the one hand ancient speculations a part of which has been preserved in the Rg- and Atharvavedas, and utilize, on the other hand, the ritualistic theories of the Brdhmawas. The tendency of their authors is however to dissociate themselves from ritualism. Emphasizing the quest for the salvation and spiritual welfare of the individual they go into the problem of the ,Soul' , that is the ,self' or the very core of the personality, which is essentially different from all phenomenal plurality. The hitman is identified with the Punira, the primeval man out of whom the universe arose. It follows that the Atrmn is also cosmic. According to Udddlaka Arum it is the subtle essence of all that exists. All the important potencies in the universe are said to be its manifestations. However, in these works . Htman and Brahman tend to fuse and the great teacher Ydjwavalkya concluded to their being identical. Ordinary men do not understand this identity, but the few who are able to arrive at this highly important insight gain the victory over the imperfections and contingencies of empirical existence. They experience the ecstatic and unanalysable condition of unity, the undifferentiated Plenum or Totality, the ,All'. They know that they are truly Brahman or Sarvam. Now, it is most important to attain to this condition, which implies the victory over death, before one is to die the worldly death. The man who dies without having escaped death will die again and again in the hereafter. Whereas the ritualists attempt to protect themselves from this much feared ,repeated death' by means of rites, especially by the construction of the Fire-altar, the teachers whose words are recorded in the early Upanishads ascribed the delivering power to the esoteric knowledge of the ,under lying theory', to the knowledge of the ritual-cosmic interrelations : the man who knows the relevant speculations will be released. This belief in the redeeming power of the rites and the ,theory' on which they are based was also of special importance with regard to the development of the Karman-doctrine. Thus ritual and spiritual identification with the One which is the Totality, the Primeval Being, the Creator, the Atman enables man by experiencing a transformation to conquer phenomenal time and death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Continental and Feminist Philosophical PedagogiesConditionsSina KramerIn thinking through what it means to teach continental and feminist philosophy, I keep coming back to a somewhat enigmatic line from Adorno’s essay, “Why Still Philosophy?”: “Because philosophy is good for nothing, it is not yet obsolete” (Adorno 2005, 15). I believe that this dialectical aphorism has everything to do with the conditions under which we as teachers practice philosophy today, and continental (...) and feminist philosophy in particular.On the one hand, Adorno’s remark is made in the context of the specific conditions—political, economic, philosophical, etc.—of his own time. On the other hand, Adorno writes that if philosophy is still necessary (and we should always take seriously this “if,” as well as the “not yet” of the quote above) then it is for the same reasons that philosophy has always been necessary: as critique. Philosophy is thus both spatially and temporally specific in that it plays particular roles in particular places and times, and it is universal in that its operation as critique has always been the same. We must therefore spell out the particular conditions of our historical moment in order for philosophy to play the critical role that it has purportedly always played. What are the conditions under which we teach continental and feminist philosophy today?I would point here to a few phenomena. First, President Barack Obama announced in his 2011 “State of the Union” address that in order for America to “win the future” we must invest in education, to reach the goal of having the [End Page 68] highest proportion of college graduates in the world by the end of the decade (Obama 2011). The president described investment in education as part of the larger of goal of supporting the competitive advantage of American workers. The president cast education in entirely economic terms: a greater quantity of graduates for the sake of a more economically prosperous nation.At the same time, some universities, especially those that depend in part upon dwindling state resources, have chosen to cut programs in the humanities in general or in philosophy in particular: at UNLV, at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, or at Middlesex University.1 Under the logic of fiscal austerity, universities are deciding that they can no longer “afford” to keep departments that are losing money or, which may amount to the same thing, programs that are no longer central to the mission of the university.Finally, recent research indicates that only about one-third of all teachers in higher education in the United States are tenured or on the tenure track; teaching has been farmed out, outsourced, or subcontracted to a contingent labor force with less job security, lower wages, and fewer benefits than those on the tenure track.2 And shortly after the president’s “State of the Union” address, the book Academically Adrift and accompanying articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education and the New York Times argued that college students are learning less, according to measurable metrics, even as they are paying more—that is, going into greater debt—for a degree that is less and less a guarantee of a stable middle-class income (Arum and Roksa 2011; Glenn 2011a, 2011b).In his dialectical aphorism, Adorno seems to set up a contradiction between philosophy and utility, between learning as an end in itself, and learning as an instrument toward some other end—a contradiction that goes back as far as philosophy’s stories about its own origins, to Thales and the olive-press. But this contradiction must be examined in each context in which it is raised. For instance, W. E. B. Du Bois seems to set up the same contradiction in The Souls of Black Folk, when he writes that “the true college will ever have one goal: not to earn meat, but to know the end and aim of that life which meat nourishes” (Du Bois 1997, 86). While this seems like the statement of a universal truth, it must be understood in the context of the larger argument in Souls, in which Du Bois argues that black people have a right to an education as... (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus . Thereupon the (...) essence of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one . Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds” . In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being” , but are rather reevaluated as “procreation” .Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des W ahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der U nbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet . Daraufhin wird ihr W esen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches . Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: W arum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform derTeilhabe in den ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet . Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem Nicht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend , sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend .Pojam miješanja, koji je središnji u kasnijim Platonovim dijalozima, ponajprije se smješta u cjeloviti kontekst transponiranja methexisa: od ravni sudjelovanja osjetilnog u ideji uzlazno k sudjelovanju među idejama te odatle k sudjelovanju dvaju platoničkih principa. S jedne strane se kao miješanje označava međusobni odnos μέγιστα γένη, s druge pak onaj između granice i neograničenosti u Filebu . U tu se svrhu razmatra i rehabilitira bit miješanja kao metafore, naime kao transformacija osjetilne slike u filozofijsku . Glavnim pitanjem našeg izvođenja postaje: zašto se uzajamno miješanje “najviših rodova”, koje se uvodi u okviru dijaloga Sofist, može opravdati kao bolji kandidat od sudjelovanja? Miješanje se razmatra kao dobro utemeljena forma preinake sudjelovanja u odnošenjima jednako izvornih “najviših rodova” . U našoj se interpretaciji, koja nanovo uspostavlja osporavano jedinstvo Fileba, prikazuje kako filozof Platon spašava lijepe fenomene: četvorostruka podjela cjeline interpretira se kao mjesto nastajanja lijepih pojava. Njima se filozof vraća nakon uspona k onom σύμφυτον dvaju platoničkih principa, ne degradirajući ih više kao one koji se “potucaju između bitka i ne-bitka” , već ih cijeni kao “rađanje”. (shrink)

The central Platonic concept of the mixture is to be situated in the entire transmission of Methexis: ascending from the level of the participation of the sensible things in the forms to the participation of the forms and finally to the participation of the two Platonic Principles. “Mixture” designates on the one hand the relation between the μέγιστα γένη in the Sophist and on the other hand the one between the Limit and the Unlimited in the Philebus. Thereupon the essence (...) of the Mixture is to be examined and rehabilitated as metaphor, namely as transformation of a sensible image in a philosophical one. Our guiding question will be: W hy can the Mixture be legitimated as a better candidate than the Methexis in the frame of the Sophist? The Mixture is to be regarded as well-founded transformation of Methexis in the context of the equioriginal “greatest kinds”. In our interpretation of the Philebus that restores the disputed unity of this Platonic dialogue, we are about to show how the philosopher Plato “saves” the beautiful phenomena: The fourfold division is to be construed as the place where the beautiful appearances are generated. To them does the philosopher return after his ascent to the σύμφυτον two Platonic Principles. They are no longer degraded as “rolling about in the midregion between being and not-being”, but are rather reevaluated as “procreation”.Der in den späteren platonischen Dialogen zentrale Begriff der Mischung wird zunächst in die ganze Übertragung der Methexis eingeordnet: von der Ebene der Teilhabe des W ahrnehmbaren an der Idee zu der innerideellen Teilhabe aufsteigend und von daher zu der Teilhabe der zwei platonischen Prinzipien. Einerseits wird die Beziehung der μέγιστα γένη untereinander, andererseits diejenige zwischen der Grenze und der U nbegrenztheit im Philebos als Mischung bezeichnet. Daraufhin wird ihr W esen als Metapher behandelt und rehabilitiert, nämlich als Transformation eines sinnlichen Bildes in ein philosophisches. Zur Leitfrage unserer Ausführung wird: W arum kann die im Rahmen des Dialogs Sophistes eingeführte Mischung der größten Gattungen miteinander als ein besserer Kandidat als derjenige der Teilhabe gerechtfertigt werden? Die Mischung wird als eine wohlbegründete Verwandlungsform derTeilhabe in den ideellen Zusammenhängen der gleichursprünglichen größten Gattungen betrachtet. Bei unserer die umstrittene Einheit des Philebos wiederherstellende Interpretation wird aufgezeigt, wie der Philosoph Platon die schönen Phänomene rettet: Die vierfache Einteilung des Ganzen wird als Ort der Genese der schönen Erscheinungen interpretiert. Ihnen wendet sich der Philosoph nach dem Aufstieg zum σύμφυτον der zwei platonischen Prinzipien zu, nicht länger sie als “zwischen dem Sein und dem Nicht-Sein herumschweifend” degradierend, sondern als “Zeugung” würdigend.Pojam miješanja, koji je središnji u kasnijim Platonovim dijalozima, ponajprije se smješta u cjeloviti kontekst transponiranja methexisa: od ravni sudjelovanja osjetilnog u ideji uzlazno k sudjelovanju među idejama te odatle k sudjelovanju dvaju platoničkih principa. S jedne strane se kao miješanje označava međusobni odnos μέγιστα γένη, s druge pak onaj između granice i neograničenosti u Filebu. U tu se svrhu razmatra i rehabilitira bit miješanja kao metafore, naime kao transformacija osjetilne slike u filozofijsku. Glavnim pitanjem našeg izvođenja postaje: zašto se uzajamno miješanje “najviših rodova”, koje se uvodi u okviru dijaloga Sofist, može opravdati kao bolji kandidat od sudjelovanja? Miješanje se razmatra kao dobro utemeljena forma preinake sudjelovanja u odnošenjima jednako izvornih “najviših rodova”. U našoj se interpretaciji, koja nanovo uspostavlja osporavano jedinstvo Fileba, prikazuje kako filozof Platon spašava lijepe fenomene: četvorostruka podjela cjeline interpretira se kao mjesto nastajanja lijepih pojava. Njima se filozof vraća nakon uspona k onom σύμφυτον dvaju platoničkih principa, ne degradirajući ih više kao one koji se “potucaju između bitka i ne-bitka”, već ih cijeni kao “rađanje”. (shrink)