Let us now examine one of these radical positions, say, the sceptical one first. According to this, since error is a fact, we may as well treat every perception as erroneous, only undetected so far and so accepted as true. But if we accept error as a fact we must also accept truth as such, for an error cannot be known as one unless we know something as true. When one says one mistook a rope for a snake one must (...) know the rope truly, otherwise there can be no mistake. One may think erroneously, "I am apparently seeing a rope but it may be that I am only imagining it, just as I imagined the snake; I may be mistaking something else for a rope." But then one must also see that as the rope is thus doubted, the unreality of the snake must also be doubted, for it is against the rope as real that the snake becomes unreal. And now one would have to say, "Perhaps I am imagining this rope which might really be the snake I thought I imagine." But in this state of oscillation one cannot pronounce any judgment at all, and so cannot assert anything about the truth and falsity of any perception. The original perception proving false leads one, through analogy, to doubt the latter perception. But if there is a doubt regarding the falsity of the original perception, there cannot be a legitimate doubt regarding the validity of the later one. More generally we may say that if one doubts one's perceptions of certain objects on the ground that some perceptions regarding these had proved false in the past, this doubt logically involves the possibility of those perceptions, rejected as false being true. So that though one may psychologically take up the attitude of doubt with respect to every perception, this attitude has no rational backing. If, however, one doubts certain objects of perception because some other perceptions e.g., snakes) proved false, one has only a weak analogy and is, moreover, forced to doubt all perceptions, including those which proved certain perceptions false, thereby starting the original doubt. But then the reasoning given above which will dispel this doubt will have to be applied. So that this doubt cannot be rationally justified. The argument that since certain perceptions have proved false therefore every one of them may prove so is, after all, a very weak one. A perception is false only when it is falsified by a true one, and we cannot doubt a perception unless it is so falsified. (shrink)

The solipsist, on the analogy of our dream-experience, imagines a higher mode of selfhood or spirit to whom the world is like a dream; his own self is a lower or deluded mode of this selfhood and to it the world appears as real. Thus objectivity appearing to the lower self is illusory and contingent, not ultimate. This analogical argument for a higher self, as against an alien God, has this counter-argument. In dreams I have unpleasant experiences because of certain (...) external causes, such as physiological and psychological. But what compels my higher self to have the unpleasant dreams that are my waking experiences of life? In other words, why cannot my higher self have nothing but rosy dreams when there cannot be anything else than itself to force on it bad ones? The answer to this is that in our dreams and fantasies we do not have unpleasant experiences due to external causes only, but also due to our inherent love of experience for its own sake. Our dreams are our wish-fulfilments too. We love to have all sorts of experiences, to taste all kinds and shades of emotion. Thirst for passions, curiosity after the unknown, and adventure for the strange and the new mark our empirical self. So it is not absurd to conceive the higher self fashioning its dreams, our waking experiences, as a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant elements rich in variety and complexity. And just as my empirical self is said to enjoy the experiences of my dreams, so this higher self may be said to enjoy his dreams, my waking experiences. (shrink)

Law is traditionally related to the practice of command and hierarchy. It seems that a legal rule should immediately establish a relation between a superior and an inferior. This hierarchical and authoritharian view might however be challenged once the phenomenology of the rule is considered from the internal point of view, that is, from the stance of those that can be said to “use” rather than to “suffer” the rules themselves. A practice oriented approach could in this way open up (...) a more liberal, and also somehow less parochial and ideological, road for legal theory. This is – it is argued in the paper – the programme, or better, the promise we can find in Herbert Hart’s main work, The Concept of Law. The article tries to render this promise more transparent while, nonetheless, not eschewing the blind sides of its narrative and argumentative strategy. (shrink)

Prispevek kritično obravnava znano Bobbievo tridelbo pravnega pozitivizma na pozitivizem kot splošni pristop k učenju prava, nauk o pravu in ideologijo. Avtor uvodoma opozori na nekaj problemov same tridelbe, nato pa se osredotoči na Bobbievo samoopredelitev znotraj nje. Na primeru Bobbieve obravnave pojmov temeljne norme in pravila priznavanja pokaže, kako ga njegovo kasnejše zavračanje teh dveh pojmov nezavedno privede do sprejemanja pravnega pozitivizma kot nauka o pravu in pravne ideologije – ki ju je sicer zavračal. Avtor vidi razlog (...) za ta nezavedni Bobbiev zdrs predvsem v njegovi vpetosti v specifično pravnokulturno okolje, ki ga prežema notranji pogled na pravo. Ob tem predlaga, da zavrnemo tridelbo pravnega pozitivizma in ga namesto tega proučujemo kot skupek ne vedno ločljivih stališč, ki tvorijo specifično pravnokulturno okolje. (shrink)

Alf Ross je želel izoblikovati »pristno« realistično teorijo prava. To pomeni, da naj bi bila ta sposobna po eni strani razrešiti probleme, s katerimi sta se soočali tako Kelsnova normativistična teorija kot teorija ameriških realistov, po drugi strani pa poustvariti njihove razprave na znanstveni način. Rossova izvirnost tiči v njegovem pojmu pristojnostnih norm, ki jih je pred vsemi drugimi obravnaval kot »konstitutivna pravila«. V nasprotju s trditvami mnogih komentatorjev takšen pojem konstitutivnih norm ni neskladen z Rossovo realistično teorijo (...) prava. V luči njegovih zgodnjih zapisov je mogoče kompetenčne norme razumeti kot racionalizacije, ki lahko izrazijo nagnjenost naslovnikov norm, da določena dejstva prepoznajo kot pravo. Zato je mogoče Rossa šteti za prehodnika postpozitivizma. (shrink)

The paper focuses on issues of development dimensions of Medical Law and its ongoing process of standardization and harmonization on one hand, versus the traditionally rooted and available principles of biomedical ethics, on the other. The collision of new legal institutes and the spread of human rights protections is evident. This paper follows the theory and practice of medical ethics and medical law. The theoretical aspect points out medical ethics as one of the sources of medical law. Legal theory makes (...) a distinction between formal and autonomous sources of medical law. Even though ethics is morally much higher, law prevails because it has stronger sanctions and legal power. In its practical aspect, this paper gives examples of different situations of medical decision-making processes. Ethical rules are of the utmost relevance in the domain of confidentiality and options of medical treatment. But, in concrete medical procedures, where legal positions of patients are evidently very significant, law has a more distinct function. Therefore, explaining particular cases from medical malpractice, such as cases of penal, civil or professional liability have an ethical dimension as well. Members of medical professions in Serbia often find these cases unfair. Mostly this is the consequence of ignorance in this kind of medical law and ethics relations. A discussion about practical cases has in that sense a self-learning component, which could be developed to strengthen ethical reasoning and judgment. Clanak stavlja naglasak na razvojnu dimenziju medicinskog prava i pitanja u kojoj meri njegova standardizacija i harmonizacija, na jednoj strani, uticu na primenu tradicionalno ukorenjenih vazecih principa biomedicinske etike, na drugoj. Teorijski aspekt clanka upucuje na medicinsku etiku kao jedan od izvora medicinskog prava koji se smatra autonomnim izvorom. Iako je etika na visoj lestvici, pravo preteze jer ima pravnu snagu element prinude i jacu sankciju za postupanje protivno pravilima. U svom prakticnom aspektu ovaj clanak stavlja naglasak na razlicite situacije pri donosenju medicinskih odluka, gde pravni polozaj onog ko se leci postaje veoma bitan, a pravo tu ima striktno odredjenu funkciju zastite. Zbog toga, objasnjenje posebnih slucajeva pogresne medicinske prakse ima svoj eticki, ali pre svega pravni znacaj, kakvi su slucajevi procesuiranja krivicne, imovinske i staleske odgovornosti. Pripadnici medicinskih profesija u Srbiji cesto smatraju sudske postupke protiv sebe nepravednim. Vecinom je to posledica upravo nepoznavanja odnosa normi medicinskog prava i etickih pravila. Razmatranje slucajeva iz prakse ima i svoju edukativnu komponentu koja na taj nacin unapredjuje eticko promisljanje i osnazuje pravno odlucivanje. (shrink)

Na temelju analize strukture i slijeda postupka analogije, autor upućuje kritiku tezi o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, tj. tezi prema kojoj se analogija, izuzev onoga njezinog koraka koji predstavlja strogu analogiju, može svesti na vaganje. U radu se stoga prvo iznose neki problemi navedene teze, poput nenužnosti svodljivosti ili činjenice da se pod krinkom vaganja provodi prava analogija. Središnja je teza rada tvrdnja da analogiju nije moguće uspješno svesti na oblik vaganja.

The paper claims that the rule of recognition, given the way it is presented by Hart, cannot be a constitutive rule of any legal system as a whole, but rather a constitutive rule of legal rules as elements of a legal system. Since I take the legal system to be an institutional artifact kind, I claim that, in order to account for a legal system as a whole, at least two further constitutive rules, in addition to the rule of recognition (...) as a token-element constitutive rule, are needed – one constitutive of legal officials and the other constitutive of a legal system as a token. However, given the central role the legal officials' practice occupies in establishing a particular instantiation or token of a legal system, I also claim that the rule of recognition cannot be understood as 'merely' a token-element constitutive rule but also as a legal system's implementation or concretisation rule. (shrink)

Dva su osnovna shvatanja odnosa između ustavnih prava i analize proporcionalnosti. Prvo drži da postoji nužna veza između ustavnih prava i proporcionalnosti; drugo tvrdi da pitanje o tome da li su ustavna prava i proporcionalnost povezani zavisi od toga šta su ustavotvorci zapravo odlučili, tj. zavisi od pozitivnog prava. Prva teza se može označiti kao “teza o nužnosti”, druga se može označiti kao “teza o kontingentnosti.” Prema tezi o nužnosti, legitimnost proporcionalnosti je pitanje prirode ustavnih (...) class='Hi'>prava, dok je prema tezi o kontingentnosti legitimnost proporcionalnosti pitanje tumačenja. U članku se zastupa teza o nužnosti. | Prethodna verzija ovog članka je objavljena u Chinese Yearbook of Constitutional Law (2010). 221–235. (shrink)

Горобец К. В. Аксиосфера права: философский и юридический дискурс : моногр. / К. В. Горобец. – Одесса : Фенікс, 2013. – 218 с. Монография посвящена философско-правовым аспектам аксиосферы права, которая предстает в качестве структурного компонента права и выражается в виде центрированной системы правовых ценностей и иерархизированной системы ценностей права. Правовые ценности рассматриваются как феномены, являющиеся одновременно компонентами права и способом его постижения. Ценности права понимаются как блага, которые защищаются и обеспечиваются правом в силу их значимости для человека и общества. Доказывается, (...) что аксиосфера права существует наряду с нормосферой права. При этом их целостность обеспечивается посредством особого феномена – верховенства права. Монография будет полезна специалистам в сфере философии права, общетеоретической юриспруденции, отраслевых юридических наук, а также всем, кто интересуется проблемами развития современного права. (shrink)