The present study provides an analysis of Socrates’ account of the first polis in Republic 2 as a thought experiment and draws attention to the fact that Socrates combines both explanatory and evaluative aspects in his scenario. The paper further shows how the analysis of the city of pigs as a thought experiment can explain the lack of pleonexia by saving both the letter of the text, according to which there are no “pleonectic” desires in the city of pigs, (...) and the fact that the first polis is nonetheless concerned with human beings. For, in contrast to the account offered by Glaucon earlier in Book 2, Socrates highlights our needs and lack of self-sufficiency as well as our compatibility with an advantageous and happy life in a community. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Thrasymachus’ Inmoralism, that is to say, of the set of judgements concerning the superior value of injustice in comparison with justice, issued by him in book I of Plato’s Republic. It is argued that both the argument in support of these judgements and its implicit resource to the concept of πλεονεξία cannot be interpreted descriptively, if they are to serve to justify the immoralists judgements. It is also argued that a particularly important subgroup of (...) such judgements is supported by a peculiar conception of practical reason based on the concept of πλεονεξία. Finally, the comparison is made between this ‘pleonexic’ conception of practical rationality and the one that Plato advocates in the Republic. (shrink)

본 논문은 사랑을 성애로 환원하는 최근의 성적 환원주의와 사랑이 가능한 한 사적으로 유지돼야 한다는 자유주의적 이상에 맞서 고대 그리스의 정치-사랑 개념 쌍을 살펴보고자 한다. 이를 통해 현대 학문 영역에서 상대적으로 간과되고 있는 고대 그리스의 정치 이론에 나타난 공적 에로스론인‘폴리스-에로스론’을 고찰하려는 데에 그 목적이 있다.BR 성적 욕망은 에로스의 제한된 유형일 뿐이라는 논점을 위해, 2절에서는 헤시오도스의 『신통기』에 나타난 에로스 신의 기원에 관한 두 가지 설명이 차례로 분석될 것이다. 헤시오도스의 신화적이고 시적인 설명에 따르면, 고전기의 정치적 에로스에 대한 최초의 기원이 아프로디테 이전의 최초의 오래된 (...) 에로스라는 것이 드러날 것이다. 이 원초적인 에로스가 비성적이거나 성적인 것 외부에 있는 비육체적인 대상들에 적용됐던 정치적 에로스의 모태임이 밝혀질 것이다. 다음으로 3절은 시칠리아 원정, 페리클레스의 장례식 연설 그리고 뮈틸레네 논쟁을 통해 투퀴디데스의 정치적 에로스 담론의 지형도가 그려진다. 투퀴디데스의 정치적 에로스 담론은 더 많이 가지려는 욕망(pleonexia), 구혼자들처럼 도시를 사랑하는 자들(erastai)이 되라는 페리클레스의 촉구, 그리고 개인적 에로스와 공동체적 에로스의 공속 관계를 통해 잘 드러나고 있다. 그리고 4절에서는『향연』의 파이드로스의 연인군대, 파우사니아스의 참주정과 소년애, 아리스토파네스의 남성-남성 욕망의 합법화 그리고 소크라테스-디오티마 연설의 불사적 명예에 대한 사랑을 통해, 정치적 에로스에 관한 담론이 논급된다. 연인군대, 참주정과 소년애, 남성-남성 욕망의 합법화 그리고 불사하는 명예에 대한 사랑(philotimia) 각각은 정치와 에로스의 공속 관계를 다시 한 번 확인시켜 줄 것이다.BR 이상의 정치적 에로스 담론에 관한 헤시오도스의 신화적이고 시적인 전통과 투퀴디데스의 실증주의적 역사, 그리고 플라톤의『향연』을 통해, 우리는 에로스가 성애를 초과하여 좀 더 넓은 의미로 사용됐고, 특히 국가적 차원에서 에로스의 정치적 함의를 확인할 수 있었다. 그러나 에로스가 정치적 저항 운동의 에너지원이고, 완전히 다른 삶의 형식, 완전히 다른 사회를 향한 혁명적 욕망의 원천이라는 진단에는 에로스의 정치적 잠재성과 동시에 그것의 위험들에 대한 경고도 함께 들어 있다. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Preliminaries Universal vs. Particular Justice The Scope of Particular Justice Justice and the Doctrine of the Mean: The Problem Distributive and Corrective Justice Political Justice Pleonexia Justice and the Doctrine of the Mean: Aristotle's Solution Conclusion Bibliography.

In this essay, I review the movie Good. Good tells the story of the moral corruption of its protagonist, a writer, who is seduced by blandishments and material rewards given to him by the Nazi regime. It is a nice illustration of corruption—the degradation of character wrought by the desire for wealth and fame—what Aristotle would call “pleonexia.”.

The paper is an analysis of Rousseau’s concept of property. It shows that Rousseau wants to draft a new system of politics that will not forbid private property but will limit its scale. It aims to clarify that Rousseau owes much to John Locke’s theory and even adopts Locke’s definition that it is a basic purpose of the social contract to protect the citizen’s property. It is argued that in spite of these similarities Rousseau’s account differs fundamentally from Locke’s. Having (...) a right of ownership to something for Locke means to be entitled to exclude anybody else from it: to say “this is mine” in Locke is synonymous to “it is not yours”. For Rousseau having a right of ownership to something implies a self-limitation by the proprietor: to say “this is mine” in Rousseau signifies “everything else is not mine”. While property rights in Locke have the purpose of legitimizing “pleonexia” and economic inequality, Rousseau tries to use them as restrictions to citizens’ desires and greed. (shrink)

In suggesting that its last chapter’s purpose is to provoke the reader to begin reconsidering and thus rereading the book they have just read, this article attempts to negotiate the interpretive quarrel as whether Xenophon’s Cyropaedia deserves a “sunny” reading—in which Cyrus straightforwardly embodies Xenophon’s own political ideals—or a more critical “dark” one, that separates the author from his protagonist. To help us get the most advantage from the paideia his book was intended to provide, Xenophon made a “sunny” first (...) reading plausible, but he also sowed in his text the kind of clues—especially with respect to pleonexia—that would reveal his full intentions only to those who reread his book. (shrink)

Fifth-century authors often invoke the idea that human beings are by nature savage, and that the civilized state of human societies is imposed on them by law and custom. A possible consequence of this idea is a pessimistic anthropological account, according to which pleonexia or greed is a natural characteristic of human beings, and therefore a justified drive of human behaviour. Scholars often attribute this pessimistic account of human nature to the sophists, whose views are considered to be reflected (...) in the speeches of Plato’s characters Glaucon and Callicles. Taking into account the genres and the contexts in which the original sophistic arguments concerning savage humanity appear, as well as the practices for which such arguments were implemented, this paper argues that the pessimistc view of human nature is not a product of sophistic thought, but is rather developed by authors such as Thucydides, who uses it in order to explain the atrocities committed in the course of the Peloponnesian war, and Plato, who uses it as a foil to his arguments concerning the superiority of human nature. (shrink)

The scarcity of goods is one of the central problems medical ethics has to deal with. Scarcity results from the connection of a naturallack of goods and human pleonexia, i.e. the desire always to wish for more. The old and the new answer on the problern of pleonexia is temperance which in the health care system could prove itself by considerately dealing with a permanently growing measure of different medical treatments. But since individual temperance can not be generally (...) guaranteed, the question of justice, of a just organization of the Health Care System remains to be answered. A fair weighing of goods, to give a concrete example, is necessary in order to clarify which significance the health care system ought to have in politics, compared with other political topics, for example education. Moreover it is necessary to know for which of the possible medical treatments there exists a just claim for everybody. For this reason a model of health care insurance with different stages is considered. (shrink)

This article discusses Otfried Höffe' s thesis, that scarcity - caused by human pleonexia - is the main reason for too much expenses of the public health service. Scarcity, however, is a social construction and depends on the distribution of goods. To this problern there are necessarly permanent conflicts in democratic societies.

Plato’s teaching about the Good is sometimes blamed for denigrating particular goods. By contrast, this article argues that for Plato pleonexia is at the heart of disordered relationships to particular goods. In turn, the psychic root of pleonexia is spiritedness, the aspect of the soul that enables it to love what is “one’s own.” Plato employs Kallipolis as a heuristic device to diagnose these psychic roots of our attraction to pleonexia. Kallipolis’ reforms are ascetic practices that seek (...) to transform his interlocutors’ spiritedness by reorienting the soul’s love away from pleonexia to the good. This love for the good turns out to be the condition for a renewed and healthy devotion to particular goods, rather than the cause of their denigration. (shrink)

Comedy and philosophy have too often been thought immiscible, a tradition supported by a solemn reading of philosophers such as Plato. A closer look at Plato – and specifically at what may be his most familiar dialogue – the Republic, suggests just the contrary. Far from immiscible, comedy and philosophy are entwined in ways that are mutually illuminating. I argue that a joke in Book V reveals the self-forgetting involved in founding the city in speech, and so illustrates the vitality (...) of self-knowledge to political ventures. Glaucon criticizes the first city in speech as akin to one “of sows”, prompting a new city altogether, and yet the city that he helps to create not only eradicates distinctions between animals and humans but is founded on principles of animal husbandry and described overwhelmingly in animalistic terms. Justice in this city is defined as a minding of one’s own business, but what exactly “one’s own” is expands to accommodate Glaucon’s pleonexia and accompanying tyrannical allowances. Glaucon has forgotten himself. Without a limit – without a restriction on what one’s own is – the city degenerates into a tyranny. Glaucon’s self-forgetting may be a minor, comical incident, but it has significant philosophical consequences, including a radical undercutting of the city in question as well as the distinction between humans and animals. The comical mode employed here suggests that it may be a comical understanding of the self that best supersedes the forgotten self. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Preliminaries Universal vs Particular Justice The Scope of Particular Justice Justice and the Doctrine of the Mean:The Problem Distributive and Corrective Justice Reciprocity Grace Political Justice Pleonexia Justice and the Doctrine of the Mean: Aristotle's Solution Responsibility Conclusion References Further reading.

The paper challenges the traditional assumption that the fragments of ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ are best understood and interpreted against the intellectual and cultural background of the so-called ‘sophistic movement’. I begin by suggesting that we can distinguish, in the fragments, between two separate ‘discourses’ concerning nomos and its role in human life: an abstract ‘sophistic’ discourse, centered around the defense of nomos against the antinomian champions of natural pleonexia, and another, less abstract and more polemical discourse on nomos, which is (...) aimed at the author’s contemporary Athens. I argue that the author’s engagement with well-known sophistic ideas is best understood as instrumental to his polemical agenda: it provides him with a powerful intellectual framework in which to articulate his criticism of democratic society, especially with regard to traditional notions of social ‘benefaction’ and the relation between rich and poor. (shrink)

Law, often neglected in treatments of the Republic, is essential to the philosopher-kings’ rule. Only law accomplishes the partial divinization of citizens at which philosophical politics aims. Socrates’ interrogation of Thrasymachus and Glaucon reveals law to be a command whereby citizens participate in philosophical knowledge and limit the pleonexia congenital to humanity. Law does so primarily by instilling in souls a true opinion resistant to pleonectic passion, producing a state of political virtue. This primary work is supported by the (...) musical and poetical education, itself shaped by law for the sake of law. Law persuades and compels the soul by appealing to both reason and spiritedness, enabling them to overcome the appetites. The soul’s consequent acceptance of truth and resistance to the passions indeed makes it resemble divinity. In so transforming the citizens through the law, the philosopher-king also unifies the city and makes it happy under his rule. (shrink)

Labor is both punishment and curse. At least this is what the mythical scenes of division and exclusion in Hesiod and in the Old Testament dramatise. At the same time they can be regarded as symptoms of misogyny. Without doubt, those two mythical scenes and the divine power to curse and sentence have held their spell over the economic tractates from antiquity to the modern period. How do the ancient writings of economic theory—and specifically Aristotle's Politics and Ethics —regulate female (...) Pleonexia on the one hand, and the limitless penal labor imposed on men on the other? How in turn do the economic tractates of the modern period—and here specifically John Locke's famous essays on the economy of labor—respond to the problem of female hybris on the one hand and the characteristical burden and suffering associated with labor on the other? What role does the differentiation and separation between free and unfree, productive and reproductive labor and, not least, the economic marginalisation of reproductive labor, play in this? And finally: In what way do »King Bee« and Queen Bee, Nurse Bee and Drone appear in this context as figures of an at once mythical and economic zoology, whose emblematic efficacy extends up to Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees ? (shrink)

Labor is both punishment and curse.At least this is what the mythical scenes of division and exclusion in Hesiod and in the Old Testament dramatise.At the same time they can be regarded as symptoms of misogyny.Without doubt, those two mythical scenes and the divine power to curse and sentence have held their spell over the economic tractates from antiquity to the modern period. How do the ancient writings of economic theory—and specifically Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics—regulate female Pleonexia on the (...) one hand, and the limitless penal labor imposed on men on the other? How in turn do the economic tractates of the modern period—and here specifically John Locke’s famous essays on the economy of labor—respond to the problem of female hybris on the one hand and the characteristical burden and suffering associated with labor on the other? What role does the differentiation and separation between free and unfree, productive and reproductive labor and, not least, the economic marginalisation of reproductive labor, play in this? And finally: In what way do »King Bee« and Queen Bee, Nurse Bee and Drone appear in this context as figures of an at once mythical and economic zoology, whose emblematic efficacy extends up to Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees? (shrink)

Aristotle views justice as the important virtue in the ideal state, since it aims for the common interest of a community. He argues for two distinct virtues: general and special justice. General justice is concerned with the good of others, specifically the common good of the political community. Special justice is concerned with equality and fairness, and the avoidance of pleonexia — greedy encroachment of the goods justly assigned to others.

This paper is a reading of Aristotle's book on justice (Book V of the Ethics) as what he says it is, a study of the disposition or inclination towards doing just (or unjust) acts. In that light, the content of Aristotle's famous treatments of distributive and corrective justice are only incidental, for their true role is as clues to a meaningful picture of the Just and the Unjust person. Aristotle's treatment of Being Just as a specific virtue is the most (...) detailed treatment he offers of any moral virtue. Being Just as distributive justice emerges as a commitment to the equal treatment of all citizens, but to an equality tempered by always contentious considerations of merited reward. Being Just as corrective justice is a commitment to protecting and repairing the sphere of each person's dignity and opportunity from damaging and sometimes malicious interactions. But more is required. For Being Just means overcoming the disordered and misdirected desire that both Aristotle and Plato call "pleonexia", wanting - tyrant-like - more-of-and-more-than. If that is overcome by re-directed libido, the virtuous will then have to integrate more subtle elements if they are to achieve an inclination to this tempered, but real equality. These elements are two. One is present only implicitly, the passion Aristotle calls nemesis, a demand that the world - and justice within the world - must never permit an evil person to go unpunished or a good one, to suffer harm. That passion cannot be admitted, but at best can only be temporarily stilled. The second impediment arises from the dynamic of human communities that are made up of diverse and actively striving individuals: such citizens, haunted by suspicion grounded in their own pleonexia, demand that the community be one of laws. That creates a true dilemma, for in Aristotle's estimation, no set of rules can cabin any virtue. The Rule of Law is in tension with the particularity of justice in real life, and that tension is ultimately only bearable through the invention of equity, the trusted deviation from the law to preserve the law. In making this abstract I have had to leave untouched the subject matter of the first and two last chapters, but in my paper I do treat these. More importantly, I also show how all political community and the inclination to seek to be a Just Person rests on a gracious act of reciprocal commitment. (shrink)

This fitting Festschrift contains twelve essays by students, colleagues and friends of Philippa Foot, all of them leading figures in philosophy. Some deal directly and even centrally with Foot’s own work, the others with topics she has herself written on and in a manner relatively sympathetic to what she has said about those topics. Foot’s interests in ethics have been fairly wide-ranging, and that fact is well reflected in the essays of the present volume. Elizabeth Anscombe writes on ‘Practical Inference’; (...) Simon Blackburn on ‘The Flight to Reality’; Rosalind Hursthouse on ‘Applying Virtue Ethics’; Anthony Kenny on ‘Philippa Foot on Double Effect’; Gavin Lawrence on ‘The Rationality of Morality’; John McDowell on ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’; Warren Quinn on ‘Putting Rationality in its Place’; David Sachs on ‘Notes on Unfairly Gaining More: Pleonexia’; Thomas Scanlon on ‘Fear of Relativism’; Michael Thompson on ‘The Representation of Life’; David Wiggins on ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty’; and Bernard Williams on ‘Acts and Omissions: Doing and Not Doing’. A short review cannot hope to do justice to all the interesting (and controversial) material to be found in these dedicatory essays. And rather than attempt to discuss even two or three of them, I think it better to choose a single one for closer consideration, namely, Warren Quinn’s rich and fascinating critique of subjectivist/instrumentalist views of practical reason. (shrink)

In the field of philosophy, Plato's view of rhetoric as a potentially treacherous craft has long overshadowed Aristotle's view, which focuses on rhetoric as an independent discipline that relates in complex ways to dialectic and logic and to ethics and moral psychology. This volume, composed of essays by internationally renowned philosophers and classicists, provides the first extensive examination of Aristotle's Rhetoric and its subject matter in many years. One aim is to locate both Aristotle's treatise and its subject within the (...) more general context of his philosophical treatment of other disciplines, including moral and political theory as well as poetics. The contributors also seek to illuminate the structure of Aristotle's own conception of rhetoric as presented in his treatise. The first section of the book, which deals with the arguments of rhetoric, contains essays by M. F. Burnyeat and Jacques Brunschwig. A section treating the status of the art of rhetoric features pieces by Eckart Schütrumpf, Jürgen Sprute, M. M. McCabe, and Glenn W. Most. Essays by John M. Cooper, Stephen Halliwell, and Jean-Louis Labarrière address topics related to rhetoric, ethics, and politics. The final section, on rhetoric and literary art, comprises essays by Alexander Nehamas and André Laks. Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The author examines the “veil of ignorance” thought experiment and the principles of justice of John Rawls via two main directions of criticism. First, although Rawls constructs a veil of ignorance with Kantian categories, the author derives Rawls’s motivation from the link between justice and the tradition of curbing pleonexic human nature, arguing that in this context Rawls’s Kantian rhetoric is actually driven by the Hobbesian fear of instability arising from the problem of cooperation in the social contract tradition. Second, (...) the veil of ignorance is a cunning instrument of the privileged to preserve their previously acquired advantages, control stability, and cover up socio-political injustices. At the same time, the principle of difference that derives from it does not reduce the gap of inequality – economic and historical – but legitimizes and establishes it. In fact, Rawls’s bourgeois liberalism and its theoretical constructs serve to hedge the well-off by securing and increasing what they already have. (shrink)

En el centro de La república, Sócrates expresa su disgusto de que Glaucón trate de enemistarlo con Trasímaco cuando existe entre ambos una relación de amistad (498c9- d4). Más allá de la ironía socrática, lo cierto es que la amistad de sus lógoi está basada en un doble acuerdo: 1) La justicia exige el conocimiento de lo útil o bueno (339d5-9); 2) El gobernante inteligente no está dispuesto a beneficiar a la ciudad si no se beneficia de algún modo a (...) sí mismo (347d6-8). El propósito de la comunicación es aclarar el sentido de esta doble homología en la que intersectan y divergen las posiciones de Trasímaco y de Sócrates. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to study a set of three issues related to the understanding of partial justice and partial injustice as character dispositions, namely the distinctive circumstance of action, the emotion involved therein and the pleasure or pain following it. Those points are treated in a relatively obscure way by Aristotle, especially in comparison with their treatment in the expositions of other character virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Building on the expression ‘capacity towards the other’ (δύναμις ἐν (...) τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον), the paper highlights the interpersonal nature of the circumstances of just and unjust actions, and points how such nature is directly related to notions such as ‘profit’ (κέρδος) or ‘getting more’(πλεονεκτεῖν) as well as to the unusual conception of excess, defect and intermediacy in Nicomachean Ethics Book V. The interpersonal nature of just and unjust actions works also as the starting-point for the interpretation both of the pleasure briefly mentioned in 1130b4 as characterizing the greedy person and of the emotion involved in acting justly or greedy, which is mentioned in an extremely elliptical way in 1130b1-2: the paper argues, on the one hand, that the pleasure felt in acting justly or unjustly concerns not only the goods that are the object of just or unjust interactions, but also the way such interactions affect the people involved; on the other hand, it argues that the emotion actuated in just or unjust interactions relates to the agent’s concern or lack of concern with the good of those people. (shrink)