Problems from Kant is distinctive in the way that it combines the crisp and often extremely critical style of argumentation found in Jonathan Bennett’s work with a very helpful grasp of the much more metaphysical character of the leading trends in current systematic philosophy. Although the book defends a phenomenalist reading of Kant's transcendental idealism that is not far from Bennett's empiricist interpretation, it also stresses many points that derive mostly from a philosophical and interpretative sympathy for the rationalist tradition (...) and a revival of modal considerations in the spirit of David Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. Since there is not enough room here to go into the many points on which I very much agree with the rationalist side of Van Cleve’s reading, I will take this occasion to play the role of critic and concentrate on one of the few areas in which it appears we have some serious disagreements. These disagreements are worthy of special attention because they arise in the chapter that overlaps the least with Van Cleve’s earlier publications, and they concern a topic that all would agree is at the very center of the Critique, namely Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories. (shrink)