Utilitas 30 (3):253-270 (2018)

Authors
Miles Tucker
Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim that even if Moore does not need Thomson's concept, he still requires the objectionable notion of absolute goodness. I undermine both these replies. I first show that we may dispense with generic goodness without losing Moorean intrinsic goodness. Then, I argue that though intrinsic goodness is indeed a kind of absolute goodness, the objections marshalled against the concept are unsound.
Keywords Axiology  Intrinsic Value  G.E. Moore
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1017/s0953820817000292
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References found in this work BETA

Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1962 - Cambridge University Press.
Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.Noah M. Lemos - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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