Intrinsic goodness is a non-Ielational property, in that the worth of an intrinsically good thing does not consist in it standing in a beneficial relationship to anyone. Except for the non-relational intrinsic goodness, which if it exists must be acknowledged by all (rational) beings, the only relational good we humans can logically and plausibly deem good is the “human-related” good. Thus, only these two options exist: from our human viewpoint, either all good things are human-related goods, or some good things (...) are also intrinsically good. Those theories that reject intrinsic goodness. and that declare that the only kind of good things there can be are the human-related goods, are all forms of feeling-consequentialism. if the (two) “default arguments” could refute all feeling-consequentialisms, they would thereby refute theories that deny the very possibility of intrinsic goodness. Hence they would establish that, so long as a theory holds that some things are indeed good, it must also hold that there exist (also) intrinsically good things. The default arguments do show that utilitarian calculations cannot account for all goodness, since no linkage exists between goodness and pleasure. But some “positive feelings” (let them be X, Y, and Z) can be inextricably linked to what is good. Hence theories that define the good in terms of X, Y. and Z, are not amenable to the criticisms that utilitarianism is. Thus, the default arguments do not establish the impossibility of there being a (non-utilitarian feeling-consequentialist) theory, which acknowledges only human-related good things, and denies intrinsic goodness altogether. The tenability of such a stance has not been ruled out. Moore’s inability to accept the consequences of things having intrinsic worth, further betrays the implausibility of the very concept of intrinsic value. (shrink)

In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in (...) ethics need not be mutually incompatible. (shrink)

In this rather compact book, Ashmore comprehensively examines those elements that are needed to build a well defined ethical theory. Many and varied topics are considered, such as the issue concerning relativity and objectivity in ethics, the relation between morality and law or morality and religion, the distinction between facts and values and metaethical theories on the nature of moral judgments. But the basic focus of the book is to examine four major ethical theories: egoism, utilitarianism, deontological ethics of Kant, (...) and virtue ethics of Aristotle. Of these, only ethical egoism is outrightly rejected, for very good reasons. At the end of each chapter, anywhere from ten to twenty questions of considerable difficulty are asked. The material is well organized, interesting, presented in a language not very technical and examines thoughts of many scholars and thinkers. (shrink)

In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in (...) ethics need not be mutually incompatible. (shrink)

Mohanty is deeply versed in Husserl. In fact, the primary focus of the book is Husserl’s phenomenology. It is a collection of fifteen essays, spanning fourteen years, which were either published in journals or presented at symposia and meetings. As the title indicates, these essays, as a whole, seek to define, elucidate, and defend “transcendental philosophy,” by which is meant basically nothing other than Husserl’s phenomenology.