Abstract

The Appendix considers whether instrumental value of any sort depends upon intrinsic goodness. It is argued that most familiar sorts do not so depend, but one can be shown to do so by a kind of First Cause argument. ;Chapter IV begins with an attempt to give a clear and complete formulation of hedonism--the theory according to which only pleasure is intrinsically good. The formulation builds upon the efforts of Warren Quinn and Edward Oldfield. Then an argument against hedonism by Brentano is critically assessed. C. D. Broad's objection to the effect that the pleasure of malice is not intrinsically good is then evaluated, as is G. E. Moore's objection to the effect that beauty is also intrinsically good. It is contended that hedonism does not succumb to any of these objections. ;In Chapter III the question is whether the concept of pleasure enters into an analysis of the concept of being intrinsically good. This topic is approached through writings by Franz Brentano. It is argued that no such analysis is possible. ;Chapter III is concerned with whether pleasure can help us to identify the bearers of intrinsic goodness. Again, some of Brentano's work is central to the topic, as is work by Charles Baylis. It is argued that pleasure is of no special help in discovering the intrinsic goods. ;The three major philosophical connections between concepts are analysis, epistemic mark, and general theoretical link. Each has been thought to relate pleasure to intrinsic goodness. The Introduction consists in a brief study of the nature of these connections. The body of the thesis examines whether pleasure and intrinsic goodness are so related