Utilitas 22 (2):148-170 (2010)

Abstract
This article defends the project of giving a single pleasure-based account of goodness against what may seem a powerful challenge. Aristotle, Peter Geach and Judith Thomson have argued that there is no such thing as simply being good; there is only (for example) being a good knife or a good painting (Geach), being serene or good to eat (Thomson), or being good in essence or in qualities (Aristotle). But I argue that these philosophersgoodgoodknife’
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820810000063
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References found in this work BETA

Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Rights and Agency.Amartya Sen - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1):3-39.
Utilitarianism and the Virtues.Philippa Foot - 1985 - Mind 94 (374):196-209.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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