Philosophical Studies 33 (2):143 - 176 (1978)

This article deals with the design argument for the existence of God as it is discussed in hume's "dialogues concerning natural religion". Using bayes's theorem in the probability calculus--Which hume almost certainly could not have known as such--It shows how the various arguments advanced by philo and cleanthes fit neatly into a comprehensive logical structure. The conclusion is drawn that, Not only does the empirical evidence fail to support the theistic hypothesis, But also renders the atheistic hypothesis quite highly probable. A postscript speculates upon the historical question of hume's own attitude toward the design argument
Keywords Hume
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DOI 10.1007/BF00571884
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In Defense of Naturalism.Gregory W. Dawes - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):3-25.
Doxastic Naturalism and Hume's Voice in the Dialogues.C. M. Lorkowski - 2016 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (3):253-274.
True Religion in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.Tim Black & Robert Gressis - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):244-264.
The Argument From Unfairness.Richard Schoenig - 1999 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 (2):115-128.
Experimental Atheism.Wesley C. Salmon - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (1):101 - 104.

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