Analysis 77 (4):735-741 (2017)

Authors
David Pitt
California State University, Los Angeles
Abstract
Reductive representationalism is the view that the qualitative properties associated with conscious experience are properties of the objects of the experience, and not of the experience itself. A prima facie problem for this view arises from dreams and hallucinations, in which qualitative properties are experienced but not instantiated in external objects of perception. I argue that representationalist attempts to solve it by appeal to actually uninstantiated properties are guilty of an absurdity akin to that which Ryle accused Descartes of in the latter’s doctrine of immaterial substance.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx123
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
When Nothing Looks Blue.Joseph Gottlieb & Ali Rezaei - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2553-2561.

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