Indexical Thought

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-70 (2013)


Call a thought whose expression involves the utterance of an indexical an indexical thought. Thus, my thoughts that I’m annoyed, that now is not the right time, that this is not acceptable, are all indexical thoughts. Such thoughts present a prima facie problem for the thesis that thought contents are phenomenally individuated -- i.e., that each distinct thought type has a proprietarily cognitive phenomenology such that its having that phenomenology makes it the thought that it is -- given the assumption that phenomenology is intrinsically determined. My concern in this paper is to blunt standard intuitions concerning the external individuation of indexical thought contents, and to defend a conception of indexical thought content that is entirely phenomenal and internalist.

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David Pitt
California State University, Los Angeles

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Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On What We Experience When We Hear People Speak.Anders Nes - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 10:58-85.
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Physicalism and the Privacy of Conscious Experience.Miklós Márton & János Tőzsér - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 4 (1):73-88.

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