Abstract

The paper explores representationalist theories of mind in the context of the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind-body problem is related to the substantial dualism, according to which there are two independent types of objects – physical and mental. For a materialistically oriented metaphysics, such a dualism was unacceptable. In the second half of the twentieth century. a new version of dualism appeared – the dualism of properties. Its essence lies in the fact that it is not the existence of mental substances that is affirmed, but the existence of phenomenal properties of experience that are irreducible to physical and functional properties. The dualism of properties is associated with the hard problem of consciousness – why are certain neurophysiological processes accompanied by a qualitative experience? The problem of a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenal characteristics of experience has become a new threat to naturalistic metaphysics. The first part of the work analyzes the philosophical context of the formation of cognitive science. It is shown how functionalism and representationalism became the two main philosophical positions that underlie this discipline. The second part deals with an attempt to solve the mind-body problem through the naturalization of intentionality. It is shown that teleosemantic representationalism, within the framework of which this naturalistic project was implemented, is not able to explain the phenomenon of misrepresentation, which plays a crucial role for the idea of representation as such. The final part of the study evaluates an attempt to answer the hard problem of consciousness by reducing the phenomenal character of experience to representational content. The author demonstrates that such a reduction leads to an ontology with non-instantiated properties and non-existent objects, which is an undesirable consequence for a physicalism.