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Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.details
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Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia?Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.details
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Qualia ain't in the head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.details
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How to account for illusion.Bill Brewer - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-180.details
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Phenomenal intentionalities.William Lycan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.details
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What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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