When nothing looks blue

Synthese 199 (1-2):2553-2561 (2020)
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Abstract

Pitt :735–741, 2017) has argued that reductive representationalism entails an absurdity akin to the “paramechanical hypothesis” Ryle attributed to Descartes. This paper focuses on one version of reductive representationalism: the property-complex theory. We contend that at least insofar as the property-complex theory goes, Pitt is wrong. The result is not just a response to Pitt, but also a clarification of the aims and structure of the property-complex theory.

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Author Profiles

Ali Rezaei
New York University
Joseph Gottlieb
Texas Tech University

References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.

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