Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021)

Authors
Peter Pagin
Stockholm University
Neri Marsili
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
Asserting is the act of claiming that something is the case—for instance, that oranges are citruses, or that there is a traffic congestion on Brooklyn Bridge (at some time). We make assertions to share information, coordinate our actions, defend arguments, and communicate our beliefs and desires. Because of its central role in communication, assertion has been investigated in several disciplines. Linguists, philosophers of language, and logicians rely heavily on the notion of assertion in theorizing about meaning, truth and inference. The nature of assertion and its relation to other speech acts and linguistic phenomena (implicatures, presuppositions, etc.) have been subject to much controversy. This entry will situate assertion within speech act theory and pragmatics more generally, and then go on to present the current main accounts of assertion.
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References found in this work BETA

Asserting.Robert Brandom - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):637-650.
Peirce.Christopher Hookway - 1985 - Routledge.
Semantics.John Lyons - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (2):289-295.

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