Truth: The Rule or the Aim of Assertion?

Episteme 21 (1):263-269 (2024)
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Abstract

Is truth the rule or the aim of assertion? Philosophers disagree. After reviewing the available evidence, the hypothesis that truth is the aim of assertion is defended against recent attempts to prove that truth is rather a rule of assertion.

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Author's Profile

Neri Marsili
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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