Assertions Only?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):44-52 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is standardly believed that the only way to justify an assertion in the face of a challenge is by making another assertion. Call this claim ASSERTIONS ONLY. Besides its intrinsic interest, ASSERTIONS ONLY is relevant to deciding between competing views of the norms that govern reasoned discourse. ASSERTIONS ONLY is also a crucial part of the motivation for infinitism and Pyrrhonian skepticism. I suggest that ASSERTIONS ONLY is false: I can justify an assertion by drawing attention to something that clearly makes the assertion true, or likely true.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Assertions and Their Function.Nicholas Tebben - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:261-279.
A Note on Existentially Known Assertions.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):813-821.
Paradoxical Assertions: A Reply to Turri.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):239-241.
Truth and directness in pictorial assertion.Lukas Lewerentz & Emanuel Viebahn - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (6):1441–1465.
You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
Centered assertion.Stephan Torre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114.
Are Selfless Assertions Hedged?Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13 (1):47-54.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-06-25

Downloads
1,088 (#20,679)

6 months
98 (#70,421)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ben Bronner
George Washington University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.

View all 33 references / Add more references