In defense of assertion

Philosophical Studies 171 (2):313-326 (2014)
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Abstract

Herman Cappelen has recently argued in favor of what he calls “the no assertion view”, where the putative speech act is replaced with Paul Grice’s category of ‘sayings’. To make his case, Cappelen produces four arguments against Timothy Williamson’s normative view of assertion, holding that the same arguments can be used mutatis mutandis against other non-normative views of assertion. In this paper I examine all four of Cappelen’s arguments against normative theories of assertion, and conclude that they fail

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Citations of this work

Gricean Quality.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):689-703.
Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.
La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción.Jaime Alfaro Iglesias - 2017 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:123-136.
La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción.Jamie Alfaro Iglesias - 2017 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:123-136.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):447 - 457.
Assertion: New Philosophical Essays.Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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