Do We Need Reasons for the Normativity of Belief?

Kritike 12 (1):162-200 (2018)
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10.25138/12.1.a8

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References found in this work

Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
There Are No Norms of Belief.David Papineau - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Does belief have an aim?David John Owens - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.

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