Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87 (1998)
Abstract |
What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.
|
Keywords | normativity autonomy metaethics interpersonal reasons rationality publicity Korsgaard |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1023/A:1009908512139 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1738 - Collins.
View all 16 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Constitutivism and Normativity: A Qualified Defence.Stefano Bertea - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):81-95.
Korsgaard’s Moral Theory ln the Light of Kant’s Architectonics.Vitaly Kiryushchenko - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.
Human Plight, Kantian as If, and Public Reasons in Korsgaard’s Moral Theory.Vitaly Kiryushchenko - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (56):99-119.
Why One’s Practical Reasons Are Not Just One’s Own Private Affair.Stefano Bertea - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiry 41 (1):63-85.
Similar books and articles
Korsgaard’s Private-Reasons Argument.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):303-324.
Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
Reason, Reasons and Normativity.Joseph Raz - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
Egoism and the Publicity of Reason: A Reply to Korsgaard.Michael J. Cholbi - 1999 - Social Theory and Practice 25 (3):491-517.
Consensus and Excellence of Reasons.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:83-103.
Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
113 ( #103,488 of 2,506,118 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,984 of 2,506,118 )
2009-01-28
Total views
113 ( #103,488 of 2,506,118 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,984 of 2,506,118 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads