Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624 (2013)

Authors
Pascal Engel
École des hautes études en sciences sociale
Abstract
Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity: a belief is correct because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and performs aptly and adroitly. I object to this teleological picture that beliefs are not performances, and that epistemic reasons or beliefs cannot be balanced against practical reasons. Although the picture fits the nature of inquiry, it does not fit the normative nature of believing, which has to be conceived along distinct lines
Keywords Belief  Normativity  Knowledge  Truth  Sosa
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Reprint years 2018
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0200-0
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References found in this work BETA

Linguistics in Philosophy.Zeno Vendler - 2019 - Cornell University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.
Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Editorial.Gerhard Heinzmann - 2017 - Philosophia Scientae 21:3-4.
Judgment Puzzles. In Conversation With Pascal Engel.Ernest Sosa - 2017 - Philosophia Scientae 21:165-180.

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