A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

2015

DOI

10.1080/0020174x.2014.932303

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
A new argument for pragmatism?Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):227-231.
Sanctifying evidentialism.Horace Fairlamb - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):61-76.
Conceptual evidentialism.Inga Nayding - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
A new argument for evidentialism?Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.
Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The will and evidence toward belief: A critical essay on Jonathan E. Adler's belief's own ethics.Nathan Segars - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.
Reasons for Belief.Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2011 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schmoozy introduction.Peter A. Railton - unknown

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-13

Downloads
1,118 (#10,828)

6 months
112 (#31,919)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence.Paul Silva - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):1012-1018.
P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.
Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.
Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.
Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-14.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

View all 18 references / Add more references