Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676 (2015)

Daan Evers
University of Groningen
Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent normative truths. I argue that neither horn is very sharp for realists about epistemic normativity
Keywords Sharon street  Epistemic normativity  Epistemic reasons   Evolution  Moral realism and antirealism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0714-4
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
A New Reliability Defeater for Evolutionary Naturalism.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):538-564.
Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox.Michael Campbell - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):151-173.

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