A Faithful Response to Disagreement

The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one’s own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one’s opinion on important matters. I show that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one’s beliefs. And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn’t already hold them.

Similar books and articles

Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
Religious Disagreement Is Not Unique.Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-106.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.
Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.
Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief.Theodore J. Everett - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):273-286.
How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2007 - In Ted Warfield & Richard Feldman (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-01-19

Downloads
1,472 (#6,270)

6 months
258 (#6,832)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lara Buchak
Princeton University

Citations of this work

On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.
Faith and traditions.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):740-759.
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 90 references / Add more references