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Risk and Rationality
Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2013)
Abstract
Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.Author's Profile
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2014, 2017
ISBN(s)
0199672164 9780198801283 9780199672165 0198801289 9780191759048
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Citations of this work
Can it be Rational to have Faith?Lara Buchak - 2012 - In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.
What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.
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