Abstract
Believers in the objectivity of morals are required some time or another to reply to their opponents’ objections, to supply an acceptable account of the evidence deployed by their opponents consistent with their own view, and to bring to light reasons for rejecting their opponents’ case. This paper is intended to go some of the way towards carrying out these objectives. Moral objectivists must also, of course, furnish a positive and defensible account of the status of moral judgments; and, as Kai Nielsen has suggested, they should also ideally construct an acceptable theory of normative ethics, if only to put flesh on the skeleton of their metaethical analysis: though this latter task is not an obligatory one, for their metaethical claims will entail that there are true moral judgments, but need not settle which these are or even how to decide which these are. The present paper contains no more than hints on how in my view these further projects may be accomplished.