Holism, realism, and truth: how to be an anti‐relativist and not give up on heidegger – a debate with Christopher Norris

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):339 – 356 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Responding to criticisms raised by Christopher Norris, this paper defends an anti-relativist reading of the work of both Davidson and Heidegger arguing that that there are important lessons to be learnt from their example - one can thus be an anti-relativist (as well as a certain sort of realist) without giving up on Davidson or on Heidegger.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
103 (#166,881)

6 months
3 (#992,575)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeff Malpas
University of Tasmania

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Three Varieties of Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:153-166.

View all 9 references / Add more references