Social Epistemology 31 (2):210-223 (2017)

Derek Egan Anderson
Boston University
This paper identifies the phenomenon of conceptual competence injustice, a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when a marginalized epistemic agent makes a conceptual claim and is illegitimately regarded as having failed to grasp one or more of the concepts expressed in her testimony. The notion of a conceptual claim is given a deflationary account that is coextensive with the class of a priori knowable claims. This study reveals a form of oppression that severely hinders marginalized epistemic agents who seek to create or communicate conceptual knowledge. Conceptual competence injustice is compared and contrasted with three other forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, and contributory injustice. The final section investigates a number of damaging effects that conceptual competence injustice has on marginalized persons pursuing a career in academic philosophy.
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DOI 10.1080/02691728.2016.1241320
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Citations of this work BETA

#MeToo, Social Norms, and Sanctions.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen & Nicolas Olsson Yaouzis - 2020 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (3):273-295.
Feminist Philosophy of Language.Jennifer Saul - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Linguistic Hijacking.Derek Anderson - 2020 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (3).
Conceptual Responsibility.Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield

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