Miranda Fricker, Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing [Book Review]

Analysis 69 (2):380-382 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Fricker's main aim is to illustrate the ethical aspects of two of our basic epistemic practices, namely conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. In particular, she wishes to investigate the idea that there are prevalent and distinctively epistemic forms of injustice related to these aspects of our epistemic lives, injustices which reflect the fact that our actual epistemic practices are socially situated. Most of the book focuses on two such forms – Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice – and on the epistemic virtues required to counteract them.Testimonial Injustice occurs when a hearer fails, because of prejudice, to give due credit to the word of a speaker. For instance, in the novel To Kill a Mockingbird, the jury in the trial of Tom Robinson fail to regard his testimony as credible because he …

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,506

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-04-11

Downloads
441 (#71,787)

6 months
27 (#127,697)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael S. Brady
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
Expanding Transformative Experience.Havi Carel & Ian James Kidd - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):199-213.
Group Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):21-42.

View all 57 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references