Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness.Jennifer M. Windt - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (4):e12661.
    Sleep is phenomenologically rich, teeming with different kinds of conscious thought and experience. Dreaming is the most prominent example, but there is more to conscious experience in sleep than dreaming. Especially in non‐rapid eye movement sleep, conscious experience, sometimes dreamful, sometimes dreamless, also alternates with a loss of consciousness. Yet while dreaming has become established as a topic for interdisciplinary consciousness science and empirically informed philosophy of mind, the same is not true of other kinds of sleep‐related experience, nor is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  • Insight and Dissociation in Lucid Dreaming and Psychosis.Ursula Voss, Armando D’Agostino, Luca Kolibius, Ansgar Klimke, Silvio Scarone & J. Allan Hobson - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  • What makes a mental state feel like a memory: feelings of pastness and presence.Melanie Rosen & Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:95-122.
    The intuitive view that memories are characterized by a feeling of pastness, perceptions by a feeling of presence, while imagination lacks either faces challenges from two sides. Some researchers complain that the “feeling of pastness” is either unclear, irrelevant or isn’t a real feature. Others point out that there are cases of memory without the feeling of pastness, perception without presence, and other cross-cutting cases. Here we argue that the feeling of pastness is indeed a real, useful feature, and although (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Sleeper Agents: The Sense of Agency Over the Dream Body.Melanie G. Rosen - 2021 - Human Studies 44 (4):693-719.
    Although the sense of agency is often reduced if not absent in dreams, our agentive dream experiences can at times be similar to or enhanced compared to waking. The sense of agency displayed in dreams is perplexing as we are mostly shut off from real stimulus whilst asleep. Theories of waking sense of agency, in particular, comparator and holistic models, are analysed in order to argue that despite the isolation from the real environment, these models can help account for dream (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • I could do that in my sleep: skilled performance in dreams.Melanie G. Rosen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6495-6522.
    The experience of skilled action occurs in dreams if we take dream reports at face value. However, what these reports indicate requires nuanced analysis. It is uncertain what it means to perform any action in a dream whatsoever. If skilled actions do occur in dreams, this has important implications for both theory of action and theory of dreaming. Here, it is argued that since some dreams generate a convincing, hallucinated world where we have virtual bodies that interact with virtual objects, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind.M. G. Rosen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):295-318.
    When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep.Melanie Rosen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (17):4107-4142.
    Our eyes, bodies, and perspectives are constantly shifting as we observe the world. Despite this, we are very good at distinguishing between self-caused visual changes and changes in the environment: the world appears mostly stable despite our visual field moving around. This, it seems, also occurs when we are dreaming. As we visually investigate the dream environment, we track moving objects with our dream eyes, examine objects, and shift focus. These movements, research suggests, are reflected in the rapid movements or (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind.Albert Newen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  • Enactivism and predictive processing: A non-representational view.Michael David Kirchhoff & Ian Robertson - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):264-281.
    This paper starts by considering an argument for thinking that predictive processing (PP) is representational. This argument suggests that the Kullback–Leibler (KL)-divergence provides an accessible measure of misrepresentation, and therefore, a measure of representational content in hierarchical Bayesian inference. The paper then argues that while the KL-divergence is a measure of information, it does not establish a sufficient measure of representational content. We argue that this follows from the fact that the KL-divergence is a measure of relative entropy, which can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Rapid Eye Movements in Sleep Furnish a Unique Probe Into Consciousness.Charles C.-H. Hong, James H. Fallon, Karl J. Friston & James C. Harris - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:377231.
    The neural correlates of rapid eye movements (REMs) in sleep are extraordinarily robust; including REM-locked activation in the retrosplenial cortex, the supplementary eye field and areas overlapping cholinergic basal nucleus. The phenomenology of REMs speaks to the notion that perceptual experience in both sleep and wakefulness is a constructive process – in which we generate predictions of sensory inputs and then test those predictions through actively sampling the sensorium with eye movements. On this view, REMs during sleep may index an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • New directions in predictive processing.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):209-223.
    Predictive processing (PP) is now a prominent theoretical framework in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This review focuses on PP research with a relatively philosophical focus, taking stock of the framework and discussing new directions. The review contains an introduction that describes the full PP toolbox; an exploration of areas where PP has advanced understanding of perceptual and cognitive phenomena; a discussion of PP's impact on foundational issues in cognitive science; and a consideration of the philosophy of science (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Conscious Self-Evidencing.Jakob Hohwy - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4):809-828.
    Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for consciousness. Different systems may however be capable of self-evidencing in different, specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with, and explain, several properties of consciousness. This carves out a distinction in nature between those systems that are conscious, as described by these properties, and those that are not. This approach throws new (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Dream engineering: Simulating worlds through sensory stimulation.Michelle Carr, Adam Haar, Judith Amores, Pedro Lopes, Guillermo Bernal, Tomás Vega, Oscar Rosello, Abhinandan Jain & Pattie Maes - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 83 (C):102955.
  • What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):243-261.
    Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and a lack of detail in dreams can anyway be explained in terms of the underlying (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Some hallucinations are experiences of the past.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):454-488.
    When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Does what we dream feel present? Two varieties of presence and implications for measuring presence in VR.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2525-2551.
    What’s presented in our normal waking perceptual visual experiences feels present to us, while what we “see” in pictures and imagine does not. What about dreams? Does what we “see” in a dream feel present? Jennifer Windt has argued for an affirmative answer, for all dreams. But the dreams which flow from the brain’s registration of myoclonic twitches present a challenge to this answer. During these dreams motion-guiding vision is shut off, and, as Mohan Matthen has argued, motion-guiding vision seems (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought?Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6111-6138.
    Starting with Gareth Evans, there’s an important tradition of theorizing about perception-based demonstrative thought which assigns necessary epistemic conditions to it. Its core idea is that demonstrative reference in thought is grounded in information links, understood as links which carry reliable information about their targets and which a subject exploits for demonstrative reference by tokening the mental files fed by these links. Perception, on these views, is not fundamental to perception-based demonstrative thought but is only the information link exploited in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Maurice Halbwachs on dreams and memory.John Sutton - forthcoming - In Daniel Gregory & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Dreaming and Memory. Springer.
    In the first two chapters of his 1925 book Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (The Social Frameworks of Memory), the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) develops a sustained comparison between remembering and dreaming. Engaging in detail with large bodies of contemporary research in psychology, physiology, philosophy, and linguistics, he aims to combat what he calls the ‘surprising’ tendency of ‘psychological treatises that deal with memory’ to treat each of us as ‘an isolated being’ (1925/ 1994, vi) 1. In the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark