Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because (...) they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey’s pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment. (shrink)

This paper starts by considering an argument for thinking that predictive processing (PP) is representational. This argument suggests that the Kullback–Leibler (KL)-divergence provides an accessible measure of misrepresentation, and therefore, a measure of representational content in hierarchical Bayesian inference. The paper then argues that while the KL-divergence is a measure of information, it does not establish a sufficient measure of representational content. We argue that this follows from the fact that the KL-divergence is a measure of relative entropy, which can (...) be shown to be the same as covariance (through a set of additional steps). It is well known that facts about covariance do not entail facts about representational content. So there is no reason to think that the KL-divergence is a measure of (mis-)representational content. This paper thus provides an enactive, non-representational account of Bayesian belief optimisation in hierarchical PP. (shrink)

This book covers all aspects of the disorder, from an historical survey of research to date, through the nature and anatomical bases of neglect, and on to review contemporary theories on the subject.

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows (...) that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet. (shrink)

This paper will argue that intellectualism about skill—the contention that skilled performance is without exception guided by proposition knowledge—is fundamentally flawed. It exposes that intellectualists about skill run into intractable theoretical problems in explicating a role for their novel theoretical conceit of practical modes of presentation. It then examines a proposed solution by Carlotta Pavese which seeks to identify practical modes of presentation with motor representations that guide skilled sensorimotor action. We argue that this proposed identification is problematic on empirical (...) and theoretical grounds, and—as such—it fails to deliver on its explanatory ambitions. In the final analysis, it will be argued that intellectualism about skill is, in any case, superfluous when it comes to accounting for the aspects of skilled performance it purports to explain. (shrink)

The impact of artificial intelligence (AI) is not only global but globally varied. Yet, AI ethics is all too often overly localised. This paper discusses the potential of a global AI ethics, highlighting several important variables that it should take into account if it is to be as successful an enterprise as it needs to be.

Building on the landmark O’Regan and Noë (Behav Brain Sci 24:939–973, 2001) that introduced us to the sensorimotor theory of perception, Alva Noë has continued to develop and defend a highly influential enactivist account of perception. Said account takes perceptual experience to be mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (knowledge of the law-like relations that hold between bodily movements and sensory changes). In recent work, Noë has argued that we should construe sensorimotor knowledge as a kind of conceptual knowledge. One significant theoretical (...) advantage of his account, he contends, is that it allows us to better characterize our embodied coping skills by way of showing how they are manifestations of a conceptual-and-yet-not-representational kind of understanding. He argues that both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of skill alike assume that conceptual understanding must be wedded to explicit judgement, and therefore have failed to correctly characterize the role of understanding in skilled performance. This paper argues against Noë’s contention that skilled action is always permeated with understanding. It argues additionally that Noë’s of unorthodox notion of conceptual understanding is unstable and, if it were adopted, would over-intellectualize the role of perception in action. The paper concludes by arguing that doing so frees us up to take more seriously the enactivist options for understanding skilled performance without introducing notions of conceptual understanding at all. (shrink)

Bruineberg and colleagues argue that a realist interpretation of Markov blankets inadvertently relies upon unfounded assumptions. However, insofar as their diagnosis is accurate, their prescribed instrumentalism may ultimately prove insufficient as a complete remedy. Drawing upon a process-based perspective on living systems, we suggest a potential way to avoid some of the assumptions behind problems described by Bruineberg and colleagues.

Craig Callender attempts to overturn conventional wisdom within decision theory by contending that rational intertemporal choices need not always conform to an exponential discounting function. He argues that there are cases in which hyperbolic discounting is the height of rationality. This paper does not seek to undermine Callender’s conclusions, but instead raises two interrelated theoretical concerns with his way securing them. The first concern is with his dismissal of influential dual-system explanations of rationality. It is argued that Callender’s criticisms of (...) said explanations fail to assess them at anything like their full weight. It is then suggested that dual-systems approaches in cognitive science do have substantial theoretical problems, but that Callender fails to identify them. The second concern builds on the first and suggests that Callender’s arguments against consensus normative standards might motivate a more dramatically reimagined notion of rationality than the one he seems to embrace. (shrink)

Osiurak and Reynaud claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.

Hutto and Myin defend, on the basis of their “radically enactive” approach to cognition, the contention that there are certain forms of imaginative activity that are entirely devoid of representational content. In a recent Thought article, Roelofs argues that Hutto and Myin’s arguments fail to recognise the role of representation in maintaining the structural isomorphisms between mental models and things in the world required for imagination be action-guiding. This reply to Roelofs argues that his objection fails because it fails to (...) fully appreciate the resources radical enactivists have at their disposal in characterising basic imaginings. (shrink)

In his recent _Autonomous Knowledge_ monograph, J. Adam Carter develops a non-standard anti-intellectualist account of know-how. On this account, an agent manifesting know-how necessarily involves her exhibiting a particular kind of cognitive grasp of the mechanism by which she performs her action. Carter considers a potential problem for his new anti-intellectualism: namely, whether it precludes less cognitively sophisticated agents from knowing how. In this discussion piece, I argue that his attempts to assuage such concerns—by appeal to work by Duncan Pritchard—fails (...) to address the problem. (shrink)

An increasingly popular objection to anti-intellectualism about know-how is that there are clear cases where an agent having the dispositional ability to φ does not suffice for her knowing how to φ. Recently, Adam Carter has argued that anti-intellectualism can only rise to meet this sufficiency objection if it imposes additional constraints on know-how. He develops a revisionary anti-intellectualism, on which knowing how to φ not only entails that the agent possesses a reliable ability to φ, but also that she (...) is equipped with certain kind of intellectual grasp of the method by which she is able to reliably φ. This paper argues that Carter's revisionary know-how does not constitute an improvement over the more standard version of anti-intellectualism. Moreover, it is argued that Carter's additional demands concede too much to the intellectualist, and, as a result, commit his revised anti-intellectualism to familiar problems facing the intellectualist account of know-how. In other words, his attempts to respond to the sufficiency objection constitutes a dangerous compromise to the intellectualist. The paper finishes with a final analysis that suggests, in the end, there are still reasons to prefer standard anti-intellectualism over intellectualism. (shrink)

In this objective, practical and authoritative introduction to animal law, the author examines the fundamental principles of the human-animal relationship and how those have, or have not, been translated into contemporary animal welfare law. The book describes the various uses of animals in society, the practical relevance of animal health and welfare to activities of professionals, and animal welfare in the context of global issues including climate change, disease control, food safety and food supply. It identifies 29 key principles which (...) guide animal law and welfare. Relevant to companion, farm, captive and wild animals, the book has international application in countries with both established and developing legislation. It focuses on the issues and principles, referencing contemporary animal welfare law to provide a global benchmark. The author acknowledges the diversity of views regarding animals as individual beings and beloved pets, to pure commodities. Yet animals need to be treated as one stakeholder, along with other interests, under the law. Based on successful courses run by the author and his own legal practice, the book combines science and ethics to provide an accessible introduction to the key principles of animal law and welfare. (shrink)

This chapter outlines the practical rehabilitation implications of current theories and models of frontal lobe function, with the aim of providing some provisional principles for the rehabilitation of the dysexecutive patient. It argues that there must be a theory of the cause of an impairment before a treatment can be designed. However, currently there is a gap between pure experimental work from which such theories might evolve and potential treatment applications. There is actually more potential cross-talk between these concerns than (...) might at first appear. Six provisional principles for treatment are presented. (shrink)

The evidence for the effectiveness of rehabilitation of three types of attention—selectivity, sustained attention, and attentional switching—is reviewed. Limited but significant effects in all three domains are observed, though evidence for generalization to wider everyday life functions remains relatively sparse. In the case of sustained attention and also in the case of spatial selectivity, the modulating effects of arousal are shown to be important, and higher level executive deficits may at times be exacerbated or even caused by lowered levels of (...) arousal. Conversely, methods of modulating arousal may be used to improve sustained attention and executive functions in a range of clinical conditions. Attentional functions are key to other cognitive domains such as attention and perception, and so the promising evidence for attentional rehabilitation may contribute to the rehabilitation of other cognitive domains also. (shrink)