This paper illustrates the main features of Luigi Ferrajoli’s theoretical approach to law, as they are developed in his Principia Juris . These include his opposition to the traditional perspective of natural law; his anti-cognitivist orientation; and, finally, his fundamentally normative approach. Among the numerous problems discussed in Ferrajoli’s compendious book, the paper focuses on his definition of constitutional democracy. In particular, the paper discusses the way in which Ferrajoli defines the complementarity between democracy and rights; Ferrajoli’s own criticism of (...) T. H. Marshall’s idea of citizenship; and the importance that the distinction between ‘decidable’ and ‘non-decidable’ rights have in Ferrajoli’s own system. Other issues of interests that are briefly discussed include the constitutionalisation of private law, and the defence of different kinds of liberty-rights. (shrink)

Globalization has expanded its influence since the early 1980s hugely since Reagan and Thatcher were in power and devoted themselves to advocating its key ideas, such as deregulation and privatizat...

Is there good reason to worry about celebrity involvement in democratic politics? The rise of celebrity politicians such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Zelensky has led political theorists and commentators to worry that the role of expertise in democratic politics has been undermined. According to one recent critique, celebrities possess a significant degree of epistemic power that is unconnected to appropriate expertise. This presents a problem both for deliberative and epistemic theories of democratic legitimacy, which ignore this form of power, (...) and for real existing democracies attempting to meet the standards of legitimacy set out by these theories. But do these critiques apply to democratic elitism? In this paper, we argue that recognition of celebrity epistemic power in fact represents a valuable resource for supporting the legitimacy and practice of democratic elitism, though these benefits do come with certain risks to which elite theories are particularly vulnerable. (shrink)

In this article, I criticize available democracy consolidation theories for assuming that the ontology of political structure and elite subjectivity are based upon historically transcendent a priori principles. In contrast to this assumption, I adopt a political field theory perspective to argue that concepts for comprehending the politics behind democracy consolidation must be reconstructed based on the history of conflicts among political actors over the meaning of politics. I demonstrate the significance of this insight for comprehending politics by empirically adopting (...) it to explain the case of Emergency in India (1975–1977). Using Multiple Correspondence Analysis, network analysis, and content analysis of biographies of politicians elected for the 1971 Indian parliament, I demonstrate that the politics behind Emergency can be comprehended only when we take into account the history of conflict since the late colonial period between those leaders who insisted that Indian politics was defined by the network of ties among politicians and those who believed that Indian politics must reflect the aspirations of the masses. The main point of this article is that the ontological principles of current political structure, elite subjectivity, and political institutions are rooted within the chaotic history of conflict among leaders over the meaning of politics. (shrink)

Most human societies exhibit a distinct class structure, with an elite, middle classes, and a bottom class, whereas animals form simple dominance hierarchies in which individuals with higher fighting ability do not appear to form coalitions to “oppress” weaker individuals. Here, we extend our model of primate coalitions and find that a division into a bottom class and an upper class is inevitable whenever fitness-enhancing resources, such as food or real estate, are exploitable or tradable and the members of the (...) bottom class cannot easily leave the group. The model predicts that the bottom class has a near flat, low payoff and always comprises at least half the society. The upper class may subdivide into one or more middle class(es), resulting in improved payoff for the topmost members (elite). The model predicts that the bottom class on its own is incapable of mounting effective counter-coalitions against the upper class, except when receiving support from dissatisfied members of the middle class(es). Such counter-coalitions can be prevented by keeping the payoff to the lowest-ranked members of the middle classes (through concessions) well above that of the bottom class. This simple model explains why classes are also absent in nomadic hunter-gatherers and predominate in (though are not limited to) societies that produce and store food. Its results also agree well with various other known features of societies with classes. (shrink)

The alleged emergence of a ‘post-truth’ regime links the rise of new forms of social media and the reemergence of political populism. Post-truth has theoretical roots in the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies, with sociologists of science arguing that both true and false claims should be explained by the same kinds of social causes. Most STS theorists have sought to deflect blame for post-truth, while at the same time enacting a normative turn, looking to deconstruct truth claims and (...) subject expertise to criticism. Steve Fuller has developed a positive case for post-truth in science, arguing that post-truth democratizes science. I criticize this argument and suggest an alternative approach that draws on the prehistory of the field in the 1930s and 1940s, when philosophers and sociologists sought to define the social conditions necessary for reliable knowledge production that might stem mass media irrationalism. (shrink)

A critical review of Bourdieu’s theory of the state is developed here against the backdrop of both his wider theoretical project and empirical studies. Elaborating the concepts of symbolic capital, symbolic violence, and symbolic domination, the centrality that Bourdieu accords to symbolic forms is compared to benchmark Weberian accounts that start with the state monopoly of violence. Reviewing also some of the burgeoning secondary literature discussing his theory of the state, Bourdieu’s writings, which encompass various antinomies, are shown to vacillate (...) between two distinct perspectives—a strong and a weak theory of the state. His rejection of the “physicalist” approaches of Marx, Elias, and Tilly is elaborated and subject to a counter-critique, particularly in relation to the notion of symbolic “violence.” Bourdieu’s account of the state is shown to be as much a political as theoretical intervention. His antagonism towards Marxist accounts in particular is shown to be rooted in a pragmatic interest in the role of the “left hand of the state” in progressive reform; and this perspective is traced back to the twin influences of Durkheim and Hegel, French republicanism, and in particular the potential of the state to express a universal interest. At the same time, compared with sophisticated Marxist and Weberian accounts and the work of Norbert Elias and Gramsci, Bourdieu’s theory is shown to be severely lacking in the way that he deals with violence and coercion. His “expanded materialism,” particularly with the “strong theory,” bends the stick too far and overplays the symbolic basis of consent. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s insights with regard to the pervasive influences of state practices of classification, taxonomy, delegation, and naming are shown to have real utility with regard to focused empirical investigations of the state in modern societies. (shrink)

Considering recent re-assessments of Pareto and Mosca, I discuss whether these thinkers’ socio-political orientations contribute to the ‘disfiguration’ of democracy or provide a resource for the renewal of democratic institutions. Femia presents Pareto as being in the “Machiavellian tradition of sceptical liberalism,” revealing the liberal potential of Pareto’s realist political theory. Finocchiaro ameliorates the conservative consequences of Mosca’s thought by reinterpreting him as a ‘democratic elitist,’ who holds a conception of political liberty “as a relationship such that authority flows from (...) the masses to the elites.” Highlighting the significance of internal tensions within each thinker’s work foregrounded by these readings, between the causal primacy of psychic states and the ‘mutual dependence’ of social factors, and between the elite principle and ‘balanced pluralism’, I ask whether the ‘sceptical liberal’ Pareto or the ‘democratic elitist’ Mosca elude Urbinati’s unpolitical, populist and plebiscitarian ‘disfigurations’ of democracy. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the concepts of social position and social status, the types of social position, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given positions in a new approach. In the first, introductory part of the article, I emphasize that the institutional sociological conception of social position in my approach is relatively closest to the structuralist position conception. In the second part, I introduce two different concepts, labelled social position and social status, and briefly review (...) the social determinedness of social status. In the third part, social positions are typified from the point of view of the two components of social position: on the one hand, from that of social power relations and on the other from that of interest relations. I point out that the different social positions promote the realization of interests to different degrees, that is, they make it possible to attain different social statuses. In a related article, I illustrate the concepts and connections in question with a case study carried out on an industrial shop floor. (shrink)

The coronavirus catastrophe that we are experiencing is first of all the result of an ecological catastrophe, but its underlying fundamental cause is the political crisis that our democracies are living. The sustainable development model is a smokescreen that will lead not to making deepgoing changes to the economic paradigm but to continuing with business as usual. The betrayal of the elites, both political and economic, supported by a system that is no longer democratic, has exposed the population to this (...) type of sanitary problem. A deep transformation of our political system is urgently needed. The people must take part in a true democracy, a direct democracy, that initiates a new democratic revolution capable of countering the sinister interests of the elites, of the caste in power. (shrink)

The political, economic and environmental policies of a hegemonic, oligarchic, political-economic international caste are the origin and cause of the ecological and political dystopia that we are living in. An utilitarian, resourcist, anthropocentric perspective guides classical economics and sustainable development models, allowing the enrichment of a tiny part of the world's population, while not impeding but, on the contrary, directly inducing economic losses and environmental destruction for the many. To preserve the integrity of natural systems we must abandon the resourcist (...) anthropocentric ethical fiction that is the current moral foundation underlying our relationship with nature and instead promote the realization of a new developmental landmark for democratic institutions: direct democracy, i.e. democracy truly governed by the people for the people, and ultimately for nature as well. (shrink)

La América Central de los años '90 es más homogénea de lo que jamás lo ha sido en el curso de su historia. Todos sus países están hoy en día democratizados y hacen frente a las mismas dificultades económicas y sociales. Esta homogeneidad ha hecho posible la creación de un sistema de integración centroamericana, en el que se encuentran Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica y Panamá. Al mismo tiempo, la integración fortalece la convergencia de las economías y las (...) políticas puestas en marcha, y de esta manera progresa la interdependencia en la región. (shrink)

Although the fallacy of composition is little studied and trivially illustrated, some view it as ubiquitous and paramount. Furthermore, although definitions regard the concept as unproblematic, it contains three distinct elements, often confused. And although some scholars apparently claim that fallacies are figments of a critic’s imagination, they are really proposing to study fallacies in the context of meta-argumentation. Guided by these ideas, I discuss the important historical example of Michels’s iron law of oligarchy.

The 14th general election in Malaysia held on May 9, 2018 is anhistoric event that altered the political landscape of the nation. For the firsttime over sixty years this election has caused to change the government fromBarisan Nasional coalition to another coalition named PakatanHarapan, formed in 2015. This article has analysed theelection results and the probable factors that might have contributed to thehistoric change. It argued that since 1999 the ruling Malay elites have becomepermanently divided challenging the dominance of United (...) Malay NationalOrganisation in politics and the prospect for a viable alternativebecame consolidated with the rise of Parti KeAdilan Rakyat offeringan avenue for a new generation politics. The return of Mahathir Mohamad topolitics and a strategic coalition mainly between his party and PKR, party ofthe jailed leader Anwar Ibrahim, made an alternative to BN/UMNO a realitythrough winning the election. (shrink)