Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why Tourette syndrome research needs philosophical phenomenology.Lisa Curtis-Wendlandt & Jack Reynolds - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):573-600.
    Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome, we still lack substantial insight into first-personal aspects of “what it is like” to live with this condition. This is despite the fact that developments in phenomenological psychiatry have demonstrated the scientific and clinical importance of understanding subjective experience in a range of other neuropsychiatric conditions. We argue that it is time for Tourette Syndrome research to tap into the sophisticated frameworks developed in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology for describing experience (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator.Yochai Ataria, Yair Dor-Ziderman & Aviva Berkovich-Ohana - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:133-147.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.
    A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion.Pablo López-Silva - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Perspective Taking and Avatar-Self Merging.Jochen Müsseler, Sophia von Salm-Hoogstraeten & Christian Böffel - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Today, avatars often represent users in digital worlds such as in video games or workplace applications. Avatars embody the user and perform their actions in these artificial environments. As a result, users sometimes develop the feeling that their self merges with their avatar. The user realizes that they are the avatar, but the avatar is also the user—meaning that avatar’s appearance, character, and actions also affect their self. In the present paper, we first introduce the event-coding approach of the self (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • A Cognitive-Semiotic Approach to Agency: Assessing Ideas from Cognitive Science and Neuroscience.Juan Mendoza-Collazos & Jordan Zlatev - 2022 - Biosemiotics 15 (1):141-170.
    Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy, and the distinction between original agency and enhanced agency, we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.Oliver Lukitsch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):955-975.
    Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Atribuciones de agencia mental Y el desafío desde la psicopatología.Pablo López-Silva - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (147):835-850.
    RESUMEN Una atribución de agencia mental es definida como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento en primera persona a un agente específico, esto, con el fin de generar grados suficientes de control sobre nuestra vida cognitiva. Si bien esta estrategia es fundamental para distinguir diferentes tipos de estados cognitivos - tales como deliberaciones, razonamientos, juicios, entre otros -, muchos autores han indicado que también es clave para entender experiencias cognitivas psicopatológicas en psicosis. Este artículo revisa (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation