Based on the assumption that consumers will reward firms for their support of social programs, many organizations have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Drawing on social identity theory, a model of influence of CSR on loyalty is developed and tested using a sample of real consumers. Results demonstrate that CSR initiatives are linked to stronger loyalty both because the consumer develops a more positive company evaluation, and because one identifies more strongly with the company. Moreover, identity salience is shown (...) to play a crucial role in the influence of CSR initiatives on consumer loyalty when this influence occurs through consumer-company identification. A strong identifier is not necessarily in a constant state of salience, but activating identity salience of a particular consumer social identity (a company) will affect consumer reactions to product stimuli, increasing consumer loyalty. (shrink)

The extent to which people identify with an organization is dependent on the attractiveness of the organizational identity, which helps individuals satisfy one or more important self-definitional needs. However, little is known about the antecedents of company identity attractiveness (IA) in a consumer–company context. Drawing on theories of social identity and organizational identification, a model of the antecedents of IA is developed and tested. The findings provide empirical validation of the relationship between IA and corporate associations perceived by consumers. Our (...) results demonstrate that the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contribution to company IA is much stronger than that of Corporate Ability (CA). This may be linked to increasing competition and of decreasing CA-based variation in the marketplace. (shrink)

Prior research has found attributions to mediate the relationship between the elements of corporate social responsibility activities and consumer responses to firms; however, the question of what variables determine consumer attributions of CSR remains partially unaddressed. This article analyzes why consumers make attributions of CSR that are either positive, or negative. The results obtained from two empirical studies indicate that company–cause fit, corporate ability, and interpersonal trust have a positive influence on the motives that consumers attribute to CSR, whereas corporate (...) hypocrisy has a negative effect. This research contributes to our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying impactful consumer judgments and provides guidance for organizations in responding to such evaluations. (shrink)

Poussin, à Rome, dit du Caravage qu'il était venu au monde pour détruire la peinture et cependant il est dit aussi qu'il possédait l'art de peindre tout entier. Ce livre cherche non point à résoudre une contradiction mais plutôt à développer une inconsistance du système représentatif dans le procès de peindre de Poussin au Caravage et vice versa. Il y sera donc question de mimésis et de fantaisie, d'histoire et d'action, de perspective et de ténèbres, de mort et de décapitation...

This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.

"--Richard Grandy, Rice University "This is the first compelling diagnosis of what has gone awry in the raging 'science wars.

L'actuel regain d'intérêt pour la philosophie témoigne de l'attente la plus légitime qui soit, eu égard aux prétentions traditionnelles et à l'aura de cette discipline, mais également la plus difficile à satisfaire : qu'elle mène celui qui épouse ses chemins à une véritable réappropriation de sa propre existence, à une recréation personnelle. Impossible ici de se satisfaire d'un horizon de consolations aimables et de recettes de prospérité, non plus que de vertiges théorisants ou d'érudition monomaniaque. Face à un monde qui (...) semble avoir d'avance consumé nos élans et consommé nos révoltes, les postures et commodités ne sont plus de mise. Un retour d'authenticité s'impose à l'engagement philosophique lui-même. En fait, la mise à l'épreuve de soi est passage obligé, dès lors que de mort de Dieu en chute des idoles de remplacement, nul ne peut plus prétendre faire surgir la valeur irréductible de l'humain d'ailleurs que de l'homme... D'où la pertinence et l'attrait de l'exploration, ici proposée, des voies traditionnelles et ressorts nouveaux d'une maïeutique propre à faire naître l'homme à lui-même, à travers la mise à nu et le retrait de tous les masques que nous imposent la vie en société et le respect de ses codes. Poussant au déracinement du moi comme à une étape nécessaire au dévoilement de notre vérité, les auteurs de cet essai s'inscrivent dans la lointaine filiation de ces philosophes de l'Antiquité (Stoïciens, Cyniques) qui vivaient leur philosophie comme un travail sur soi, voire une ascèse, et dans le prolongement de tout ce pan de la pensée contemporaine qui, avec Foucault notamment, s'est employé à armer la philosophie d'un pouvoir maximal de transformation croisée de celui qui s'y adonne et du social qui l'environne. (shrink)

Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, (...) is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive. Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced. Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty. (shrink)

Pourquoi a-t-on raison de se révolter contre l'homme-machine et le monde mécanique qu'entraînent les mutations technologiques incontrôlées? Et si, contre les robots, la fragilité faisait l'humanité? Un traité philosophique, un manuel de combat. Dans cet essai de philosophie contemporaine, Pascal Marin rassemble un large faisceau d'arguments contre ceux qui entendent faire de l'homme une machine. De chapitre en chapitre, il dénonce le fantasme du transhumanisme californien, qui s'exporte aujourd'hui à travers des médias en mal de sujets. Mais selon Marin, cette (...) crise du sens de l'humain est peut-être une chance pour la pensée : elle contraint à mieux prendre la mesure de la vie qui demeure énigmatique à la science. Cette enquête d'anthropologie radicale progresse donc par des chemins insolites jusqu'à atteindre à l'ironie d'un constat paradoxal : ce pouvoir technicien fascinant, qui semble sans limite, aurait pour cause le rapport intime que l'homme entretient depuis toujours avec le raté, la panne, le bug, bref tout ce qui peut mettre justement une machine en défaut. Un cri d'alerte, où l'intelligence et le style convainquent à chaque page. (shrink)

James Tabery Helen Longino’s Studying Human Behavior is an overdue effort at a nonpartisan evaluation of the many scientific disciplines that study the nature and nurture of human behavior, arguing for the acceptance of the strengths and weaknesses of all approaches. After years of conflict, Longino makes the pluralist case for peaceful coexistence. Her analysis of the approaches raises the following question: how are we to understand the pluralistic relationship among the peacefully coexisting approaches? Longino is ironically rather unpluralistic about (...) her pluralism, forcing a choice between integrative pluralism and her preferred ineliminative pluralism. I hope to show that the analysis of approaches she offers actually accommodates a pluralism that is both integrative and ineliminative.Approaches to studying human behaviorPhilosophy of biology took shape as a discipline in the 1970s. This disciplinary formation over. (shrink)

The proposal of anything like a feminist epistemology has, I think, two sources. Feminist scholars have demonstrated how the scientific cards have been stacked against women for centuries. Given that the sciences are taken as the epitome of knowledge and rationality in modern Western societies, the game looks desperate unless some ways of knowing different from those that have validated misogyny and gynephobia can be found. Can we know the world without hating ourselves? This is one of the questions at (...) the core of discussions of feminist epistemology. It has spinoffs, e.g., can we know the world in ways that will permit women as well as men to thrive? Can we know the world without hating any human group? and so on. Now, these questions might be answered in a way that does not require any rethinking of fundamental philosophical issues. Some philosophers might argue that sexism in the sciences from Aristotle to human sociobiology results from a masculinist blinding that impedes the normal workings of the human cognitive apparatus. Unblinded, that apparatus produces real knowledge rather than ideology. Or: that was then, this is now. This somewhat overestimates the progress made in the sciences in the last 20 years, but can be read as a promissory note. (shrink)

Research on sexual orientation attempts to reduce it to a monocausal phenomenon, whether that be biology (genes, hormones) or social environment (parenting patterns). None of these fully accounts for the diversity of erotic attraction and behavior, and indeed these reductionist strategies either misrepresent many forms of sexual behavior or erase them from our ontology. Understanding is better served by first acknowledging the variety of roles of sexual interaction in human life, rather than treating sex as a single kind of phenomenon.

In Studying Human Behavior, Helen E. Longino enters into the complexities of human behavioral research, a domain still dominated by the age-old debate of “nature versus nurture.” Rather than supporting one side or another or attempting..

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 182-184.

What are we trying to explain when we explain behavior? How is behavior conceptualized as an object of study and how else might it be conceptualized? Longino urges pluralism with respect to causes and explanations of behavior. This paper extends Longino’s analysis to the object of those explanations and urges pluralism with respect to behavior itself. The paper proposes that there are three ways in which behavior can be conceptualized, each of which opens to different kinds of research questions.

Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge. I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria drawn from a pool of (...) cognitive or theoretical values, such as simplicity or generality, to bolster judgements about the worth of models, theories, and hypotheses. What is the status of such criteria? Larry Laudan, in Science and Values, argued that cognitive values could not be treated as self-validating, beyond justification, but are embedded in a three-way reticulational system containing theories, methods, and aims or values, which are involved in mutually supportive relationships (Laudan, 1984). My interest in this paper is not the purportedly self-validating nature of cognitive values, but their cognitive nature. Although Laudan rejects the idea that what he calls cognitive values are exempt from rational criticism and disagreement, he does seem to think that the reticulational system he identifies is independent of non-cognitive considerations. It is this cognitive/non-cognitive distinction that I wish to query in this paper. Let me begin by summarizing those of my own views about inquiry in which this worry about the distinction arises. (shrink)

Traits like simplicity and explanatory power have traditionally been treated as values internal to the sciences, constitutive rather than contextual. As such they are cognitive virtues. This essay contrasts a traditional set of such virtues with a set of alternative virtues drawn from feminist writings about the sciences. In certain theoretical contexts, the only reasons for preferring a traditional or an alternative virtue are socio-political. This undermines the notion that the traditional virtues can be considered purely cognitive.

Continuous poleward motion of microtubules in metazoan mitotic spindles has been fascinating generations of cell biologists over the last several decades. In human cells, this so‐called poleward flux was recently shown to be driven by the coordinated action of four mitotic kinesins. The sliding activities of kinesin‐5/EG5 and kinesin‐12/KIF15 are sequentially supported by kinesin‐7/CENP‐E at kinetochores and kinesin‐4/KIF4A on chromosome arms, with the individual contributions peaking during prometaphase and metaphase, respectively. Although recent data elucidate the molecular mechanism underlying this cellular (...) phenomenon, the functional roles of microtubule poleward flux during cell division remain largely elusive. Here, we discuss potential contribution of microtubule flux engine to various essential processes at different stages of mitosis. (shrink)

Much work performed under the banner of social epistemology still centers the problems of the individual cognitive agent. AU distinguishes multiple senses of "social," some of which are more social than others, and argues that different senses are at work in various contributions to social epistemology. Drawing on work in history and philosophy of science and addressing the literature on testimony and disagreement in particular, this paper argues for a more thoroughgoing approach in social epistemology.

This paper explores a number of recent proposals regarding "feminist science" and rejects a content-based approach in favor of a process-based approach to characterizing feminist science. Philosophy of science can yield models of scientific reasoning that illuminate the interaction between cultural values and ideology and scientific inquiry. While we can use these models to expose masculine and other forms of bias, we can also use them to defend the introduction of assumptions grounded in feminist political values.

Starting again of thesis that the value appear to us like value in self, transcendental, and value for somebody, this paper enlarging upon idea that the value is object of knowledge but different of any others objects of the reality. The knowledge of value involve a emotional constituent and other rational constituent. Advancing the judgement of value, the feeling of value is essential for detection and to converted the being of value into reality of life and culture. This part of (...) value feeling do not put in danger the unity and eternity of value and it is very important for the knowledge and the intercultural communication in the world. (shrink)

The proposal of anything like a feminist epistemology has, I think, two sources. Feminist scholars have demonstrated how the scientific cards have been stacked against women for centuries. Given that the sciences are taken as the epitome of knowledge and rationality in modern Western societies, the game looks desperate unless some ways of knowing different from those that have validated misogyny and gynephobia can be found. Can we know the world without hating ourselves? This is one of the questions at (...) the core of discussions of feminist epistemology. It has spinoffs, e.g., can we know the world in ways that will permit women as well as men to thrive? Can we know the world without hating any human group? and so on. Now, these questions might be answered in a way that does not require any rethinking of fundamental philosophical issues. Some philosophers might argue that sexism in the sciences from Aristotle to human sociobiology results from a masculinist blinding that impedes the normal workings of the human cognitive apparatus. Unblinded, that apparatus produces real knowledge rather than ideology. Or: that was then, this is now. This somewhat overestimates the progress made in the sciences in the last 20 years, but can be read as a promissory note. (shrink)

El presente artículo hace un recorrido histórico de los procesos lógicos para lograr una formalización rigurosa del lenguaje. Desde sus inicios en Grecia hasta las propuestas contemporáneas de la lógica simbólica o matemática. Se realiza una ubicación general de los avances en las diferentes épocas para luego explicar el proceso de formalización lógico del lenguaje cotidiano a partir de la lógica clásica; luego de ello se postulan algunas limitaciones de la formalización clásica y se procede a explicar el proceso moderno (...) de formalización; en un tercer momento, se hace referencia a la importancia del manejo formal del lenguaje en el análisis del discurso y la validación de teorías cientí cas, valorando el lenguaje formal de la lógica y de la matemática como sistemas para la construcción de la ciencia. La formalización del lenguaje apoya con veracidad los manejos de la argumentación cientí ca y que luego se puede traducir en aplicaciones tecnológicas. El objetivo del artículo es analizar los procesos de formalización del lenguaje a través de un análisis histórico de la lógica, para la determinación de los elementos lógicos que aportan a la formalización del lenguaje y a la construcción de argumentos cientí cos válidos; y, se alcanzará por medio del planteamiento de las preguntas: ¿Qué aportes losó cos constituyen los postulados más relevantes para la evolución del análisis lógico? ¿Cuáles son las limitaciones que presenta la lógica clásica o aristotélica ante la lógica simbólica estructurada por Frege? ¿Cuáles son los aportes a partir de la formalización lógica del lenguaje para el análisis del discurso y la estructuración de la ciencia? (shrink)

If culture is the whole of spirituality (of nation or mankind), philosophy is part of this whole together with the other spiritual values. Philosophy frees itself from thiswhole and, at times, rises over it by concepts. In this way philosophy is itself conscious of culture. Consequently philosophy is autonomous in the system of cultural values with which it has biunivocal relations.Arising out of the signs of one culture (national or regional), philosophy, in its aspirations towards knowledge and truth, expresses the (...) universal. Under the negativist pressure of the present which is prevalent through the utilitarian, philosophy cannot abandon its finality. It remains to catch its time in thoughts, as Hegel has argued. (shrink)

We conducted a thorough investigation of the impact of representativeness on reasoning and metacognitive processes by employing the Linda problem. In congruent versions, the more representative res...

Scientific pluralism is an issue at the forefront of philosophy of science. This landmark work addresses the question, Can pluralism be advanced as a general, philosophical interpretation of science?

The practice of taking hand-written notes in lectures has been rediscovered recently because of several studies on its learning efficacy in the mainstream media. Students are enjoined to ditch their laptops and return to pen and paper. Such arguments presuppose that notes are taken in order to be revisited after the lecture. Learning is seen to happen only after the event. We argue instead that student’s note-taking is an educational practice worthy in itself as a way to relate to the (...) live event of the lecture. We adopt a phenomenological approach inspired by Vilém Flusser’s phenomenology of gestures, which assumes that a gesture like note-taking is always an event of thinking with media in which a certain freedom is expressed. But Flusser’s description of note-taking focusses on the individual note-taker. What about students’ note-taking in a lecture hall as a collective gesture? Nietzsche considered note-taking ‘mechanical,’ as if students were automatons who mindlessly transcribed a verbal flow, while Benjamin considered it an inaesthetic gesture: at best, boring; at worst, ‘painful to watch.’ In contrast, we argue that the educational potentiality of note-taking—or better, note-making—can be grasped only if we account for its mediaticity (as writing that displaces the voice), together with but distinct from its political potentiality as a collective mediality (as a ‘means without end’). Note-taking enables us to see how collective thinking emerges in the lecture, a kind of thinking that belongs neither to the lecturer nor the student, but emerges in the relation of attention established between the lecturer, students and their object of thought. (shrink)