The purpose of the study was twofold: Experiment 1 tested the possibility that the mere recollection of food aroused a state of hunger and that different types of food influenced the state of hunger differently; Experiment 2 tested the possibility that food cues affected altruistic behavior. In Experiment 1, 28 participants reported how hungry they felt before and after their recollection of certain foods. Results suggest that recollection of food increased hunger and that the type of food influenced the degree (...) of hunger = 31.88, p <.001, η2 =.54). In Experiment 2, 63 participants were randomly assigned to one of three recollection conditions: noodles, pudding, and control. Participants in the two conditions described each food in detail; control group participants did not. Participants were then asked how much they would be willing to participate in an ostensible experiment. Results indicate that recollection-induced hunger reduced altruistic behavior = 4.11, p =.021, η2 =.12). Cue reactivity theory and the hierarchy of needs could explain these results. (shrink)

In Book One of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume seems to acknowledge the existence of both internal and external worlds, in which perceptions, objects, and bodies, exist. In particular, Hume seems directly to affirm the existence of extra-mental bodies, when he says at the beginning of the section "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," "We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in theexistence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, whether there be body or (...) not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings" (T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187).1 Furthermore, he thinks that the existence of body must be taken for granted because it is "an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our .. (shrink)

William James criticizes Hume for failing to adhere to the strictly empiricist method when he postulates discrete constituents of experience—which Hume calls perceptions—thereby making our experience a train of disconnected pieces. James argues that the discontinuity of experience in Hume results in part from his failure to recognize the immediate presence of relations in experience.1 Emphasizing a continuity and unity of experience, James thus differentiates his empiricism from Hume's as being radical in the sense that it recognizes relations as 'real' (...) parts of experience just as are things that are experienced to be so related.2 This raises a question concerning the experiential status of relations in Hume: is .. (shrink)

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume seems to use the term "object" to refer to different things in different contexts, including impressions, ideas, perceptions, and bodies. Does he ever use the term "external bodies" to refer to things in the extra-mental world? I argue that what Hume means by external bodies when he affirms their existence is not externally existing, material objects that are somehow presented to the mind or presented in impressions. Rather, the bodies that Hume affirms are, (...) at bottom, no different from perceptions, but they can be distinguished from merely internal perceptions like pain or pleasure in terms of their "different relations, connexions, and durations" (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68). I conclude that in order to be consistent, given the various statements he makes throughout Book One of the Treatise, Hume must reject the philosopher's doctrine of double existence of perceptions and objects and affirm only the existence of perceptions, sometimes conceived as internally existing and mind-dependent and sometimes conceived as existing outside and independent of the mind. (shrink)

William James criticizes Hume for failing to adhere to the strictly empiricist method when he postulates discrete constituents of experience — which Hume calls perceptions — thereby making our experience a train of disconnected pieces. James argues that the discontinuity of experience in Hume results in part from his failure to recognize the immediate presence of relations in experience. Emphasizing a continuity and unity of experience, James thus differentiates his empiricism from Hume's as being radical in the sense that it (...) recognizes relations as ‘real’ parts of experience just as are things that are experienced to be so related. This raises a question concerning the experiential status of relations in Hume: is James correct in accusing Hume of failing to notice the experiential reality of relations? Does Hume deny the experiential reality of relations entirely? Or does Hume downplay the experiential reality of relations and come to take them merely as products of the imagination, hence not ‘real,’ for certain theoretical reasons? (shrink)

In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously retracts his account of personal identity by confessing that it involves a profound problem he cannot solve, which I have elsewhere identified and called the Bundling Problem. Neither of the two possible solutions that Hume himself considers in the Appendix is a viable option for him by his own lights, which might suggest that any successful account of a unified self must go beyond the empirical framework. In this paper, (...) I argue that we can find a strictly empiricist solution to Hume's problem in William James. I attempt to show that James's descriptions of our experience are phenomenologically more detailed and faithful to how experience is undergone from the first-person perspective, which allows him to explain our belief in an identical, unified self solely on empirical grounds. James finds unity and continuity right in the content of the stream of experience itself. A detailed investigation of James's accounts reveals that Hume's fundamental problem does not stem merely from his lack of empirical resources but, more importantly, from his tacit abandonment of the professed empiricist methodology. (shrink)

There are remarkable parallels between Hume and Nagarjuna in their denial of substantiality and independence in objects and their subsequent attitude toward our ordinary world. Acknowledging a deep-rooted human tendency to take objects as independent entities, they both argue that there is nothing intrinsic in those objects that make them unitary and independent, and that those characters are, strictly speaking, merely fictitious, mental constructs. They nonetheless affirm the existence of our ordinary world as real. Although their main purposes of the (...) philosophical inquiry are different (epistemological for Hume, and soteriological for Nagarjuna), their accounts of the nature of our world allow us to accept it in the way we ordinarily believe with the deeper understanding of it. It is only in this world where we think, act, and interact with others that an epistemology grounded in human sentiment and experience (for Hume) or humans liberation (for Nagarjuna) is possible. (shrink)

Uma característica distintiva das sociedades da modernidade tardia é a extensão significativa a qual estas são dependentes do conhecimento para seu funcionamento. Contrário a como o conhecimento era visto nas sociedades pré-modernas, o conhecimento agora tende a ser entendido como informação, isto é, consistindo em representações objetificadas, mercantilizadas, abstratas e descontextualizadas. A superabundância de informação na modernidade tardia torna a sociedade da informação cheia de tentações. Isso nos leva a pensar que o conhecimento como informação é objetivo e existe independentemente (...) dos seres humanos; que tudo pode ser reduzido à informação; e que a geração de quantidades cada vez maiores de informações aumentará a transparência da sociedade e, portanto, levará ao gerenciamento racional de problemas sociais. No entanto, como discutido neste artigo, a sociedade da informação está repleta de paradoxos que a impedem de satisfazer as tentações que cria. Mais informações podem levar a menos compreensão; mais informações podem enfraquecer a confiança; e mais informações podem tornar a sociedade menos racionalmente governável. Essas reivindicações são ilustradas com exemplos do Reino Unido e dos Estados Unidos. (shrink)