Hume on relations: Are they real?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):185-209 (2010)
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Abstract

William James criticizes Hume for failing to adhere to the strictly empiricist method when he postulates discrete constituents of experience—which Hume calls perceptions—thereby making our experience a train of disconnected pieces. James argues that the discontinuity of experience in Hume results in part from his failure to recognize the immediate presence of relations in experience.1 Emphasizing a continuity and unity of experience, James thus differentiates his empiricism from Hume's as being radical in the sense that it recognizes relations as 'real' parts of experience just as are things that are experienced to be so related.2 This raises a question concerning the experiential status of relations in Hume: is ..

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Yumiko Inukai
University of Massachusetts, Boston

Citations of this work

Hume on Distinctions of Reason: A Resemblance-First Interpretation.Taro Okamura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):423-436.
Darwin, Hume, Morgan, and the verae causae of psychology.Hayley Clatterbuck - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 60 (C):1-14.
Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Graham Clay - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10:195-229.
The False Hume in Pragmatism.Catherine Kemp - 2020 - The Pluralist 15 (2):1-24.

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