The chromocenter of Drosophila polytene chromosomes, which consists of two major chromatin types, has long been a troublesome region in molecular terms. The recent microcloning of part of this region, the isolation of a monoclonal antibody to a beta‐heterochromatin binding protein, and new in situ studies now shed a little more light on this chromosomal region.

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

Le présent volume rassemble des études consacrées à la philosophie contemporaine. Cette philosophie est née comme réaction et réponse aux positivismes et aux scientismes, mais également aux mises en question du Système et de l'Universel par Nietzsche. Dans l'aire anglo-américaine, elle est surtout représentée par la pensée du Procès, dans l'aire 'continentale' par la Phénoménologie. Elle re-pense à nouveaux frais des thèmes pérennes de la métaphysique comme le temps et l'espace, le bien et le mal, l'individu, l'amour, Dieu. Les auteurs (...) dont traitent les textes de ce recueil ont été souvent en rapport, au moins conceptuel, les uns avec les autres, mais certains d'entre eux sont isolés, paraissent comme des météorites. A. Whitehead, H. Bergson, M. Heidegger, G. Marcel, L. Gondos-Grünhut, H. Arendt, S. Weil, M. Merleau-Ponty, J.-L. Marion sont des penseurs originaux, profonds, même si tous ne sont pas bien connus ou reconnus. L'historiographie philosophique peut ne pas leur attribuer une importance égale, mais précisément, ce volume n'a pas l'ambition de présenter même une ébauche d'histoire de la philosophie contemporaine. Il se veut et il n'est effectivement qu'un ensemble d'éclats, il ne dévoile qu'un paysage de lumières non-coordonnées entre elles. (shrink)

A partition $\{C_i\}_{i\in I}$ of a Boolean algebra $\cS$ in a probability measure space $(\cS,p)$ is called a Reichenbachian common cause system for the correlated pair $A,B$ of events in $\cS$ if any two elements in the partition behave like a Reichenbachian common cause and its complement, the cardinality of the index set $I$ is called the size of the common cause system. It is shown that given any correlation in $(\cS,p)$, and given any finite size $n>2$, the probability space (...) $(\cS,p)$ can be embedded into a larger probability space in such a manner that the larger space contains a Reichenbachian common cause system of size $n$ for the correlation. It also is shown that every totally ordered subset in the partially ordered set of all partitions of \cS$ contains only one Reichenbachian common cause system. Some open problems concerning Reichenbachian common cause systems are formulated. (shrink)

A partition $\{C_i\}_{i\in I}$ of a Boolean algebra Ω in a probability measure space (Ω, p) is called a Reichenbachian common cause system for the correlation between a pair A,B of events in Ω if any two elements in the partition behave like a Reichenbachian common cause and its complement; the cardinality of the index set I is called the size of the common cause system. It is shown that given any non-strict correlation in (Ω, p), and given any finite (...) natural number n > 2, the probability space (Ω,p) can be embedded into a larger probability space in such a manner that the larger space contains a Reichenbachian common cause system of size n for the correlation. (shrink)

The problem of relation between statistical mechanics (SM) and classical mechanics (CM), especially the question whether SM can be founded on CM, has been a subject of controversies since the rise of classical statistical mechanics (CSM) at the end of 19th century. The first views rejecting explicitly the possibility of laying the foundations of CSM in CM were triggered by the "Wiederkehr-" and "Umkehreinwand" arguments. These arguments played an important role in the debate about Boltzmann's original H-theorem and led to (...) the so called statistical H-theorem proposed by Boltzmann himself. (For the history of these early debates we refer to Brush's monograph (Brush 1976).) After CSM had been brought to "canonical form" by the Ehrenfests, (Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest 1959) the physicists turned away from the foundational problem leaving it to mathematicians to worry about in the form of what has become called the ergodic theory. In retrospect, the physicists' general mood seems to have been the hope that ergodic theory establishes rigorously what is needed to found CSM on CM and which had been expressed essentially by Boltzmann already (Wightman 1985). However, very few physicists followed closely the developments in the mathematical theory of dynamic systems. One of those who did was the Russian physicist N.S. Krylov. (For a brief description of Krylov's personal life we refer to the papers in (Krylov 1979).). (shrink)

Miklos Vetö | Résumé : La philosophie occidentale, depuis ses origines helléniques jusqu’aux grands systèmes postcartésiens, n’a jamais su donner sa place au particulier, au singulier. L’intelligibilité du singulier ne pouvait être exposée en concept qu’à partir de la réhabilitation du temps et de l’image par la philosophie critique. Kant présente le singulier à travers le grand philosophème esthétique du Génie. Chez Hegel le singulier se trouve « déduit » dans la Philosophie du droit à travers la figure du (...) Prince. Et le second Schelling rapatrie quasiment la notion en philosophie théologique avec la monstration de Dieu qui affirme sa personnalité dans l’abandon kénotique de son propre être en faveur de l’être du Monde. |: Western metaphysics, from its Greek origins till the great post-Cartesian systems, has never been able to do justice to the particular, the singular. The intelligibility of the singular could be conceptualized only through the rehabilitation of time and image in the Critical philosophy. It is in the great esthetical philosopheme of Genius that the singular appears in Kant. Hegel “deduces” it in his Philosophy of Law in the guise of the Prince. And the second Schelling brings the notion back into philosophical theology via the manifestation of God affirming his personality by renouncing his own being in favour of the being of the world. (shrink)

Gabriel Marcel a été l'un des plus grands penseurs du XXe siècle. Antérieurement et parallèlement à la Phénoménologie, il a élaboré une philosophie concrète où il traite avec une grande rigueur conceptuelle des notions que la métaphysique de l'Occident n'a pas su ou voulu thématiser. Opposant être et avoir, problème et mystère, dénonçant les erreurs et les travers de l'objectivation, il pense et repense, grâce à une seconde réflexion, la philosophie morale aussi bien que l'univers de l'intersubjectivité. Il soumet à (...) un nouvel éclairage la fidélité, la trahison, le don. Il analyse avec profondeur la famille, le mariage, la paternité. Contre l'arrière-fond des totalitarismes de son temps, il énonce inlassablement la pertinence et la validité des vertus de l'individu. Penseur chrétien, il présente des méditations d'une nouveauté inentamée sur la foi, sur l'immortalité, sur Dieu comme le Toi absolu. Dans les quatre décennies qui ont suivi sa disparition, la grande figure de Gabriel Marcel a subi une éclipse, voire un quasi-oubli. Or tout récemment, cette pensée riche et profonde recommence à attirer. Après l'édition d'une partie de sa correspondance, la parution des actes d'un colloque et d'un important recueil d'études sur sa philosophie, le livre de Miklos Vetö se veut une introduction systématique aux thèmes majeurs de ce socratisme chrétien. (shrink)

Contrairement à la plupart des grands philosophes modernes, Merleau-Ponty s’intéresse davantage à l’espace qu’au temps. Au lieu de l’espace géométrique, euclidien, ce phénoménologue étudie l’espace subjectif, fondé et déterminé par le corps propre. Le spatial n’est guère une catégorie quantitative, il est fonction de la perception, il possède un véritable système d’intentionnalité propre qui se déploie dans et par une eidétique des dimensions et des directions. L’eidos spatial central est la profondeur, entrevue à partir de la notion du volumineux.Unlike most (...) modern philosophers, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical interest is centered around space, not time. Strongly criticising the traditional concept of abstract, geometrical space, this great phenomenologist is studying « subjective space », grounded and determined by the person’s own body. Spatiality is by no means a quantative category, it is based upon perception, it does have a system of intentionality of its own, unfolding through an eidetics of directions and dimensions. The principal spatial eidos is depth, best understood via the notion of ‘voluminous’. (shrink)

La pensée de Bergson est une philosophie de la durée. Or la durée n’est pas un flux, un devenir sans borne. Elle a une structure propre dont les moments essentiels sont le passé et le présent. A travers la comparaison de la perception et du souvenir, passé et présent apparaissent comme distincts selon la nature, non seulement selon le degré. Ce sont des catégories eidétiques sui generis, des formes générales dont la vérité ne se réduit pas à leur place dans (...) la succession. Elles exposent la facture essentiellement temporelle de cette philosophie de l’hétérogénéité qu’est le bergsonisme. (shrink)

La question de la fondation n’a cessé de hanter la métaphysique. Elle a reçu trois formulations majeures dans l’Idéalisme Allemand. Chez Kant la subjectivité a priori est montrée comme la base de la validité de la connaissance humaine. Dans la spéculation hégélienne, les notions mêmes de substrat ou fondement cèdent le pas à l’unité de la forme et de la matière, de l’historique et du conceptuel, c’est-à-dire à la transparence du réel tout entier. Finalement, chez Schelling l’idée de Dieu est (...) repensée pour réunir l’intelligibilité de l’essence et la factualité de l’existence. (shrink)

Dans l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale ce n'est que Kant qui parvient, en la dissociant des phénomènes de la nature, à donner à la liberté un statut métaphysique autonome. Or Malebranche anticipe Kant. Il distingue la volonté qui vient de Dieu de la liberté qui surgit de l'homme. La volonté est une force de quantité déterminée, la liberté est un rien qui n'ajoute rien à cette forme mais en détermine le mouvement. La liberté n'est rien car elle n'est pas elle-même (...) une force, par conséquent, elle permet de fonder une réflexion morale autonome. Kant by separating freedom from the phenomena of nature endows it with an autonomous metaphysical status. Malebranche anticipates Kant. He distinguishes the will which comes from God and freedom which is from man. The will is a force of a given quantity, freedom is a nothing which does not increase or decrease this force but only determines its movement. Freedom is a nothing since it is not a force itself, thus it makes possible an autonomous moral philosophy. (shrink)

Le Pere Xavier Tilliette est l'un des plus grands historiens contemporains de la philosophie. Il est l'auteur d'une monumentale etude en deux volumes sur Schelling... qui il avait d'ailleurs consacre plusieurs autres ouvrages. Il a egalement ecrit d'excellents livres sur d'autres grandes figures de la philosophie occidentale notamment Fichte, Merleau-Ponty, Lequier. Il est aussi et surtout le representant le plus connu d'un genre unique de la philosophie de la religion, celui qui traite des grands themes de la theologie chretienne selon (...) leurs dimensions proprement philosophiques. Rappelons simplement plusieurs travaux tres novateurs sur le Christ et la philosophie, mais aussi sur la philosophie et l'Eglise ou encore la philosophie et l'Eucharistie. Toutefois, Xavier Tilliette n'est pas seulement philosophe, il est aussi un grand erudit de l'histoire litteraire francaise, notamment de l'oeuvre de Paul Claudel. Apres deux Festschrift anterieures parues respectivement en Allemagne et en Italie, ce troisieme recueil publie en l'honneur du Pere Tilliette est edite en Belgique. Il contient trente contributions, plus de la moitie consacrees... l'histoire de la philosophie, avec un nombre eleve de textes sur Schelling. Les autres etudes, tres variees, tres originales, relevent de la philosophie de la religion, de la theologie philosophique et de l'histoire de la litterature. Ces travaux dont les auteurs, en provenance de huit pays et de trois continents, vont de jeunes erudits... peine trentenaires jusqu'aux contemporains de l'illustre jesuite, sont rediges en Francais, en Italien, en Allemand et en Anglais. Ils manifestent et illustrent la fecondite de l'oeuvre de ce disciple fervent des Peres de Lubac et Danielou, son rayonnement extraordinaire, les richesses multivalentes de ses deux-mille publications. (shrink)

Although it is known that reachability in undirected finite graphs can be expressed by an existential monadic second-order sentence, our main result is that this is not the case for directed finite graphs (even in the presence of certain "built-in" relations, such as the successor relation). The proof makes use of Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games, along with probabilistic arguments. However, we show that for directed finite graphs with degree at most k, reachability is expressible by an existential monadic second-order sentence.

Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as “Ought Implies Can”. Arguably, this principle reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they claimed to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgements, (...) obligations persist irrespective of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be war- ranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all. (shrink)

Rorty on Politics, Culture, and Philosophy: A Defence of his Romanticism Rorty's historicist romanticism is a peculiar and oft criticized feature of his neopragmatism. I attempt to show that it should be regarded not so much as a more or less exceptionable philosophical approach, but rather, as a practice in ‘cultural politics’—which is his ultimate definition for philosophy—prompted by his acute political concerns and his views on the nature of moral progress.

This paper argues for a reappraisal of extant scholarship on delegation in the domain of financial regulation. Through an examination of Japan's experience with financial regulation between 1992 and 2003, it is demonstrated that crisis-induced institutional development entails a shift toward a more flexible, trustee-type bureaucratic structure. While the logic presented in this paper is far from a universally applicable theory of institutional change, it calls into question the relevance of more conventional approaches to the origins of delegation of authority, (...) notably the approach that uses unified and divided government as a key variable. A renewed emphasis on the role of extra-political sources of transfers of authority inside the executive, and also between the legislature and the executive, therefore, is in order. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically analyze Andrea Sangiovanni’s approach to international justice in the EU that he labels Reciprocity-based Internationalism (RBI). I aim to show that the type of reciprocity RBI operates with is not a morally attractive ground for distributive justice because it cannot cope with the case of member states’ inability to reciprocate the production of collective goods at the EU level. I illustrate this with the case of disability. I contrast RBI’s understanding of reciprocity with Christie Hartley’s (...) ‘relationship model’. I argue that the relationship model of reciprocity should characterize the EU, whose two core normative features are fraternity and equal status. The advantage of the relationship model is that it calls for a stronger type of solidarity than RBI does. That not only entails the willingness to support those worse-off members that cannot productively reciprocate other member states’ efforts at the EU level but also calls for a higher redistribution rate within the EU. In the paper, I make three comparisons between RBI’s ‘productive reciprocity’ and the relationship model. The first concerns non-EU-integration-related disadvantages; the second concerns membership cases, such as accession to federations and supranational unions, while the third comparison examines EU-integration-related disadvantages. I argue that the relationship model is a better alternative to RBI in both integration-related and non-integration-related disadvantages. Also, the relationship model can justify accession cases where previous historical ties are relevant, which are outside of the purview of RBI. (shrink)

Cognitive control is a set of mechanisms that help us process conflicting stimuli and maintain goal-relevant behaviour. According to the Affective Signalling Hypothesis, conflicting stimuli are aversive and thus elicit (negative) affect, moreover – to avoid aversive signals – affective and cognitive systems work together by increasing control and thus, drive conflict adaptation. Several studies have found that affective stimuli can indeed modulate conflict adaptation, however, there is currently no evidence that phasic affective states not triggered by conflict also trigger (...) improved cognitive control. To investigate this possibility, we intermixed trials of a conflict task and trials involving the passive viewing of emotional words. We tested whether affective states induced by affective words in a given trial trigger improved cognitive control in a subsequent conflict trial. Applying Bayesian analysis, the results of four experiments supported the lack of adaptation to aversive signals, both in terms of valence and arousal. These results suggest that phasic affective states by themselves are not sufficient to elicit an increase in control. (shrink)

The Common Cause Principle, stating that correlations are either consequences of a direct causal link between the correlated events or are due to a common cause, is assessed from the perspective of its viability and it is argued that at present we do not have strictly empirical evidence that could be interpreted as disconfirming the principle. In particular it is not known whether spacelike correlations predicted by quantum field theory can be explained by properly localized common causes, and EPR correlations (...) are known to be unexplainable only by common causes that are required to satisfy conditions that are empirically not tested. (shrink)

Moti Mizrahi provides experimental evidence according to which subjects judge that a person ought to ? even when she cannot ?. He takes his results to constitute a falsification of the alleged intuitiveness of the ‘Ought Implies Can’ principle. We point out that in the light of the fact that (a) ‘ought’ is multiply ambiguous, that (b) only a restricted set of readings of ‘ought’ will be relevant to the principle, and that (c) he did not instruct his subjects appropriately (...) – or otherwise ensure that in their ‘ought’ judgements they applied the relevant concept(s) – Mizrahi’s conclusions appear premature. We suggest two ways in which the experimental design could be adjusted or supplemented. First, Mizrahi could instruct (or prime) subjects to read the ‘ought’ question in a particular way. Second, he could complement his experiment by asking follow-up questions aimed at uncovering the implications for blame of subjects’ judgements. Once these adjustments are applied, an experiment with a similar outcome would be more significant. (shrink)

This chapter describes how philosophical theorizing about justice can be connected with empirical research in the social sciences. We begin by drawing on some received distinctions between ideal and non-ideal approaches to theorizing justice along several different dimensions, showing how non-ideal approaches are needed to address normative aspects of real-world problems and to provide practical guidance. We argue that there are advantages to a transitional approach to justice focusing on manifest injustices, including the fact that it enables us to set (...) aside some reasonable disagreements about justice. The ‘bottom-up’ approach we advocate, for which we borrow Wolff’s term ‘real-world political philosophy’, is an empirically-informed normative analysis that attends to specific, identifiable injustices, and thus is partial, though not isolationist. We illustrate our approach by considering how different models of the nature of disability suggest different kinds of remedy for injustices faced by persons living with disabilities. We reflect on the nature and significance of vulnerabilities, and we assess the role of public opinion in normative theorizing, suggesting a particular significance for the opinions and experiences of marginalized groups. We finally reflect on the relevance of European legal and institutional frameworks for theorizing justice in Europe. (shrink)

In 2009, Scott S. Reuben was convicted of fabricating data, which lead to 25 of his publications being retracted. Although it is clear that the perpetuation of retracted articles negatively effects the appraisal of evidence, the extent to which retracted literature is cited had not previously been investigated. In this study, to better understand the perpetuation of discredited research, we examine the number of citations of Reuben’s articles within 5 years of their retraction. Citations of Reuben’s retracted articles were assessed (...) using the Web of Science Core Collection. All citing articles were screened to discriminate between articles in which Reuben’s work was quoted as retracted, and articles in which his data was wrongly cited without any note of the retraction status. Twenty of Reuben’s publications had been cited 274 times between 2009 and 1024. In 2014, 45 % of the retracted articles had been cited at least once. In only 25.8 % of citing articles was it clearly stated that Reuben’s work had been retracted. Annual citations decreased from 108 in 2009 to 18 in 2014; however, the percentage of publications correctly indicating the retraction status also declined. The percentage of citations in top-25 %-journals, as well as the percentage of citations in journals from Reuben’s research area, declined sharply after 2009. Our data show that even 5 years after their retraction, nearly half of Reuben’s articles are still being quoted and the retraction status is correctly mentioned in only one quarter of the citations. (shrink)

Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental fictionalism. In the second part, we present the various versions of fictionalism and their main sources of motivation.We do this because in the third part we argue that mental fictionalism, as opposed to other versions of fictionalism, is a highly undermotivated theory.

In diesem Aufsatz erläutere ich Leibniz' Versuche, seinen Infinitesimalkalkül zu rechtfertigen. Die Untersuchung zielt ab auf ein klareres Verständnis, wie tief Leibniz die Begriffe, Ziele und Methoden im Hinblick auf das fragliche Problem faßte. Mein Überblick ist in zwei Teile gegliedert. Der erste stellt die Definition und den Gebrauch einiger Leibnizscher Begriffe dar, die bei der Rechtfertigung des Calculus eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Im zweiten skizziere ich, auf welche Weise Leibniz die Infinitesimalrechnung zu rechtfertigen versuchte.

This article shows that we can identify a subset of religious and cultural accommodation cases that follow the structure of a particular disability model: the Human Variation Model. According to this model, disadvantageous disability arises because most social arrangements are tailored to the needs of individuals with typical characteristics; people with atypical features are frequently left out from these arrangements. Hence, the latter need personalised resources tailored to them, or their social and/or material environment ought to change according to their (...) atypical characteristics. I argue, however, that not everyone's claim stemming from an atypical characteristic merits accommodation – it would be simply unreasonable to provide personalised resources to everyone or modify the environment to accommodate everyone's needs. In other words, these human variation claimants must be ‘reasonably accommodated’. Nevertheless, members of certain social groups have a justifiable claim to receive such accommodation and those in religious and cultural groups could be among them for two specific sociological reasons. (shrink)

Three classes are introduced which are closely related to the class included in the title. It is proven that the class obtained from by replacing axiom C4 by the commutativity of single substitutions can be considered as the abstract class in the Resek–Thompson theorem, thus it is representable by set algebras. Then the class is defined and it is shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for neat embeddability of an algebra in CAα into is the validity of the merry-go-round (...) properties. Finally, the class is introduced which class is a counterpart of among the polyadic like algebras. (shrink)