A convenience sample of 171 students answered a questionnaire indicating their religious orientations and the frequency and intensity of their flow experiences . Flow experiences are similar to athletes' experiences of "being in the zone." Intrinsics live by their religion, and Intrinsic religiosity was associated with fewer flow experiences in everyday activities.Extrinsics want the benefits of belonging. Extrinsic religiosity correlated with less intense flow experiences, and these experiences were more frequent during public religious gatherings than private prayer or meditation.

A convenience sample of 171 students answered a questionnaire indicating their religious orientations and the frequency and intensity of their flow experiences . Flow experiences are similar to athletes' experiences of "being in the zone." Intrinsics live by their religion, and Intrinsic religiosity was associated with fewer flow experiences in everyday activities.Extrinsics want the benefits of belonging. Extrinsic religiosity correlated with less intense flow experiences, and these experiences were more frequent during public religious gatherings than private prayer or meditation.

To explore religious orientations, 163 Christians answered the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation and Quest Scales. Cluster analysis showed that Extrinsic Item 2 did not fit in the two- or three-cluster model. One cluster of the two-cluster and one of the three-cluster models were exactly the same and reflected intrinsic, personal religion. The remaining clusters showed why a correlation is found between the Extrinsic and Quest scales and suggest refinements of the scales.

List of contributors; Acknowledgments; Introduction Robert S. Westman and David C. Lindberg; 1. Conceptions of the scientific revolution from Bacon to Butterfield: a preliminary sketch David C. Lindberg; 2. Conceptions of science in the scientific revolution Ernan McMullin; 3. Metaphysics and the new science Gary Hatfield; 4. Proof, portics, and patronage: Copernicus’s preface to De revolutionibus Robert S. Westman; 5. A reappraisal of the role of the universities in the scientific revolution John Gascoigne; 6. Natural magic, hermetism, and (...) occultism in early modern science Brian P. Copenhaver; 7. Natural history and the emblematic world view William B. Ashworth, Jr.; 8. From the secrets of nature to public knowledge William Eamon; 9. Chemistry in the scientific revolution: problems of language and communication Jan V. Golinski; 10. The new philosophy and medicine in seventeenth-century England Harold J. Cook; 11. Science and heterodoxy: an early modern problem reconsidered Michael Hunter; 12. Infinitesimals and transcendent relations: the mathematics of motion in the late seventeenth century Michael S. Mahoney; 13. The case of mechanics: one revolution or many? Alan Gabbey; Index. (shrink)

In separate reviews of The Copernican Question published in the Summer 2012 issue of this journal, Noel Swerdlow and John Heilbron find little that meets their approval while failing to provide readers with a full and accurate summary of the book’s major claims and arguments.* The reviewers engage in an exercise in deconstructive surgery, essentially breaking down and reconstituting the work into separate studies. Swerdlow, who devotes most of his twenty-five page treatment to chapter 3 (with brief side-glances at the (...) introduction, chapters 1, 8, and 11), leaves the impression that my book is almost entirely about Copernicus. Heilbron, who confines himself mostly to what I have to say about Galileo, identifies a .. (shrink)

In setting forth a new theory of the growth of scientific knowledge, Larry Laudan shows that any account of scientific change has consequences for the relationship between the history, philosophy and sociology of science. It is a laudable feature of his work that he does not treat any of these disciplines as undifferentiated monoliths. In fact, one of his main goals is to show that his account of progress requires specific ways of doing and relating these three disciplines. As an (...) historian invited to speak at the Philosophy of Science Association, it seemed appropriate for me to appraise the function of history of science in Laudan’s program. Without going into unnecessary detail, let me begin by examining some of his main claims.The focus of Laudan’s argument is on science construed as a form of problem-solving activity and on progress and rationality as appraisals of problem-solving capabilities. (shrink)

Considerable historiographical controversy surrounds the question of why and how Copernicus decided to overturn the prevailing Earth-centered representation of the heavens. This essay summarizes some key elements of an explanation first laid out in The Copernican Question: Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order (2011) and subsequently expanded with further evidence in Copernicus and the Astrologers (2016). Copernicus’s defining problem situation is to be found in his involvement in a culture of astrological prognostication during his student days in Bologna (1496–1500). Just before (...) Copernicus’s arrival in the fall of 1496, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s attack on the foundations of astrology appeared from a prominent Bologna publisher. This publisher also produced several of the prognostications authored by Domenico Maria di Novara, in whose house Copernicus lodged. Among Pico’s many charges was a claim that astrologers do not agree on the order of the planets. Although the word “astrology” appears only once in Copernicus’s extant writings, it is certain that he was aware of Pico’s account of the astrologers’ disagreements on the matter of planetary order. The Copernican Question sets forth an inference about how and why Copernicus turned to heliocentrism that claims to be not only plausible but also the likeliest to correspond to what actually happened. (shrink)

Duhem regarded the history of physical science as carrying a twofold lesson for the practicing physicist. First, history revealed the slow, groping, yet continuous development of physical theory toward a true description of the relations among natural entities. Second, history also unmasked false explanations and metaphysical beliefs that might seduce the unwary scientist into following an unfruitful line of research. This paper brings forth the central images underlying Duhem's historiographical project and uses the papers by S. Menn and W. A. (...) Wallace to ask what Duhem's enterprise actually meant in practice. I argue that the main question is the following: What is to count as the proper space of historical meaning and explanation? Strong Duhemians, such as S. Menn, purchase the longue durée at the cost of making historical agents into completely passive transmitters of conceptual homologies; weak Duhemians, such as W. A. Wallace, shorten the temporal distance between agents and permit thereby a modicum of conflict and negotiation within physical theory while still seeking to preserve long-term conceptual genealogies. Both positions, it is argued, allow insufficient room for actors' categories to determine the space of cultural analysis. (shrink)

In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of temptation in (...) the way that he claims, because the second-order intention is as equally susceptible to temptation as the first-order intention alone would be. I appeal to independently compelling principles – principles that Holton should accept, because they help fill an important explanatory gap in his account – to demonstrate why this objection succeeds. This argument both shows us where Holton’s view goes wrong and points us to the kind of solu-tion we need. In conclusion, I sketch an alternative account of resolutions as a first-order intention paired with a second-order desire. I argue that my account is not susceptible to the same objection because a temptation that cannot be blocked by an intention can be blocked by a desire. (shrink)

Throughout his writings Kelsen ignores, rejects, or misrepresents the most fundamental ideas of Kantian critical idealism and uses Kantian language imprecisely. Consequently, to start an examination of Kelsen's basic norm, as Raz does, with references to Kelsen's use of a Kantian “conceptual framework” or “intellectual tools” does not clarify the issue. Raz sees a double function in Kelsen's basic norm i.e., its function in explaining the identity and unity of a legal order and its functions in establishing the normativity thereof. (...) I contend that the basic norm performs a single function which bears on the identity and unity of an order; but that it altogether fails to establish “normativity” as understood by Raz. Kelsen's account of legal normativity, I contend, is purely technical-juristic; there is no “justified normativity” in Kelsen as Raz claims. Other aspects of Kelsen's theory examined by Raz and considered here are: (1) the possibility of a refusal to pre-suppose the basic norm; (2) the need, alleged by Kelsen at one stage of his work, to see an order as “a meaningful whole”; (3) the inadmissibility, likewise alleged by him at one stage, of conflicting norms. (shrink)

Three Imperial Mathematicians: Kepler Trapped between Tycho Brahe and Ursus. By Edward Rosen.

I answer two questions: (1) what are people doing when they exchange conventional wedding vows? and (2) under what circumstances are these things morally and rationally permissible to do? I propose that wedding pledges are public proclamations that are simultaneously both private vows and interpersonal promises, and that they are often subject to uncertainty. I argue that the permissibility of uncertain wedding promises depends on whether the uncertainty stems from doubts about one’s own internal weakness of will and susceptibility to (...) temptation or from the expectation that external circumstances might change. I then explain why uncertainty is a prima facie challenge for unconditional wedding vows, and I offer a solution: rational wedding vows are unconditional in their content but implicitly conditional in their structure; the spouse pledges to act in certain ways unconditionally, so long as they remain in the spousal role. I respond to objections to my view (including Elizabeth Brake’s claim that the permissibility of unilateral divorce undermines an understanding of wedding vows as promises), and conclude with some suggestions about what marrying couples should do to ensure permissible pledges. (shrink)

In response to three papers about sex and disability published in this journal, I offer a critique of existing arguments and a suggestion about how the debate should be reframed going forward. Jacob M. Appel argues that disabled individuals have a right to sex and should receive a special exemption to the general prohibition of prostitution. Ezio Di Nucci and Frej Klem Thomsen separately argue contra Appel that an appeal to sex rights cannot justify such an exemption. I argue that (...) Appel’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Di Nucci and Thomsen propose, as they have missed the most pressing objection to Appel’s argument: Appel falsely presumes that we never have good reasons to restrict someone’s sexual liberty rights. More importantly, there is a major flaw in the way that all three authors frame their positive accounts. They focus on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion, when these categories should be pulled apart: some are sexually excluded who are not disabled, while some who are disabled are not sexually excluded. I conclude that it would be less socially harmful and more productive to focus directly on sexual exclusion per se rather than on disability as a proxy for sexual exclusion. (shrink)

I outline four conditions on permissible promise-making: the promise must be for a morally permissible end, must not be deceptive, must be in good faith, and must involve a realistic assessment of oneself. I then address whether promises that you are uncertain you can keep can meet these four criteria, with a focus on campaign promises as an illustrative example. I argue that uncertain promises can meet the first two criteria, but that whether they can meet the second two depends (...) on the source of the promisor's uncertainty. External uncertainty stemming from outside factors is unproblematic, but internal uncertainty stemming from the promisor's doubts about her own strength leads to promises that are in bad faith or unrealistic. I conclude that campaign promises are often subject to internal uncertainty and are therefore morally impermissible to make, all else being equal. (shrink)

I explore the debate about whether consequentialist theories can adequately accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation. I outline a straightforward act consequentialist account grounded in the value of satisfying expectations, and raise and assess three objections to this account: that it counterintuitively predicts that certain promises should be broken when commonsense morality insists that they should be kept, that the account is circular, and Michael Cholbi’s argument that this account problematically implies that promise-making is frequently obligatory. I then discuss (...) alternative act consequentialist accounts, including Philip Pettit’s suggestion that promise-keeping is an intrinsic good and Michael Smith’s agent-relative account. I outline Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialist account of promissory obligation and raise a challenge for it. I conclude that appeals to intuitions about cases will not settle the dispute, and that consequentialists and their critics must instead engage in substantive debate about the nature and stringency of promissory obligation. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's, book The Copernican Revolution deserves to be regarded as the best of that small group of longue duree histories that mark postwar historiography of science. In many respects, it is probably the single most influential one. Tightly written and brilliantly argued, it is responsible, together with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for the continued popularity of the metaphor of revolution in science among scholars and students alike. Yet, surprisingly, while aspects of the story conceived in Kuhn's original account (...) have been debated, researched, and considerably revised, his overall understanding of a scientific revolution initiated by Copernicus has received no detailed scrutiny. The same may be said of the deployment of Copernican episode in Structure. Finally, a critical appreciation is in order not least because Kuhn's story is so compact and his language at times metaphorical. (shrink)

I aim to understand how the act of becoming an organ donor impacts whether it is permissible for a family veto to override an individual’s wish to donate. I argue that a Consent Model does not capture the right understanding of donor autonomy. I then assess a Gift Model and a Promise Model, arguing that both fail to capture important data about the ability to revoke one’s donor status. I then propose a Promise Acceptance Model, which construes becoming an organ (...) donor as accepting a promise the state makes to you to use your organs. This model, which implies that family vetoes are impermissible, captures the data other models struggle to accommodate. (shrink)

Corporations are increasingly forced to widen their agendas to include social and environmental concerns, or corporate social responsibility (CSR). This development has been recorded in the current academic debate, and the views regarding its implications for business, the state, and civil society diverge. However, there is agreement within the CSR and corporate governance literatures that there is a lack of thorough empirical studies of these effects. Based on a case study of the multinational wind energy company Suzlon Energy's CSR projects (...) in rural India, this article contends that CSR projects implemented through cross‐sector partnerships can help to build the capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs). Although the risk of corporate steering of the civil society agenda is reduced when CSR prioritizes community needs over business imperatives, CSOs tend to bear the highest costs in partnerships, through credibility losses and insecurity concerning project terms and funding, reinforcing the importance of critical cooperation and complementary core competencies in cross‐sector partnerships. The results have implications for the strategies of corporations, CSOs, and governments as well as for the planning of national and international development aid. (shrink)

We address the problem of observables in generally invariant spacetime theories such as Einstein’s general relativity. Using the refined notion of an event as a “point-coincidence” between scalar fields that completely characterise a spacetime model, we propose a generalisation of the relational local observables that does not require the existence of four everywhere invertible scalar fields. The collection of all point-coincidences forms in generic situations a four-dimensional manifold, that is naturally identified with the physical spacetime.

Children’s school journeys have changed vastly during recent decades: More children are being driven to school in private cars instead of walking and cycling, with many who are entitled to a free school bus service still being driven. Earlier research into travel mode choice has often investigated how urban form impacts upon mode choice regarding school journeys – in particular how urban form hinders or enables the use of the active mode. This paper quantitatively explores parents’ stated reasons for choosing (...) the car and the relationship between these reasons and the decision to use the car to take their children to school. We additionally investigate the relationship between sociodemographic factors, distance, and both the stated reasons and the actual mode decision. A sample of 245 parents (194 women) of school children aged 10-15 in the County of Värmland in Sweden were included in the study. The results of PLS-SEM show that the factor Social convenience has a direct relationship with the frequency of car use indicating that the wish to accompany the child and the convenience of car impacts on car choice. If the child is not allowed to travel independently, the parents choose the car to take him/her to school. Sociodemographic factors had a direct relationship with the stated reasons, whereby parents with a higher level of education valued safety/security less. Quite surprisingly, distance (i.e. environmental factor) did not affect car use, indicating that parents drive their children to school regardless of distance. By isolating the particular reasons for choosing the car, this paper focuses on a potentially important missing piece as regards finding out what motivates the increasing car usage in children’s school journeys. An increased knowledge of what motivates the decision to take children by car is important for effective policies aimed at changing parents’ inclination towards choosing the car. (shrink)

Even in the Netherlands, where the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD) has been legalized for over 20 years, there is no such thing as a ‘right to die’. Especially patients with extraordinary requests, such as a wish for PAD based on psychiatric suffering, advanced dementia, or (a limited number of) multiple geriatric syndromes, encounter barriers in access to PAD. In this paper, we discuss whether these barriers can be justified in the context of the Dutch situation where PAD is legally (...) permitted for those who suffer unbearably and hopelessly as a result of medical conditions. Furthermore, we explore whether there are options to address some of the barriers or their consequences, both within the Dutch legal framework or by adjusting the legal framework, and whether these options are feasible. We conclude that although there are insufficient arguments to overrule the doctor’s freedom of conscience in the Netherlands, there are ways to address some of the barriers, mainly by offering support to doctors that would be willing to support a request. Moreover, we believe it is morally required to reduce or mitigate where possible the negative consequences of the barriers for patients, such as the long waiting time for those who suffer from psychiatric disorders, because it is unlikely the adjustments suggested to the system will ensure reasonable access for these patient groups. (shrink)