_Early Modern Women and the Problem of Evil_ examines the concept of theodicy—the attempt to reconcile divine perfection with the existence of evil—through the lens of early modern female scholars. This timely volume knits together the perennial problem of defining evil with current scholarly interest in women’s roles in the evolution of religious philosophy. Accessible for those without a background in philosophy or theology, Jill Graper Hernandez’s text will be of interest to upper-level undergraduates as well as graduate students and (...) researchers. (shrink)

Bernard Williams’ integrity objection poses a significant challenge to utilitarianism, which has largely been answered by utilitarians. This paper recasts the integrity objection to show that utilitarian agents could be committed to producing the overall best states of affairs and yet not positively act to bring them about. I introduce the ‘Moral Pinch Hitter’ – someone who performs actions at the bequest of another agent – to demonstrate that utilitarianism cannot distinguish between cases in which an agent maximizes utility by (...) positively acting in response to her duty, and cases in which an agent fails morally by relying upon someone else to perform the obligatory act. The inability to distinguish among these cases establishes a new, reloaded integrity objection to utilitarianism: utilitarianism cannot explain why it would be wrong to have someone else make difficult moral decisions, and to act on those decisions, for me. (shrink)

This paper argues that, although Margaret Cavendish’s main philosophical contributions are not in philosophy of religion, she makes a case for a defense of God, in spite of the worst sorts of harms being present in the world. Her arguments about those harms actually presage those of contemporary feminist ethicists, which positions Cavendish’s scholarship in a unique position: it makes a positive theodical contribution, by relying on evils that contemporary atheists think are the best evidence against the existence of God. (...) To demonstrate that Cavendish’s work should be considered as early modern feminist theodicy, this paper will briefly introduce the contemporary feminist worry about theodicy as a project, show that Cavendish shares the contemporary feminist view about situated evil, and argue that her theodicy aims for agreement about how to eradicate great moral evils while preserving free will—and so, carves out a space for future female philosophers of religion who aim to be agents of healing in the face of such evil. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Exaltation views’ of humility are grounded on a kenotic view of humility, such that divine blessing comes proportionate to the extent to which an agent humbles herself. This article rejects exaltation views of humility which define humility kenotically, justify their arguments from a divine hiddenness perspective, and which conclude that divine concurrence with evil is justified as long as all humble believers eventually are exalted and blessed. Rather, I will contend that exaltation views misunderstand the meaning of both ‘humility’ and (...) ‘exaltation,’ even from their own Christian standpoint. I ultimately offer an alternate response to the problem of evil based on an existentially grounded conception of ‘humility’, which provides for a transmuted turn away from individual kenotic acts and toward community to transform those who suffer from atrocities. (shrink)

This chapter is unique for several reasons. First, it brings together two unlikely authors, a PhD ethicist and her 15‐year‐old high‐school daughter, whose diverse interests include thinking about depictions of female characters in graphic novels. Second, it compares two unlikely DC female characters, Wonder Woman (the Amazonian princess heroine who protects innocent citizens from evil) and Harley Quinn (the ever‐evolving anti‐hero who vacillates between being an outright villain to being merely window dressing for her boyfriend, the Joker). The conclusion of (...) the chapter is unlikely, too: neither Wonder Woman nor Harley Quinn can ultimately succeed in their roles as moral hero and immoral anti‐hero when their popularity depends upon them being depicted as sexual objects. The chapter uses Aristotle's ethics to show that it isn't Wonder Woman's virtue that is thwarted, but her phronesis. Harley's antiheroism is similarly in jeopardy, since phronesis helps any person set and meet goals. (shrink)

This chapter contends that Phillis Wheatley, African-American slave-turned-poet, can and should be read as a philosopher of religion. Her work, collectively, takes up the problem of evil and demonstrates a commitment to moral improvement in the face of suffering, and knowledge of divine benevolence and care for all people. As early modern philosophy, her work presents courageous arguments about the equality of those on the margins of moral considerability, as well as criticisms of the system of oppression that led to (...) her being enslaved. Although humanities scholars generally debate whether Wheatley does enough to speak out against slavery, for philosophers, Wheatley’s poetry should motivate new work on narrative theodicy. (shrink)

This chapter explores Marcel’s relationship with German idealism, the impact idealism had on his existentialism, his philosophical evolution beyond idealist conceptions of objectivity and consciousness, and his own move towards the authentic “ethical self,” whose goal is a reciprocal, intersubjective relationship with others who are freely seeking the inner meaning of experience. It will argue that the authentic self is fundamentally personal because it is embodied, non-objective, and creates opportunities for others to existentially flourish. The continuing progress of the ethical, (...) authentic self in a world that threatens it establishes Marcel’s existentialism as way to flourish in the midst of absurdity, and so establishes it as more than a mere reaction to German idealism. (shrink)

That an act can have moral worth even if the end of the action is not realized seems asymmetrical with Kant’s dual notion that acts cannot have moral worth if the maxim for action is impermissible. Recent scholarship contends that fixing the asymmetry will allow impermissible acts done from a morally worthy motive to have moral worth. I argue against the asymmetry thesis and contend that Kant cannot consistently maintain a class of impermissible, morally worthy action and the view that (...) right acts respect the dignity of humanity. (shrink)

This paper maps out Marcel’s conception of evil onto his fundamental distinction between problem and mystery, shows that the distinction creates two effective methodologies for dealing with evil in the world, draws the antinomy of evil based on these methodologies, and then demonstrates that the antinomy can be dissolved through an existentially engaged, communal encounter with evil and hope. The antinomy between the problem of evil and the mystery of evil is not one to be solved, then, but is one (...) to be dissolved through an encounter with hope. Evil cannot be wholly eradicated when it lacks the objective features of a problem. Evil cannot be reflected upon as a pure mystery, when it produces wholly concrete experiences of suffering. Dissolving the antinomy facilitates Marcel’s vision of transforming the encounter of evil through a love that brings a feeling of hope – for all, regardless of existential or theistic commitment. Hope can act as a “springboard” to existential meaning, wherein the community resides at the very heart of mystery. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Dark Brew: Traditional Existentialism and Community Coffee and Otherness: Community and Coffee Coffee, Community, and Hope.

This paper responds to a recent challenge posed to Claudia Card’s atrocity paradigm by “transmuted goods,” or, goods which positively transmute victims of atrocity in ways which are difficult for the paradigm to explain. Whereas the legacy of Card’s atrocity paradigm will surely be its demand that we hold others culpable for allowing and perpetuating systems of harm which threaten our ability to flourish, this paper suggests a way for the paradigm to incorporate transmuted goods in a manner that strengthens (...) the paradigm’s overall goal of holding people responsible for perpetuating atrocious harms. To that end, I will articulate the systematicity and transmutativity conditions of an “atrocity,” will demonstrate how “transmuted goods” can threaten the transmutativity condition of an atrocity, and will conclude by suggesting a potential integration of transmuted goods into the atrocity paradigm to salvage the transmutativity condition for the paradigm. (shrink)