The investigation of concept of “true” and “false” has long privileged in contemporary philosophy apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences or propositions). To which entities, though, beyond dicta, the predicate ‘true’ pertains? This paper sheds a light on the less frequently investigated cases where we speak of a truth of things, or res. We say, for instance, that a 17 euros banknote is not a true banknote, or that a true soldier ought to be brave. The paper, (...) thus, distinguishes, beside the concept of de dicto (apophantic) truth, the concept of de re truth and two of its subspecies: eidological truth and idiological truth. (shrink)

Abstract.The starting point of deontic logic is the distinction between non‐normative necessity and normative necessity. The first part of the paper shows that the distinction between normative necessity and non‐normative necessity occurs already in Aristotle's Orgunon. The second part of the paper makes a further distinction within normative deon itself: The distinction between deontic deon and anankastic deon. Anankastic deon behaves differently from deontic deon in a very important respect: Deontic indifference has no anankastic counterpart.

Pragmatic Ambiguity: The Thetic Function of Modality The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of ambiguity present in deontic sentences, which may have three pragmatic functions: a prescriptive or a descriptive or a constitutive function. This type of ambiguity is investigated on the lexical, phrasal, and sentential level. The discussion focuses on the deontic constructions of the German verb sollen and the English shall as they are used in legal texts. It also includes (...) comments on the thetic function of the Latin imperative mood and the subjunctive mood. (shrink)

This essay deals with the concept of negation in Deontics. In relation with this concept, the polish logician Jerzy Sztykgold seems to put forward these two thesis: a) a norm may have a negation; b) a norm may be a negation. Sztykgold studies the concept of Inegation of a norm through the analysis of other two concepts of a right or of a duty and the concept of opposition of behaviour), and, as early as 1936, he puts hirnself in a (...) clear position in relation to the problem of the possibility of a logic of norms: There is a deontic analogonof truth, which is the słuszność consequently, for the norms, entities of which the słuszność is predicated, are valid the thesis of the propositional logic that are valid for the apophantic sentences. (shrink)